

# Louis R. Anemone



## Oral History Interview with Louis R. Anemone

*Interviewed by Jeffrey A. Kroessler & Larry L. Sullivan  
on January 12, 2012*

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
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Justice in New York: An Oral History

No. 14



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### Preface

President Jeremy Travis initiated Justice in New York: An Oral History in 2006. Based in the Lloyd Sealy Library, the project was made possible through a generous grant from Jules B. Kroll, President of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Foundation. The goal was to interview criminal justice leaders – district attorneys, police commissioners and members of the department, elected officials, defense attorneys, and advocates, individuals concerned with the workings of the system.

Each interview is recorded on cassette tapes and/or a digital recorder. The original is deposited in Special Collections in the library. Each transcript is bound and the volume is cataloged and placed on the shelves. A digital copy is available through the library's web site, as are selected audio clips from the interviews (<http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/>).

Oral history is a problematic endeavor. The interview is only as good as the questions asked and the willingness of the interview subject to be open and honest. Some remain guarded, others become expansive. Sometimes memory fails, and details, names and dates are confused. Some individuals have their own set story, and an oral history will add little that is new or especially insightful. Other individuals use the interview as an opportunity to sum up a career; on occasion that means gliding over unpleasant or difficult details. Our purpose was to allow each individual to tell his or her story. In each case, the final transcript has been approved by the interview subject.

Even with those caveats, what emerges from these interviews is more than a collection of personal reminiscences. The interviews shed light on controversies and policy decisions of a particular historical moment. At times, the interviews verge on the philosophical, as with discussion of capital punishment, race relations, or the decriminalization of controlled substances. Always, the interviews contribute to our understanding of the many facets of the criminal justice system – law enforcement, prosecution, incarceration, prisoner re-entry, and electoral politics – and reveal how New York has changed over the decades, as have social and cultural attitudes.

Justice in New York: An Oral History stretches across more than half a century, from the 1950s to the 2010s. Those years saw an unprecedented rise in social unrest and violent crime in the city, and then an equally dramatic drop in crime and disorder. If the interviews have an overarching theme, it is how the city – the police, courts, elected officials, and advocates – addressed and, yes, overcame those challenges. These men and women were actors in that drama, and their narratives stand on their own. The truth or mendacity of the story is for the reader to assess.

Chief Librarian Larry E. Sullivan guided this project from the start and participated in several interviews. Interim Chief Librarian Bonnie Nelson oversaw the creation of a new website for Criminal Justice in New York, a portal for the oral histories, trial transcripts, images and documents from Special Collections, and other resources. Special Collections librarian Ellen Belcher, cataloging librarian Marlene Kandel, and emerging technologies librarian Robin Davis contributed to the success of this project.

Jeffrey A. Kroessler  
2014

## Louis R. Anemone

## Chronology

1946	Born
1965	Joined NYPD
1980s	Captain, Manhattan North Narcotics
1987	Captain, commanding officer 32 <sup>nd</sup> Precinct
January 1989	Received a B.A. in Liberal Studies from Regent's College via distance learning; he started at Brooklyn College in 1963.
January-June 1990	Commander of the 34 <sup>th</sup> Precinct in Washington Heights
June 1990	Promoted to Inspector and named Commanding Officer of the 9 <sup>th</sup> Division
August 19, 1991	Crown Heights riots began, lasting four nights.
1992	Deputy Chief, responsible for devising NYPD response to civil disobedience; prepared "Disorder Control Guidelines."
1993	Defendant in a sexual harassment suit brought by Officer Marissa Perhaes Wise for an incident that occurred when Anemone commanded the 34 <sup>th</sup> Precinct. She claimed he warned her not to file a sexual harassment complaint. The City settled out of court with Wise in January 1997, agreeing to pay \$149,000.
November 1993	Following Crown Heights riots, named director of disorder control training; NYPD issues new manual, Disorder Control Guidelines.
1993	Received a Masters in Humanities from California State University at Dominguez Hills through distance learning.
1994	Appointed Chief of Patrol by Commissioner Bratton
April 1994	First Compstat meetings, co-chaired with Jack Maple.

Bratton: "If people can't adjust, we're basically going to move them out of that assignment. I want competition. If you can't do the job for a variety of reasons, there's someone in line to take your place."

Anemone: “I don’t want any captain, lieutenant or sergeant to think that dealing with drinking beer in the streets in the summer is beneath them; that this is the N’Y.P.D. and we’ve got more important things to do. We’ve got to work from the bottom up.”

- 1994 NYPD program to address truancy and return children to school; criticism that police are picking up youths with valid reasons to be out of school.
- July 28, 1994 FBI intelligence suggested a terrorist attack on NYC targets; Anemone mobilized forces to protect likely targets (Temple Emanuel, Israeli Mission to UN, etc.)
- August 1994 Crackdown on street racing in Queens, Staten Island, Bronx as part of quality of life campaign.
- 1994 Expands security zone program around schools to combat low level street crime and vandalism.
- November 1994 Officers ordered to use seatbelts in patrol cars
- January 9, 1995 Named Chief of Department, highest ranking uniformed officer.
- February 10, 1995 Deputy Commissioner Walter S. Mack, the first civilian commander of the Internal Affairs Bureau, was dismissed. He had proposed measures to weed out officers who lied in court, assaulted suspects, or took drugs and money from dealers and claimed that senior NYPD officials (Anemone and Timoney) had blocked his efforts. “I’m sure they resisted me. They certainly were not fans. But I never thought they would assassinate me.”
- March 1, 1995 The 16 precincts in the Queens command were split into North and South (as in Manhattan and Brooklyn). Chief Gertrude LaForgia commanded Queens North, and Chief Robert F. Burke commanded Queens South.
- August 3, 1995 Patrolling a five-floor walk-up at 548 West 163<sup>rd</sup> Street in Washington Heights at about 6 p.m., Police Officer Frank Rivera encountered Carlos Arro Santos Ortega exiting a fourth floor apartment. Santos fled back into the apartment and barricaded the door with a steel brace, then jumped from a window – unfortunately not the window leading to the fire escape – and fell to the ground. A witness immediately accused the officer of pushing the young man out of the window. Anemone was soon on the scene and stated, “He fell by nobody’s effort but his own,”

noting that the door was barricaded from the inside and the window to the fire escape was still locked. The situation was quickly diffused, unlike the Kiko Garcia incident three years before. The next day, Police Commissioner Bratton defended the officer: “You try to go in one of those buildings by yourself, walking six flights of stairs in a building known for drug traffickers. Let’s get real.” In the previous 18 months, 28 people had been arrested there on drug charges.

- 1995 Leads Anti-Terrorism Task Force, joint operation of NYPD and FBI.
- 1995 At Anemone’s suggestion, the NYPD acquired the USS Labrador, a torpedo recovery vessel. Renamed Launch 681, it was stationed under the Triborough Bridge on Randall’s Island, ready to move officers to parts of the city not accessible by bridges. It was used as a command post during the recovery of TWA 800, which exploded off Long Island in 1996.
- January 1996 New detective unit with city-wide jurisdiction, the Cold Case and Apprehension Squad, a brainchild of Jack Maple, formed under authority of Anemone, not Chief of Detectives Charles Reuther.
- March 1996 Accompanied Mayor Giuliani to Israel.
- 1996 Cleared of corruption allegations by IAB.
- March 4, 1996 Reassigned the Riot Control Unit from Chief of Patrol Wilbur Chapman to his own control.
- March 20, 1996 A week after Officer Kevin Gillespie was shot dead in the Bronx, Anemone relieved Inspector John Clancey of his post as third ranking officer in the Bronx; the next day the Bronx Borough Commander, Assistant Chief Rafael Piniero, was relieved of command.
- March 24, 1996 Mayor Giuliani announced that Commissioner Bratton was resigning; Anemone considered possible successor; Howard Safir appointed. First Deputy Commissioner John Timoney forced to resign after criticizing Giuliani and his choice. Jack Maple left when Bratton did.
- July 3, 1996 Removed Charles G. Reuther as Chief of Detectives and replaced him with Patrick E. Kelleher, head of I.A.B.

- July 4, 1996 NYPD floods Ozone Park neighborhood around John Gotti's Bergin Hunt and Fish Club to stop his annual block party and [illegal] fireworks display.
- March 1997 NYPD shifted to hollow-point bullets for 9-millimeter weapons
- August 9, 1997 Precinct house assault on Abner Louima.  
Anemone: "the most distressing act of brutality and/or corruption that I think I have ever seen."
- June 7, 1999 Office of Emergency Management Command Center opened on the 23<sup>rd</sup> Floor of 7 World Trade Center, over the objections of the NYPD, who argued that the site was vulnerable and, given the presence of several federal agencies, a likely target.
- June 10, 1999 Retired from NYPD.  
John Timoney: "There are very few people who are actually irreplaceable. Lou Anemone is one of them."  
Anonymous retired NYPD official: "He ruled by fear, which is not always the best way."
- Sept. 2001 Governor Pataki named Anemone Deputy Director of state's new domestic security agency.
- December 2001 Appointed Security Director, Metropolitan Transit Authority
- May 9, 2003 Dismissed by MTA after accusing officials of impeding a corruption inquiry, together with top aide, Nicholas Casale (at the time, the MTA had been in discussion with the United States Army to utilize advanced military technology to improve security in the system; the talks ended with Anemone's departure). They had referred \$100 million worth of tainted contracts to the District Attorney's office. After an electrical contractor admitted fraud soon after, Anemone said, "We await the indictment of the M.T.A. officials responsible, because it takes two to tango in that business."
- March 24, 2005 Sued MTA in federal court for wrongful dismissal; on May 2, 2008, the U.S. District Court ruled against Anemone and granted the defendants' motions for a summary judgment, dismissing Anemone's claim that he had been terminated for exercising his First Amendment rights in speaking to the *Times* about corruption at the MTA; the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on January 4, 2011.
- 2014 Consultant to returning Police Commissioner Bill Bratton.

## Louis Anemone

January 12, 2012

LS The first question I have is whether the Pinocchio story is true. [Laughter]

JK You know, Larry, I was going to work my way, in an hour and three quarters.

LS I really had to know.

Anemone It's absolutely true.

LS Good. Can you tell us a little bit about it.

JK I thought you were going to ask him, "Do you believe drugs should be decriminalized?"

Anemone Well, I don't remember the exact year, but I know Bratton was still the commissioner, so it might have been '95. Tony Simonetti, Tosano Simonetti, was the borough commander in Staten Island at the time. He was the borough commander for Staten Island. I believe this is when this happened. We had had a number of Compstat meetings, which started in April of '94, so this is certainly '95, maybe even early '95. It was our, and I say "our," Jack Maple and I thought that Simonetti wasn't always 100% truthful at the meetings. We told the commanders that we were holding them accountable, if you can remember; that honesty was absolutely crucial in the process of compiling statistics, in discussing your actions or inactions; that crime going up was not a sin; not caring about it, or lying about it, or using the pencil or the pen and the eraser rather than innovative police tactics to reduce crime, was a sin. Jack felt that Simonetti could, and we had this conversation, was lying to us at the meetings. What the specific topic was at the time, I don't know, but it might have been as to what he was doing in regards as a borough commander to address, or to help, some of these precinct people. Jack spoke to John Yohe on my staff. John is a very bright sergeant. He developed a computer program for Compstat, after discussions with Jack, and a little guidance from me, and he had a great idea. When Simonetti was up at the podium, doing his speech, if Jack or I gave him the sign that he was lying, on the screen behind him, instead of the map of Staten Island, or Brooklyn South, or whatever it might have been, you would see Pinocchio, and the nose kept growing as he went on. He didn't see it; it was behind him. It was kind of unfair, but it happened. It's not one of my most endearing memories. It's certainly something that, if I had it to do over again, I probably wouldn't have. But he was rightly incensed.

LS Well, when did he learn that this was going on?

Anemone During the meeting. He turned around, or people had started giggling, and looking. So he went to Bratton, and shortly thereafter Jack and I were in front of Bratton's

desk, apologizing. He gave us a good going-over. We said it wouldn't happen again. It never did happen again. The only other time I think this came up was, at the time, I think George Kelling may have been in attendance at the meeting, and I think Bratton mentioned the fact that Kelling now might use that in a book, and it wouldn't reflect very well on Jack or myself. I think it was mentioned.

LS Also Eli Silverman [Professor of Law and Police Science, John Jay College] wrote a on Compstat.

Anemone Oh, yes. He wasn't there. He may have mentioned it, but he wasn't a witness to it.

LS I don't know if Kelling mentioned it; he may have.

JK But the story certainly has obtained legendary status. Did he have to be restrained?

Anemone No, no, no. That was someone else, a couple years later.

LS Okay. I've got my answer. But I had to hear that from the horse's mouth.

JK Now that we're in the middle of this, could you identify yourself?

Anemone Yes. I'm Louis Anemone.

JK And were you born a police officer?

Anemone No, I was not. I was born in 1946. My father, and his father, and his brothers worked for the City Department of Sanitation.

JK Where were you born?

Anemone In Brooklyn. Brooklyn, New York. Coney Island Hospital.

JK Everyone was born in Brooklyn. So the question is, you come from a family that was used to municipal employment, but the question is, how did you choose the police department, and what pushed you in that direction.

Anemone Well, we didn't have a lot of money. We lived in the projects, the Marlboro Projects. I guess we moved there in 1958. I was the oldest of five children. My father switched from Sanitation to the Correction Department, which necessitated a cut in pay. He had to start as a rookie correction officer, and work his way up. We were living in the projects. I spoke to my grandfather and my father about what I was going to do. I was a high-school graduate in 1963. I was doing part-time catering, waiting at a catering hall in Jackson Heights, Queens. My grandfather told me, "Try to get a civil-service job. There's good protection there." I followed his advice. My father used to read *The Chief*, a

civil-service newspaper. He saw a notice about an exam for police trainee. I filed for the exam, I took the exam, and I was appointed a police trainee in December '64. I stopped going to college shortly after that, I'd been enrolled at Brooklyn [College], and I made a career at the NYPD.

LS Was that the same class that Kelly was in?

Anemone No. No, he was a police cadet. That pre-dated this program. This program was full-time employment, forty hours a week.

JK So what immediately impressed you, as a twenty-one-year-old?

Anemone Eighteen-year-old.

JK Eighteen. It's unusual. No one in your family had gone to college.

Anemone No, I was the first.

JK And there wasn't any, "No, you're not going this. You're going to stay in college? You're going to be the first accountant in our family," kind of thing?

Anemone We didn't have that discussion at home. I was kind of lost in college. I joined a fraternity at Brooklyn College, and it was a lot of foolishness, good times, and not much studying. So a full-time job, I think, was what I needed at that time, a little discipline in my life. It helped.

JK And what did it mean to be a police trainee? Was that like the academy?

Anemone Well, I went through the academy, the same way the police officers did, everything but the firearms training. So I graduated in April of 1965, from the Police Academy, along with a class of police officers. They went immediately to patrol throughout the city, in their gray uniforms. I went in my police-trainee uniform, to 400 Broome Street, where I was assigned to the Information Unit. And because I was a cut-up during the Academy, I was placed on the around-the-clock shift. So I did a week of days, a week of 4:00 to 12:00, a week of midnights, answering the phones, providing officers in the field information on registrations for stolen vehicles. I did that for a year. Then I was transferred to the 14<sup>th</sup> Precinct, the castle on West 30<sup>th</sup> Street, where I worked in what we used to call the 124 room, taking citizen complaints, or handwritten reports from police officers, crime reports, or aided reports; typing them, giving them numbers, typing reports for the plainclothesmen. That's where I learned that you got \$2.00 for typing a report for every gambling arrest they made. I was nineteen then, nineteen-and-a-half or twenty.

JK Is that a lot of responsibility for a nineteen-year-old?

Anemone Well, yes and no. I don't think, we were only 100 trainees. This was at the very, very top of the list. Just about everybody was a great student, a little bit above average in intelligence. I was able to do it, but I don't know of anyone in that class that dropped out. There was a former police commissioner's son in that class, as well, another Michael Murphy, son of the Commissioner, Michael Murphy. So I learned an awful lot about the police department, the good, the bad, but I also learned about the operations; what happened, what was behind the scenes, at a young age.

JK It almost sounds like it's a better process to have a kid, a trainee, working behind the scenes in the precinct, learning the procedures that way, rather than, "Congratulations. You've finished the Academy. Here's your gun. There's Nineteenth Street."

Anemone Exactly. Exactly. Every one of us, if you stayed a year or more, you were guaranteed a transfer. So I saw a little bit of the administrative side, the Information Unit, and I was assigned to what was then the busiest precinct in the City of New York, the 14<sup>th</sup> Precinct. So we learned an awful lot there.

JK On the West Side of Manhattan.

Anemone West 30<sup>th</sup> Street, between Sixth and Seventh. It covered 34<sup>th</sup> Street, Macy's; the old Penn Station was still in existence then; 42<sup>nd</sup> Street. We had half of 42<sup>nd</sup> Street.

JK Forty-second Street would be a busy place When you say busy, I'm assuming it's street crime, prostitution.

Anemone You had gambling, you had prostitution. The crimes mostly were pickpockets, the lost properties, and burglaries. We had the garment center, the fur industry.

JK The garment center!

Anemone Yes. On a Monday morning, they would have me come in early. I worked, generally, 10:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. But on Mondays they had me come in at 8:00, because the weekend burglary reports would be this high, and needed to be typed.

JK Were these free-lancers or organized-crime operations?

Anemone A little bit of both. And every so often you'd find a report regarding someone who was found dead in an airshaft, and the assumption was that it was during an attempted burglary.

JK When you say gambling: during the 1950 Harry Gross scandal that brought down a lot of people, even into the Knapp Commission, gambling was the prime motivator for corrupting police officers. I'm just wondering if you can explain what you saw, what kind

of gambling we're talking about. As a kid, you're watching this. You knew that people placed bets and the like, but this is something new.

Anemone Well, the new part of it was the fact that there was money going around. So this is 1966. From March of '66 until I turned twenty-one, in March in '67, I was at the 14<sup>th</sup> Precinct, and they'd come in, the plainclothesmen would come in with someone who was running, generally it was numbers. It was a numbers operation or sports betting. They didn't look, to me, anyway, a twenty-year-old kid, they didn't look like they were Mr. Big. They looked like they may have been runners in the operation, or the guy on the street who goes from store to store, picking up the different bets. The plainclothesman would come in, and the first thing he'd do was he'd see the lieutenant, give him something, then the lieutenant would direct that this report be prepared. The plainclothesman would take the prisoner upstairs, he'd write the report. The first time I asked, "What's this all about?" They'd say, "No, no. That's the way. He gives you \$2.00. If you don't do it," this is another cop telling me. "If I type it, I get the \$2.00. Whoever types the report gets the money."

JK Two dollars is a big deal for a kid in 1966.

Anemone So that was my first introduction to seeing it.

LS Let me ask you a question about reports. The New York Police Department, sometimes has a black hole; what happened to all those reports? I'm still trying to get the bomb squad papers; they were in the 6<sup>th</sup> Precinct in the basement. And I've had a number of letters to Kelly about this. Given the fact that I have to go through the deputy counsel. Actually a sergeant was very interested in saving these, these go back to the anarchists. They're not quite sure what to do with it. But when you talk these reports about gambling and murders and whatever, what happened to them all?

Anemone After a set period of time they're destroyed.

JK These were the years immediately preceding the Knapp Commission.

Anemone Yes.

JK So it's interesting that you started in one kind of NYPD, and very soon you came out the other side in a different kind of NYPD. And gambling, not so much narcotics in 1966-67, I would think; more gambling, in terms of the garden-variety corruption that the Knapp Commission was looking at.

Anemone Well, I didn't see any of the narcotic corruption. Just before I turned twenty-one, one of the lieutenants sent me through the process as a tag-along, with a detective who had made a narcotic arrest. He introduced me to where they get fingerprinted; where they get photographed; what happens in court. I spent a little time talking with them, but when I asked them, "So tell me, what's it really like?" he referred me to the Kirk Douglas movie. Oh, my gosh, the police movie. The name will come to me. He

said, "It's exactly like that." Do you know the movie I'm thinking of? Kirk Douglas was a detective. His wife had an affair. Yeah, yeah. He said, "It's exactly like that." There was a reporter, a photographer based in the squad. He'd only take flattering photos, and only write flattering reports. They trusted him as if he was one of them, he said, "It's exactly like that." I was familiar with the movie. I just can't think of the name of it now. ["Detective Story," 1951] So I went through this whole process with this detective. All I know is, he was always at the head of every line. But I didn't catch on as to why or what, so I think there probably was something going on back then.

LS There's so much money involved. That's why, legalization, because you wouldn't have the violence without the money and the drugs. It's the money.

Anemone My father told me this in 1963-64, every year he said, "They ought to legalize it."

LS I tell my students, you guys realize that alcohol used to be illegal. Where do you think the mob came from in those days? Because there was so much money to be made. It's the same thing here. You have the violence and they take over territories, and they shoot. If they legalized it, at least you could have FDA-approved.

JK I realize that you're far, far down the chain of NYPD knowledge, experience, trust among the more experienced officers, as a young officer. But by the time of the Knapp Commission, you're on the streets. You've had, what, three years in uniform? Three, four years in uniform, when this thing breaks. I'm just wondering, how did that affect you personally, and what changes did you see, pre-Knapp to post-Knapp?

Anemone Well, that's a very involved question, but let me start you off. When I left, as a police officer, I left the 14<sup>th</sup> Precinct, and I went to a week or two of firearms training. Then I went out to Coney Island, the 60<sup>th</sup> Precinct, in blues, not in grays, the way the officers were. I went out as, so except for the newness of everything I was on, I looked for a full-fledged cop, although I was still on probation. They told me in the 14<sup>th</sup> Precinct that they could arrange for any command I wanted to be in, any precinct. "Stay in Manhattan. You don't want to go to Brooklyn." I said, "No, no, no." I was interested in less travel. I didn't want to take the subway to get to work. I didn't have a car at the time. "No, I want to be close to home. Coney Island." I swam in Coney Island. A lot of my family still lived in Coney Island. The projects I grew up in were not far from Coney Island. "I'd like to work down there, because it's enough action to keep you busy." They said, "Yeah, all right. But watch out." Why? They said, "And don't fall into this trap. In Brooklyn, they take traffic money. We don't do that in Manhattan." This was the advice. They brought me my service revolver from that precinct, because they were, like I said, satisfied with my work. But that was the advice they gave me: "Don't take traffic money. They take traffic money in Brooklyn." And when I went to Coney Island, in my blues; I'm not a rookie; I'm not wearing grays, they put around-the-clock, the same way a regular officer would, where the rookies work steady, 6:00 P.M. to 2:00 A.M. So I got to see a little bit of the radio cars; not much. A little bit of foot posts; not much. And an awful lot of booth posts in Manhattan Beach. They had three posts. There was a judge,

Liebowitz, I think his name was, who lived in Manhattan Beach. Lots of rich people lived in Manhattan Beach, and they wanted their cops. They wanted to know where the cops were. They had three "booths;" one at the foot of the Sheepshead Bay bridge; one on Oriental Avenue and West End Avenue; and one at West End Avenue at whatever the other street was. I spent most of the next year in either one of those three booths, or escorting what we used to call psychos down to Kings County Hospital for an evaluation. Then you make your way back. Or sitting with DOAs. At one point, a year and a half, two years in, I just wanted to pack it in. I couldn't take it anymore. Very little police work; a lot of these mind-numbing assignments, day in and day out. Later on, with hindsight, you look back and you say, "They didn't trust me. They didn't want me to see whatever was going on," and this was my steady diet of assignments.

JK And you had no radio.

Anemone Not when I started, no.

JK There was no way for you to contact the department, the precinct, if something is happening and if you need assistance. And there's no way for them to contact you, unless they send a car. "Come on, we've got a big deal over at the high school. We need you immediately."

Anemone Well, twice an hour, from the booth, I had to call in.

LS There was a call box.

Anemone Yes. So from the booth you had to phone, but on the post there were call boxes, at either end of the post. The sergeant in the station house would answer the call. If he had something for you to do, he'd tell you. But you had to make those calls, twice, and he'd indicate, he was able to tell where you were calling from.

JK It's a very different mindset for policing. Because you have a man on that spot. He's doing whatever he's doing there, but it isn't rapid deployment of essential forces.

Anemone Not by any stretch of the imagination. It's not timely, accurate; it was not rapid deployment; there weren't effective; and there was certainly no relentless assessment and follow-up with any of that. Although they had their own little follow-up assistance at the time.

LS I'm going to have to run.

JK Picking up the story of the Lindsay administration, he really tried to make big changes in the police department and the city of New York, and I'm absolutely certain that officers and brass, in the NYPD, were not thrilled with what Lindsay was doing with the city. Did that percolate down to your little booth there, on Sheepshead Bay?

Anemone It certainly did. It percolated down. During this whole time, the PBA was a very, very strong influence, certainly in my life as a young cop. The party line was, "He's anti-cop," although he was building station houses, new station houses, all over the city. Some really nice, and firehouses, also. But he was "anti-cop." Then this whole idea with the Knapp Commission, and the public airing of it in the newspapers, on the television, on the radio. It hurt my morale, and it did a lot of the younger cops. We weren't doing what Bill Phillips was doing, or what they were doing in the SIU [Special Investigative Unit], or any of these other places. But you kind of felt, you're wear your uniform, you're clearly identifiable to the public, and cops weren't held in such high esteem.

JK Did you get comments or guff from the public?

Anemone I don't remember any of that. It was more of an internal feeling; that the public is looking at you, and you're wondering what it is that they're thinking, in light of what was the latest revelation.

JK I was speaking with Mike Armstrong and Dick Condon, they were involved with the Knapp Commission. Armstrong said that he turned to Condon and said, "Oh. How many pads do you think there are?" And without missing a beat he said, "Seventy-six. One for each precinct." And that was it. And he was, "What? Really?" His great analysis of it is, before the Knapp Commission it was the norm to take, to be on-the-take, to be corrupt. After the Knapp Commission, they made it possible for honest cops to be honest; that they made a distinction between the so-called "grass eaters" and "meat eaters." Bill Phillips being the ultimate "meat eater."

Anemone I agree. I certainly agree. It was a lot easier to go about your job after the Knapp Commission, but it was painful to live through it. It was very painful.

JK You saw older cops, who had more challenges than you did.

Anemone Oh, sure. Sure. At Christmas time, there was a list. The sergeants had a list, and they'd go from store, to store, to store, business to business, picking up. They brought it back, and I guess they shared it.

JK John Timoney said that sometimes they just want to give you a cup of coffee, and sometimes it's more trouble to, and he said, "You know, I can't take it. So I end up paying a dollar for a fifty-cent cup of coffee, or whatever it is," because he's on the up-and-up. But sometimes people just want to say thank-you, and the NYPD can't make that distinction.

Anemone I was in that same situation at different times and places. You walk into a place, sit down and have a meal, a lunch, or a dinner, and the owner would go, "No, no, no." Post-Knapp Commission, I always paid. Prior to those Knapp Commission revelations, I was one of the guys who'd get a lunch; get half off a lunch for a sandwich;

get a free cup of coffee, and think nothing of it. Sit for an hour in a diner, making notes, catching up on my summons entries; drink coffee; have a hamburger, and leave \$1.00 tip.

JK It was a comfortable culture, a comfortable existence.

Anemone What they told me in Coney Island early on, one of the old-timers said, "It's a great job, being a policeman. It's a place where you can have all your needs satisfied." "What do you mean?" "You can come to work broke, hungry, and thirsty, and get it all during your shift. Walk home with money in your pocket, a meal under your belt, and a couple of drinks."

JK And after Knapp, that was no longer the norm.

Anemone Oh, no! Oh, no!

JK How did the word come down? Or was it just all the street patrolmen just saying, "Oh, I guess we can't do that anymore." Or did the word come down from above?

Anemone No, it came down from above, and it percolated up from the street. You heard it from the PBA, too.

JK PBA?

Anemone Yeah. That this was going to cause you the loss of your job, the loss of your pension; going to jail in some cases, some of these fellows. So it didn't take a lot. Then you had the media. You had the Commission, everybody beating that drum. Pat Murphy changed a lot of what the cops had to do, or what they used to do.

JK He replaced a lot of the upper echelon of the NYPD, in the wake of Knapp.

Anemone At the time, I wasn't all that aware of it. But later on, looking at it, and reading Eli Silverman's book, among some others, I see that there was a big difference, though, between his change and Bratton's change.

JK Really?

Anemone Oh, my gosh. Yes.

JK Can you go into that?

Anemone They both did the same thing, but Bratton did it right. He let the shirkers, the nay-sayers, etc., go almost immediately. So that when people talk about, "Gee, how were you able to get so much done?" Well, because by 1995, a year into his administration, these people were gone. They were left by the roadside. He immediately replaced three or four of the top chiefs. That got everybody's attention.

JK That would do it.

Anemone Pat Murphy may have changed, fired, reduced more people in rank, but it took him a couple of years to get it done. So there is always that feeling in the department, "Well, I'll outlast this commissioner. They don't last very long. I'm not going to give in." Bratton got everybody's attention.

JK I never thought of that. The assessment of Murphy is that by the end of his tenure, he had replaced ninety-percent, or eighty-percent of the top.

Anemone But not a lot changed.

JK But not a lot changed. Whereas Bratton came in, and within a couple of weeks, thirty days, gone. That would get everyone's attention.

Anemone It sure would.

JK So if we could go through your career. We've established that you were not corrupt as a young trainee, and only took three cups of coffee, that we know of. But you were never satisfied with staying where you were. You had ambition within the NYPD. Not everyone does.

Anemone Right. This is true. Initially, I wanted to be a detective. Unfortunately, I never achieved that rank. I did foot patrol in Coney Island. Foot patrol for the most part, booth patrol, and just prior to my transferring to Washington Heights, I was working in a sector car in Coney Island for a while, with a steady partner.

JK And what were you encountering, just the everyday issues in Coney Island?

Anemone Yes. I guess by the time I left, we had portable radios in the car. That had been like a new idea in 1969. There was a portable radio, as well as the radio in the car. But there still weren't any radios for anyone walking the street. Coney Island, at least during the summer months back then, you still had crowds. We had an influx of police from all over the city, what they called the summer detail. They'd show up just after Easter, and gradually increase it. At Memorial Day you had a full complement. At Labor Day they'd start dwindling down, because we had crowds, enormous crowds. A lot of what we did was to help out in the amusement area; to prevent a riot; to get people quickly off the street. Then it was a poor area, and for the most part the younger cops, people like me, were assigned to the Coney Island end. The older guys were at Brighton Beach and Manhattan Beach.

JK That's a lot quieter there.

Anemone A lot quieter. Certainly back then. You'd get people dying. You'd get people hit by cars. You'd have traffic accidents. I think I made one gun arrest in three years in Coney Island, and it was a World War II vintage German something-or-other.

JK It really is a different world. There were guns out there. But it wasn't a gun culture.

Anemone No, it wasn't.

JK And it wasn't a drug culture.

Anemone There were drugs out there. There was heroin, and marijuana.

JK But it wasn't as out-in-the-open as it became.

Anemone No. In Coney Island, we didn't have any open-air drug markets. When I left, I was there three years. I thought I was a pretty heads-up cop. I couldn't tell you where to go to buy heroin or marijuana, anywhere in the precinct. Later on, in the '70s and '80s, no matter where I worked, I could tell you, "That's the spot. That's the spot." I don't think I got that much smarter. It's just that it became more and more prevalent and obvious.

JK So how did you get transferred out of Brooklyn? And Washington Heights is rather far, by mass transit, from Brooklyn.

Anemone Yes, it is. I bought a house in November of 1969, in Rockland County, the same house I'm in today.

JK You'd gotten married.

Anemone Yes. I got married in May of '68, and by November '69 we purchased a house, and I put in a request for a transfer. The 34<sup>th</sup> Precinct was the closest to Rockland County, right over the George Washington Bridge. I didn't know anything about it, just that it was close, about a thirty-minute ride.

JK That was pretty soon after the NYPD even let you live in Rockland County. For a long time it had been you had to live within the five boroughs, and then maybe Westchester.

Anemone Contiguous counties. Then they changed it, and that's why I was able to do that. So November '69 I put the request in; April of 1970, I got the request approved. So I was commuting to Coney Island from November of '69 to April of '70.

JK So you landed in Washington Heights in April, 1970. Good timing.

Anemone Yes. Nobody would talk to me there. Because now a lot of this is heating up. Corruption allegations. They had an eye on anyone new coming in or going out. It was like being in the 6-0 Precinct all over again, as a rookie. I worked by myself. I worked foot post. There were no booth posts. So I did a little bit of that. I was in a squad

that worked, we worked around the clock. Your first day in, on every shift, we were assigned to Judge [John] Murtagh's protection detail. He was hearing the Black Panther case.

JK Right. His house was bombed.

Anemone Yes. So I got up there after that event, and now we had our sergeant, and the six or seven cops in every squad, your first tour in you spent up there, in the building surrounding his, in front of his house, or in the back yard.

JK It really does suggest how the city was changing; that that trial was going on. And they all got off.

Anemone Yes, yes.

JK That tells you a lot about the city, also. Number one, that this kind of trial is going on; number two that the judge's house is fire-bombed; number three, that ultimately the jury lets them all go. It took them an hour to read all the not-guilty decisions. That's what I mean by good timing; you're arriving at a neighborhood which is in transition from old-world German Jews and Hungarian Jews, those kind of immigrants. They were the mainstay in Washington Heights for generations. Now that is shifting.

Anemone When I was there they were still there. They were west of Broadway. West of Broadway, and on the east of Broadway, and back then we started at 165<sup>th</sup> Street, that was the southern divide, and we end up to the Broadway bridge to the Bronx, from river to river. So west of Broadway, in Washington Heights, would be Jewish. Kissinger, I think, lived west of Broadway, on either Overlook Terrace, or one of those nice little streets up there, Fort Washington Avenue, at the very tip of it, up near the Cloisters. East of Broadway had Irish, up in Inwood, in the Inwood section, and blacks, Dominicans, and Cubans, east of Broadway, down in the Heights area. A nice mix. Not a lot of crime. The 34<sup>th</sup> Precinct had the highest incident of police officers residing within the command.

JK No kidding.

Anemone They used to keep a file, a huge file of cards, of cops that lived in the 34<sup>th</sup> Precinct. Later on, I met people like Timoney and other guys. They all grew up there. I worked with so many of them. They all came from the Heights.

JK The Irish Heights.

Anemone Yes. Or Inwood.

JK Part of that is still intact.

Anemone Yes. It's smaller, I guess, now. What else do we remember from up there? The bars. A lot of Irish drinking bars. The deal there was, the commander at the time

must have heard from somebody in the chain of command, that they were getting complaints about the cops parking and going in to drink, off-duty cops, and they weren't getting summonses. They were double-parking, and triple-parking, at a couple of key places, very popular bars up there.

JK Alcohol was an enormous part of the cop culture.

Anemone Yes, it sure was. We used to talk about the 4:00 to 4:00s, not the 4:00 to 12:00s. After you left work, you'd go out.

JK Every day?

Anemone No. When I was a young kid I liked my beer, but once a week. I couldn't afford more than that. But certainly once a week.

JK And you look at some of the guys who did go out every day a little funny, if they could afford to go. "He's making the same as I am."

Anemone Some of them went to places where they weren't paying.

JK There are two aspects of it, one the camaraderie and the culture of drinking; two, the alcoholism as a serious problem, much more recognized today. In 1970 it's just, "Oh, he's a good drinker." Now it's, "I think he has a problem." Were you aware of this, as a young guy?

Anemone Oh, yes. In Coney Island we had a notorious drunk, working with us. Nobody worked with him as a partner. Nobody *would* work with him. It was at the stage where I guess he had wrecked a couple of cars off-duty. He wasn't allowed to rent cars from either Hertz or Avis because of his driving record. He was never arrested for a DUI, but he came into work loaded. And he wasn't the only one. There was another guy or two who would travel with a flask in the car. As a young kid, you didn't want to be in the car with those guys, work with them.

JK But there was also drinking in the precinct houses.

Anemone I never saw that in the 6-0 and I never saw that in the 3-4. We did it on duty. I can tell you I had a beer on duty on more than one occasion; never in the station house. I never had that kind of access. I was a rookie. I was a young kid. Even when I went to the 3-4, I had more time in the job; I would never presume to bring anything into the station house. That was crazy.

JK So in 1970 you do have the black radicals kicking in.

Anemone Yes.

JK [on targeting of police officers by black radicals] They were one of the most tragic episodes in the history of the city, I think.

Anemone And before that, before I even left Brooklyn, there had been snipings occurring in the 71<sup>st</sup> Precinct, along Empire Boulevard and, oh, what's the other street, big street. In any event, we were aware of that. There was a lot of talk, cops-to-cops, about what was going on. You had Five-Percenter, I thought, were behind some of it. I didn't know about the Black Panthers by that name, but Five-Percenter, blacks, were sniping at cops, in particular the 7-1, and perhaps even the 7-7 Precinct. I don't know if this has come up before, but there was a group that was formed. They called it the Law Enforcement Group. It started in Brooklyn, in Brooklyn North precincts. I went to a meeting or two of the group. They were kind of anti-PBA. They didn't think the PBA was doing enough. They were extremely vocal in their opinions about taking back the streets; using more force; getting these guys who were taking shots at the cops.

JK In other words, this is something above-and-beyond, outside the normal channels of policing.

Anemone Yes.

JK And who would get involved with this?

Anemone They were mostly cops, uniformed cops, and some supervisors. As I indicated, a lot of these members were from the Brooklyn North precincts, where they had active, violent minority representations. There was an incident or two that occurred in a Brooklyn courthouse that I think finally put an end to it. There may have been a mini-riot.

JK There was. There was an arraignment of some Black Panthers, who had either assaulted police officers, or something in there, and a large contingent of off-duty NYPD were confronting the Black Panthers in the courthouse.

Anemone My understanding was that this was this LEG group, kind of a splinter group. It didn't last very long. It just kind of disappeared.

JK But it expresses the frustration of the rank-and-file.

Anemone It certainly did. So now you have, a year later, or maybe a year and a half or two years later, you have the Piagentini and Jones assassinations.

JK Do you get the feeling that the city was abandoning you guys?

Anemone We had the feeling that, certainly, the mayor didn't care. And that the police brass were more concerned with their own agendas than they were with the cops. We didn't see, I don't know if this had some effect on me, and the way I modeled myself later on as a supervisor, but I didn't see anybody above the rank of sergeant on the street,

ever. But they'd show up at the funerals, and they'd go to the ceremonies. So it was us, the sergeants and the cops, and them, headquarters and the rest of the department.

JK Two different departments. Two different agendas. Two different sets of problems.

Anemone And they'd tell you all the time, patrol was the backbone of the department. But you didn't really see that belief.

JK Coming out of that moment, 1969-'70-'71, with the assaults on the police, did you get the feeling that the brass were using tactics from the nineteenth-century, and the situation had changed so completely. Which is why you've got this Law Enforcement Group saying, "We've got to do things differently. This isn't working." And it wasn't working, in any way.

Anemone That's a terrific question. Because I can tell you that we developed our own tactics, without headquarters, without anyone teaching us.

JK And they would have said, "No, you can't do it," if you'd asked them.

Anemone Yeah. So, just little things, that I can relate to now. One of the things that was certainly outside the guidelines, some officers would bring in weapons from home, and work. At the time, we had our 38s, and there was the sense that we were out-gunned, even then, '69-'68-'70-'71-'72. Most of these assassinations or attacks on police, the weapon that was used was some form of a semi-automatic. The department's pushback, to the membership and to the unions, anyway, was that, more often than not, these guns will jam. Your revolver will never jam. It's a simple, mechanical impossibility. You pull the trigger, and the chamber spins.

JK It will not jam, but it will run out of rounds very quickly.

Anemone Certainly. So we had that issue. We were looking for more firepower; we weren't getting it. I worked in what we used to call "flying." I'd leave the 6-0, and they sent me up to the 78<sup>th</sup> Precinct, which was Brooklyn South headquarters. It was, I guess, an Italian versus Spanish dispute, somewhere along Fifth Avenue, in what is now a very fashionable area of Brooklyn, around Carroll Street, etc. The mob was there, and I'm working with two guys from the 78<sup>th</sup> Precinct. I'm the third guy in the car. He tells me, "Watch where you sit in back." "Why is that?" "My shotgun is there." He brought a shotgun in from home. He took it out with him on a couple of the jobs we responded to. They had an officer ambushed in the 78<sup>th</sup> Precinct, in a building, on the stairwell. This guy said it wasn't going to happen to him and his partner. That was an interesting experience. The other thing that we did, guys moved their holster, righty or lefty, when you're in a car, they put it right here. So it would be right there, and you wouldn't get hung up, trying to get a gun out. This is what my thought was. When I entered the department, that was the furthest thing from, I didn't have that concern.

JK I know what I'm like trying to get my cellphone out of my pocket, with a seatbelt on. It's not coming out of my pocket while I'm driving.

Anemone We weren't all wearing seatbelt back then. But even so, it was a fixed holster. Sometimes it would be hard to get it out. Guys changed the locking mechanism, so that now it became really a hazard. Someone could easily take the gun out of your holster, but they felt that they wanted to be able to retrieve it quicker.

JK There was that sense of ominous danger, omnipresent, as you're riding in the cars.

Anemone You'd pull up on a side street, or any street, you'd look both ways and turn, make a right turn. When I asked someone, "What are you doing?" "We're not going to get ambushed at a corner. We're not stopping." This was just something that in the ghetto precincts, this was de facto action. A guy would turn to you, or I would turn to somebody working with me for the first time, "Where are we?" It was a test for the new guys. "What do you mean?" You have to know where you are, because if you have to call for help, you have to be able to say, "I'm on West 33<sup>rd</sup>, between Neptune and Mermaid. Send help. Shots fired." Whatever it is. So there was that. And this was all started by cops talking to each other.

JK I think I know the answer to this, but were there any movements to get these innovations accepted by the top? Or was this just simply what cops did among themselves, and they had no expectation that the brass would approve.

Anemone No. This was something we did, as well as getting a blackjack, or a slapper. Some chose a slapper, or the SAP gloves. These were things that cops did to protect themselves.

JK It did become a dangerous city, from the mid-'60s on.

Anemone And nobody had a better view and a feel for it than a cop on foot, really anywhere in the city. You saw it.

JK That's why I asked, did you have a feeling, '66 to '73 are the Lindsay years. Then '73 to '77, you've got Beame, the fiscal crisis disaster. But did you get the feeling that the city had abandoned the NYPD? That you'd go to take care of it, but they weren't supporting you, and didn't understand what you were facing?

Anemone I know they didn't understand what we were facing. Or, if they did, it wasn't high up on their list of priorities. Our sense, my sense, and I think other cops shared it, was that they would make an effort to placate different minorities at the expense of law enforcement, supporting law enforcement.

JK One of the things that struck me, as a historian, looking at those years, was the number of times when people caught red-handed with shotguns, or dynamite, or god-

knows-whatever-else, are acquitted, and it's either the juries letting them go completely, or the judges.

Anemone      Technicalities.

JK      Letting them go. It's a different kind of criminal-justice mindset in those years. When you arrested someone, did you have an expectation they would be convicted?

Anemone      Well, initially I did. Yes.

JK      Well, when you're a kid, this is the way it works.

Anemone      Initially, I did. And I tried to do everything I could on my end. Good notes; good recall of the facts that occurred. But I saw that there were occasions where the cases didn't flow; or you wouldn't hear any more about a case. You had to draw your own conclusions from that. Either somebody walked; there was going to be no trial. The other aspect of that, though, was this idea of youthful-offender status. I made a few arrests for stolen cars, young kids joyriding. I wasn't looking to see them go to Sing Sing. I had no interest in seeing that happen, either. So you wouldn't object if the DA would say, "Well, we're going to give them youthful offender."

JK      That's a different mindset, also. There seemed to be a judgment of, "Well, this is just stupid, teenage madness," as opposed to career-criminal. Whereas, today, there seems to be more of a zero-tolerance. There's no margin for error here, because if we let this kid go for shoplifting a Snickers bar, he's going to have a gun next week.

Anemone      That probably is an overstatement.

JK      I'd say that was an overstatement.

Anemone      Yes. And over the years, there was always this issue of exercising discretion. Trying to get the message out to the field. Now I'm skipping ahead. When I'm in headquarters, trying to let them understand that although summonses for riding a bicycle on a sidewalk are appropriate in some sections of the city, it's not appropriate all over the city. They had very specific problems on the West Side of Manhattan, in the 20<sup>th</sup> Precinct, or in the 77<sup>th</sup> Precinct in Brooklyn, and the bicycle summons was a way to address two different problems. I had this happen in Forest Hills. A father and his kids, on Saturday morning, they got a summons for being on the sidewalk.

JK      He was teaching his kid to ride, without training wheels.

Anemone      This was not what was intended.

JK      I interviewed the colonel of the New Jersey State Police.

Anemone      Ric Fuentes?

JK Ric Fuentes. He's a career guy, very proud of what he did under the consent decree and everything. I said, it sounds like your troopers have to make discretionary stops. And he said, "Every stop is a discretionary stop." Oh. That understanding, to me, suddenly, that's what policing is. Every stop is a discretionary stop.

Anemone True, isn't it.

JK I had never thought of it in that exact way; that there's no objective set of anything. It's, "This time I'm going to stop you for this. This time I'm taking you in. This time I'm going to go get a cup of coffee."

Anemone Make believe I didn't see.

JK There are lots of variations. If we could get back to your career. You're up in Washington Heights, minding your own business, commuting over the GW Bridge every day. The world is changing around you. When did you decide to become a sergeant?

Anemone I guess I did that while I was still in the 6-0.

JK That's early.

Anemone I was eligible, with two years in the department, to take the sergeant's exam. So in '69 they gave a sergeant's exam. I came in in March of '67. I was eligible to take that test. I really didn't study for it, but my background as a trainee, I had tremendous familiarity with forms, reports, procedures. It was also one of those crazy exams where they wanted to see whether or not you knew the city; questions about the subway, which line? I knew it inside out, having lived in the city and used the subways. I didn't have a lot of seniority on the test. I didn't have many medals at the time, so it took me a while to become a sergeant. But I took that first test, and passed that first test that I was eligible for.

JK And that's good forever.

Anemone Yes. Well, until the list expired. But by '73, I was promoted. June of '73.

JK Seventy-three. You really don't want a twenty-three-year-old sergeant. No offense.

Anemone I was twenty-six.

JK That's still a young guy without a lot of experience. You've been in three precincts, I guess, at that point.

Anemone Let's see. Two.

JK And the trainee.

Anemone All right. But I actually left the 34<sup>th</sup>, and I was in the citywide anti-crime unit. That's where I was when I was promoted.

JK What was the citywide anti-crime unit?

Anemone A new idea, a new tactic, a bolt from the blue. I guess we were, I don't know, 300 or so selected members. Let me back up. While I was in the 34<sup>th</sup> Precinct, one of the senior officers approached me. His partner was retiring; would I work with him? I said, "Well, yeah. How do you know me?" He said, "I saw you come in with a couple of arrests. I liked the way you handled yourself." Okay. So we worked together for a short while. In November of 1970, we'd been working together for a month or two, he tells me there's going to be a new program, plainclothes, precinct-based, plainclothes officers, to fight crime. Street crimes. "Are you interested?" Yes, yes, I'm interested. I still had this idea of one day becoming a detective. So I guess there were maybe four or five precincts that were selected. This was during Pat Murphy's tenure as commissioner. I bless him for this idea. I don't know whose idea it was, but he blessed it.

JK Ideas come along all the time. You have to be smart enough to know which ones to accept, and then to act on, and then implement.

Anemone So it was a pilot project, five precincts in the city. My partner and I were selected to do, he actually campaigned for us to be assigned to do this. So we worked in civilian clothes, and we were out catching purse-snatchers and robbers in the act.

JK It says a lot for the streets of New York that you could just walk around and see this.

Anemone And, this was the first time in history that they were actually using police officers in plainclothes to do anything other than vice and gambling. So this was a whole new idea, we kind of wrote the book on the tactics to be used; and how you catch the guys; and what you should be doing. We weren't really responding, although we did, on occasion, to the radio calls. This was all us, sitting, walking, watching, following, surveilling, and then snatching them up on their way out, or whatever.

JK This is what the public is more concerned about. They're not as concerned about the gambling, or even the prostitution, unless it's street prostitution. But most of the time, that's not what the public will complain about to the precinct. It's what you're out there doing.

Anemone So they went citywide with this. It was such a success that it went citywide with the idea, and by December of '71, they had created this citywide, anti-crime unit. So we all had about a year's experience. They selected the best from the different precincts, and they put us all together, to work with, I guess there were about 200 from precincts, and 100 from the TPF, Tactical Patrol Force. We all worked, now, in civilian

clothes, from Randall's Island, mostly night work, and one day a week you would do a day tour. So three nights, and a day. And from Randall's, you could get to the Bronx, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens, like that. We worked the toughest places, with an eye toward taxicab violence, truck violence, and then just ordinary street crime. We worked all over the city, and learned a lot from working with smart guys.

JK This is the early '70s.

Anemone In December '71. I was there until I was promoted in June of '73. Later on, they changed the name of the unit. They won a federal grant as an exemplary project, and it was called the Street Crime Unit, which name you may be familiar with. Back then, we were CWACS, Citywide Anti-Crime Section. We reported directly to the chief of patrol.

JK This seems to me as though it's a very good tactic, but you're still trying to empty out the Atlantic Ocean with a bucket. Because in those years, it's just getting worse faster than you can innovate.

Anemone Yes. But we knew we were doing God's work. We were really enthusiastic. Again, it was a younger crew, but we had some veteran cops there, as well. Good bosses, who understood the mission.

JK So by the time you become a sergeant, until you're at top-of-the-list promoted, you have some very significant experience. You're no longer green.

Anemone In January of '72, I'm working with my partner and a third officer in the car, down in the 13<sup>th</sup> Precinct, which is down by the Police Academy, from 14<sup>th</sup> Street north. A quiet night. A quiet night, nothing happening. So my partner tells me, "You know what? Why don't you drive down to the 9<sup>th</sup> Precinct?"

JK That's the Lower East Side, East Village.

Anemone From 14<sup>th</sup> Street south, with Alphabet City and all that. He said, "There's more action down there," and they're on the same radio; you can hear all the calls. "All right. Yeah." So we do that, and while we're down there, Foster and Laurie are killed. They make their escape right there on 14<sup>th</sup> Street. So now we went to the scene. The bodies are already gone. They're on their way to the hospital. We worked through the night. We picked up a couple of guys, brought them into the detectives for questioning.

JK That was almost worse than Jones and Piagentini.

Anemone Yes. Young fellas.

JK Vietnam vets, partners in Vietnam, the whole thing. You just think that, and just cold-blooded, with no.

Anemone A day later they sent the entire unit to every airport, every bus terminal, every railroad terminal in the city and in the metropolitan region. My partner and I went to Newark. We had a gate assignment. We still didn't know who did it, but in the event something came up, they wanted people in every location.

JK That's a very tough assignment.

Anemone Yes. St. Patrick's Cathedral, we went to the services.

JK That's what I mean when I say it just kept getting worse over those years.

Anemone Oh, my god, yes. And in between the assassinations, where they killed people. There were officers being shot, ambushed, continually.

JK And then the courts are letting them off quite often.

Anemone Yes.

JK My favorite was the Black Panther caught in an apartment with thirteen sticks of dynamite, rounds of ammunition, shotguns, and it was like, well, she was acquitted because she might have gotten them from a police informant. Like, huh? So what? But, still. So, moving yourself up. Where did you find yourself a sergeant?

Anemone In the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct, Central Harlem. June of '73, and I stayed there until I was promoted to lieutenant in November of '77. I did four years up there. I was there a week when Ralph Stanchi was shot and killed.

JK I don't know that one.

Anemone Just a radio call to a bar opposite Harlem Hospital. He responded. I guess there was a man with a gun in the bar, the Capri Bar. He responded, a couple of other cars responded. He was one of the first ones in, and he's ordering the guy to drop the gun. He's at one end of the bar, the guy's down at the other end of the bar. "Drop the gun. Drop the gun. Drop the gun." The guy finally fired. Nobody fired until this guy did. He kills Stanchi, wounds Carmine Mora, and then the boys open up on him, and they kill him. And right after that, they transferred, a lot of young guys, they went to Queens. They had had it. They were there for Piagentini and Jones; now it's like three years later, and Stanchi. I was a young sergeant, a new sergeant, and I start to see all these guys I'd just met leaving.

JK "Excuse me. I want to go to Bayside."

Anemone Yes. So they allowed a lot of that.

JK It's high tension all the time for those years.

Anemone Let me tell you. About a quarter of a million people living there. This is truly the city that never sleeps, uptown. It's going on all the time. I'm seeing now more gunshots, more guns, knifings, slashings, stabbings. A lot of violence, a lot of drugs, a lot of heroin. A specific spot, they would line up on the street, and afterwards they'd begin to nod on those same corners. It was prostitution hotels, entire buildings filled with drugs and prostitutes, nobody legitimate in the places. And I thought I was an experienced cop. I'd worked a couple of shifts with street crime, but it's not the same as being there every day, around the clock, working, seeing what's going on.

JK Which brings me to the great question: If the police know where the prostitutes, drug-dealers, and the like are, how come they don't do anything about it? That's the eternal question. You're never going to eliminate all of it, but what were you supposed to do with street drugs and prostitution, as the sergeant, and then the lieutenant.

Anemone Move the prostitutes when they're on the street. Stay out of the hotel, whether it was the Dawn Hotel or, I forget the name of the other one. Just move them on the street. Don't let them congregate. The same with the guys lining up for their heroin. It was hands-off.

JK Hands-off?

Anemone Hands-off the drugs. They had OCCB, another Pat Murphy innovation.

JK OCCB?

Anemone Organized Crime Control Bureau. Those specialists would now handle the narcotics. We were there to answer calls; provide first-aid; write crime reports; drug arrests were not supposed to be done. I don't know that any of my people made more than a handful of drug arrests, in my over four years up there in the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct. And you talk about the nexus between all the problems, it was drugs. The drug nexus.

JK Street crime, organized crime, prostitution, violence, people coming in, robbery. You can all see if there's a drug supermarket, that this is the problem. Was this the order from above? Thou shalt not touch drugs?

Anemone We were all instructed on the new changes, post-Knapp. This was the word. And if you did make that kind of an arrest, there were forms now that had to be written; reports that had to be written, explaining the hows, the whys, the wherefores of this officer getting involved in a narcotics arrest. So just between us and the tape recorder, while I was in street crime, the citywide anti-crime section, we would, once a week at least, be assigned to the 28<sup>th</sup> Precinct, the neighboring precinct in Central Harlem. On occasion, we'd chase somebody on the street into one of the hotels. They used to call it the Kennedy Arms. It was the hotel on Eighth Avenue, where one of Robert Kennedy's kids was grabbed. We chased the guy in, my partner and I, up the stairs; get him up on the second floor; get him prone down; now we're searching for the gun. He was loaded with heroin, bags of heroin. Son of a bitch. What do you do? We

flushed it. All of it. Felony weight, clearly felony weight heroin. We flushed it, kicked him in the ass, and went back in the car, looking for violent street crime. Because in that unit, were you to come in with a narcotic arrest instead of, supervision felt you were off the street now, processing some dirt-bag junkie, and maybe missing a legitimate citizen being robbed, assaulted, shot, stabbed.

JK The connection between someone carrying heroin on the street, for people who are coming in with money, who are obvious targets, that connection is not?

Anemone Well, maybe it was made, but there was clearly policy, department policy, not to have uniformed officers or plainclothes, street-crime unit officers involved in enforcing these laws.

JK Which is the unintended consequence of the Knapp Commission. Namely, it's worse to have corruption rampant among the police than to have them fighting crime; because if you fight crime and it leads to corruption, that's bad.

Anemone That's the way.

JK Not a lot of trust of the force.

Anemone No. And that was the other change, say, with Bratton, if you fast-forward, this idea of trust and openness. It was very refreshing.

JK I understand the culture of the city not trusting the police officers, because you did have corruption scandals in 1950, '67.

Anemone The '90s, too, Mollen.

JK You've got this regular revelation of police corruption, always somewhat different, but you also have the interactions with police in certain areas. The police are overlooking the drugs; they're overlooking the prostitution. Why should we trust these guys? Yet, once Bratton came in, once that moment of, even a little before, there was a change. There did seem to be a change among the public regarding the NYPD, because there was some, it was effective, and everyone could see that.

Anemone But I took the public a few years to get to that point.

JK And we're not sure the *New York Times* ever did. Well, the *Daily News* did. That's the flip side. And certainly not the *Village Voice*, which used to be a newspaper in New York. So we've been talking for an hour and twenty minutes. Do you feel like stopping at this point, and picking up again next week? Or do you feel like continuing?

Anemone I feel like if I had a bathroom break, we could go.

JK Back to yourself. You took the sergeant's exam and became a sergeant. You decided to become a lieutenant, and became a lieutenant. A lot of officers stop at that rank, because it's rather more political once you get above the rank of lieutenant. The problems that you have are a lot more extreme and political when you become a captain and above. So your one ambition that you stated was to become a detective, and you never became a detective. But you did become just about everything else, and you did work your way up through the ranks very well, very strongly. So the question is, what motivated you to become in management, so to speak, as opposed to remaining a crime fighter?

Anemone Yes, well, I had hoped that even if I rose through the ranks I would always be able to do something about improving the crime situation in the streets. I looked at it from that perspective. I also promised my wife, very early on, that I'd study to make captain. Beyond that, I said, "I really can't promise that I'll make any of those other ranks. But I'll work my tail off to become a captain." And I knew I'd buy the books; I'd read the books; I'd study the books, and I passed all my promotional exams.

JK Did you ever go to college, by the way?

Anemone You know, I did. I started at Brooklyn College. Then I took, I guess, one semester at John Jay. It was given, I think, at the Police Academy.

JK When they first started.

Anemone In '69. In 1969. The joke was, I had the longest span between starting college and getting my B.A.; 1963 I started, and I got it in January, 1989. Twenty-six years later. Twenty-six years, from starting college to getting, so I left John Jay. I couldn't make the classes, even though they tried to accommodate. I went back to Brooklyn College at night; then my shifts changed, and I couldn't make those classes. I put it off for a while, and then the department was coming around to the thought that you needed degrees to make promotion. I said I didn't want to be left out there without, something that would disqualify me, so let me go out and get it. I signed up, first, with Empire State, and that didn't work for me. But then the Regent's College Degree Program of the University of the State of New York, that's where I got my degree, finally, taking exams, three-credit exams. Three-credit exams. I got a BA in liberal studies. I did the same thing but now it was through distance learning, at Cal State at Dominguez Hills, to get a master's in the humanities. But there it wasn't exams, it was writing a thesis and reports, etc. That was four years later, in '93, I was able to do that.

JK That's quite the stick-to-itiveness; the idea that, it's tough, being a police officer and going to school. But the idea of keeping those two goals in mind, promotion, ambition, and education, going together. It's a motivator; if you need the degree, you're going to.

Anemone Yes. I didn't want to be one of the guys, and I saw some along the way, who stopped being police because they were going to college. You're going through the

motions; made sure they didn't get involved in. We talked a little bit about discretion; avoiding stuff; not getting to the scene as quickly as you might, if I had a class.

JK Or if I make this arrest, this is going to go on until tomorrow.

Anemone Yes. Exactly. Later on, I was able to do it at my pace, distance learning in both cases.

JK Several police officers decide to go to law school. Was that ever in your head?

Anemone It was, but by the time I got my B.A., and then the M.A., I'm already now at headquarters. How and where I was going to do this.

JK And why, at that point.

Anemone Yes. I didn't want to be a lawyer.

JK So where were you assigned as a lieutenant?

Anemone As a lieutenant. I went back to the 14<sup>th</sup> Precinct, now called Midtown Precinct South, as a lieutenant. That's November, '77.

JK What does it mean to you to be a lieutenant? How is it different from being a sergeant?

Anemone Well, it was the worst chart, working chart, back then. It was still the same chart that they were working when I became a policeman, in '67. Everyone else's chart had been modified through collective bargaining. The lieutenants had, they were still working this old a-week-of-days, a week-of 4 to 12s, a week of midnights. Throughout the rest of the department, we were moving to some form of steady shifts, or the scooter chart; a week of days; a week of 4 to 12; days, 4 to 12; days, and no midnights. So we were still doing that.

JK Is that beneficial for the force? The corruption out of the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct came from that one shift, largely. I just wonder whether you think that was a beneficial change, going from the rotating shifts to the fixed assignments.

Anemone I'll answer that in the way I had hoped Commissioner Murphy would have answered it, in regards to the Knapp Commission. Is enforcing the drug laws were important, than the opposite? I believe it's beneficial to each and every cop, for their well-being, their health, to work some sort of a steady schedule. Now if we have issues on the overnight shift, it's the that precinct commander's responsibility, and headquarters' responsibility, to see that it doesn't happen ever again; that you do everything you can from preventing it from happening. More supervision; more presence of the white shirts on patrol, and visiting places, and responding to assignments.

JK It was one of the startling facts that hit me, that those three rotations had the same number of officers assigned to each one. You had equal numbers at the 12 to 8 shift as from.

Anemone Well, you didn't, really.

JK But it seemed like it was just spread them out equally.

Anemone That would only happen when your fifth midnight to 8 occurred on a Saturday or Sunday. Otherwise, you did five day tours, five 4 to 12s, and four 12 to 8s. So you had less. You had one squad less on the midnight, unless it was Saturday or Sunday. So a Friday night and a Saturday night, then you had to come in and do that fifth tour. There was some recognition in headquarters that things were different, on the weekend, anyway. Certainly on the weekend midnight shift.

JK But that brings me back to, you have a mindset of this is how the department works, and the city is coming apart at the seams, in terms of drugs, crime, street crime, and subway crime, and the like.

Anemone So you asked me, "How was it different, being a lieutenant?" Well, Midtown Precinct South, the busiest precinct in the city at that time. The volume of crime reports, aided cases, accident reports had skyrocketed from the time I had been a trainee there, and the role of the lieutenant, back then, was to be the desk officer. We used to book the prisoners in the arrest book, by hand. You'd read and sign every crime report. You'd read, evaluate, and sign every aided report, every city-involved accident report. So that from the time you walked in, that was the quickest tour. No matter what tour I was working, the quickest eight hours in my life, always. It never stopped. The phones were ringing, cops were coming in with arrests, and it was just boom, boom. You were so tunnel-visioned, focused on what was in front of you, what had to be done, you really couldn't think bigger. Paperwork, unbelievable. And it was really old-fashioned paperwork. We had an assistant, a cop, on light duty, who would assist you at the desk, and the two of you would go all shift long. I would look forward to that one-hour meal break. I'd go to the lieutenant's locker room, generally, and just pass out for the hour. Come back, and you'd find a new pile waiting for you.

JK You said it was the busiest in the city. This is 1977-'78. You weren't there for the blackout in '77.

Anemone No, I was in Harlem.

JK You were in Harlem for the blackout of '77.

Anemone Oh, yes.

JK That was not like the romantic 1965 blackout.

Anemone      Which I attended as a police trainee. I was at Brooklyn College, in the cafeteria, and I walked over to the 63<sup>rd</sup> Precinct. I volunteered to help, because they said, "Go into your nearest facility." I reported there. The blackout of '77, I did a day tour that day. I came home. My next-door neighbor was also a police sergeant, also in the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct. He was doing 4 to 12. I went to bed early that night, day tours used to exhaust me, and my wife shook me. She was watching the 10 o'clock news. "The lights are out. They're calling for everyone to come into the city." I said, "What?!" I got up out of bed, went down, saw a little bit on the TV, and I said, "Oh, my god. Bill is working." My neighbor. "I have to go in." It was more that I was concerned, he was a friend. It wasn't so much that whoever the commissioner was was calling for everyone to come in. So I went in.

JK      Meanwhile, you're on the street.

Anemone      I stopped on the way in, in Fort Lee.

JK      You're at the diner in Fort Lee, loading up.

Anemone      And they have power. They have lights. But across the way, in Manhattan, in the city, complete blackness. I drove over the bridge, went to the station house, brought the coffee in, and it was just really kind of pandemonium. They had already filled up the precinct cells with arrests.

JK      That's pretty impressive, considering that the culture of the police is, "Don't get too involved." This was different.

Anemone      This was very different. But, again, the commissioner was calling for everyone to come in. I don't remember seeing anyone out on the street that night, and I spent the rest of that night, from midnight to 6:00 in the morning, 6:30 in the morning, before the sun came up, myself and three officers, in a car. By the time 6:30 rolled around, I had given assignments to all three of these officers. They were guarding places that had been looted; or they had arrests from different spots that we had been to. I went through two cycles of three different officers in the car. A crazy night. But we held the line. You talk about the difference, cops not doing it. In Brooklyn, in Williamsburg, in Bushwick, they didn't do anything. They just let them run wild. Where, in Harlem, we didn't. We went toe-to-toe with them. We saw the group, we saw someone breaking, we'd stop the car; get out; chase them; get them, catch them if you could; secure the store. That's how we spent that night. They didn't burn Harlem down. There were some fires, but they didn't shoot and kill any firemen or any cops that night. But Brooklyn was a completely different story, and we kind of felt like we were on our own. You didn't have many, there was very little radio communication. I forget why. But we'd get only high priority calls over the police radio. There was none of the usual chatter; you couldn't hear the other cars. The central dispatch would be the only one really talking, and you'd answer. But nobody could hear that. It was kind of unique. We were there for, I don't know, a couple of days, two or three days, until the lights came back on. I slept in the

stationhouse. I went out every night. We did more or less the same thing, but it calmed down almost immediately in Harlem.

JK     Bushwick burned. It never did recover.

Anemone     I used film from the results, when I did my disorder control training later on, a film of what Brooklyn looked like under the El, on Broadway.

JK     Yes. That was the worst case in the city. And you know, it's funny, a couple of years ago, when the electricity went out, I don't think we had the same kind of large-scale looting. But walking over the Queensboro Bridge, it was chaos. And I'm thinking, the officers are trying, and people aren't listening. People are going everywhere, cars, and people. It was just, I was thinking, it doesn't take much for it to completely break down. But it was a moment in the City of New York that seemed to exemplify, between the blackout, it was also the summer of Son of Sam going on, and a whole kind of.

Anemone     Yes. Oh, my god. Yes.

JK     I kept thinking, "We're going to hit the low point in the City of New York," and I could pinpoint one of them. But the blackout certainly was a moment. What accounts for the difference in police tactics from one precinct to another, one neighborhood to another?

Anemone     Leadership, I guess. Leadership and training. I don't know. In L.A., during my consulting, I went out with the LAPD, and what I noticed there I've seen sometimes in the city, and I've never liked it. The sense that, we're out on the street, we're doing this police work, but our first concern is for our own safety, not the safety of the public. That, to me, is wrong. This culture at L.A., and maybe we had a little bit of it in the NYPD, in different sections of the city. "Hey, I'm taking care of myself and my partner. My only important job is to get home at the end of the shift." Well, you can use that kind of reasoning to do nothing, to sit back and watch. When I think of the Rodney King riots in L.A. Different stations had twenty, thirty cops sitting in the back room, waiting, for what I don't know, before they would go out and do something about it.

JK     And there was no leadership directing them, "Go here, go there," and there was no initiative to.

Anemone     No.

JK     That's a department in paralysis.

Anemone     Yes. So I like to think we were good sergeants. We had a great lieutenant who worked the desk that night, during the blackout.

JK That's a lot of paperwork and a lot of follow-through, if you've got hundreds of arrests in precincts like Harlem, parts of Brooklyn and the like. How long did it take to clear all this up?

Anemone Days. Days. Literally, days. We had people, we were feeding them, in the stationhouse, three meals a day. There was no room downtown for them. And the first day and a half, they were chained at the front desk because the cells were full. And not every precinct had those cells. The 32<sup>nd</sup> had cells for lodging the prisoners overnight. But those were filled. We had people at the front desk.

JK That sends a message on the streets pretty quickly: "What do you mean, we're arrested? How come I'm arrested? How come he's not?" But the word would get out pretty quickly.

Anemone Well, I'll tell you. The 32<sup>nd</sup>, the 28<sup>th</sup>, right next door, the 25<sup>th</sup>, were the three Harlem precincts. We all were doing the same thing. And I'm thinking, I forget now who was in the borough command, who was the division commander. There was a time up there when the fellow who went on to become chief of operations, chief of department, Robert Johnston was assigned up in Harlem. He was the division commander. He was kind of a no-nonsense guy; get the job done. We saw him every once in a while, on the streets.

JK He strikes me as the same kind of guy working his way up through the department, a lifetime commitment to professional policing.

Anemone Yes.

JK So did you ever escape from the paperwork downtown, at Midtown South.

Anemone Yes, I did. Myself and Ralph Zacker, who is now deceased, were on the same lieutenants list together. We were in the same class, the twenty people who made lieutenant together. We both went to Midtown South. He worked with Timoney in the 44<sup>th</sup> Precinct. He was a sergeant in the 44<sup>th</sup> when Timoney was a cop. So Ralph and I would commiserate. He would relieve me. "Oh, my god. Another day on the desk. This and that."

JK Why did I become a lieutenant?

Anemone Look out for this. Look out for that. I left you this. Follow up on that. The issue down there, too, in Midtown, was the backlog of jobs. So we were doing some things, as lieutenants, inside. I'd have the clerk pull up all the jobs. No matter what tour I was working. I had started the tour before the cops went out on the street. We had a lot of foot cops in Midtown. "All right. You. You take this assignment. You take this assignment. It's on your post. It's near your post. It's on your way out to your post." So that the walking cops, we were forcing them to, and you'd reduce the amount of jobs that they were holding down at central.

JK That's going above and beyond, because all you have to do is assign them. This is your post. Go there, and come back.

Anemone And this queue of jobs, worked out whenever. So we did that. We then approached the commander. He was a captain, a fellow by the name of Gunderson, nice guy, and said, "Listen. We can do this and more for you, if you let us out from behind the desk. Let us hit the streets, on patrol." Now there were two older lieutenants who didn't want any part of that. They were content. They would let the assistant do most of the work. Whatever. So he partially agreed. He said, "Okay. You can do it on the midnight shift." He had a concern about what was going on in the midnights. So he let us out on patrol, and when we did that we'd take a sergeant who was slated to be on patrol, and put him on the desk. The union raised some issues about it, but he backed us. He, then, was replaced, and the new commander came in and said, "Great. I see an improvement in the response time. I see this, I see that. Tell you what. Can you do this on every shift?" Sure. So then we became the operations officers on the day tour, the 4 to 12, and the midnight. Two of us. The other two guys stayed behind.

JK But that is a much more aggressive martialing of resources than, I just have the impression that the word that describes the NYPD, on an everyday basis, is stasis.

Anemone Yes, yes.

JK As long as it keeps going like this, that's fine. It's not everyone who responds well to ideas to shake it up, and it sounds as though you never had no ideas.

Anemone Thank you. Plus, you have this additional level of supervision now showing up. I had an officer shot on 42<sup>nd</sup> Street. I was able to get to the scene; direct a young sergeant who was overcome with the, now here's what you're going to do. This, this, this, and this. I'm going to go to the hospital. You're going to secure the scene. You're going to call for Homicide.

JK Speaking of 42<sup>nd</sup> Street, you had Bryant Park.

Anemone Yes. And the library.

JK And the library. The library, I was probably inside the library, getting my dissertation done, while your guys were working behind. Can you describe what happened to Bryant Park, and how you addressed policing it? Was this on the radar screen of the NYPD? Or was it stay away, and just stay out of trouble?

Anemone What I learned in Midtown South was that it was an incredibly important business community that had direct access to not only headquarters but to the borough commander. So you had the garment center industry, had access and demand and issues, and a former chief inspector worked there, Sandy Garelik.

JK Oh, really?

Anemone He was present and about, or maybe that was later on. He may have been in the City Council then. But he had those connections. Mickey Schwartz was the borough commander, and he would meet with the Fifth Avenue Association; Madison Avenue; the Grand Central Partnership; The Time Square Alliance; the theatre. They were very close with the theatres. So, having said all of that, Bryant Park was one of the top locations. Forty-second street; the Theatre District; Grand Central wasn't, well, yes, it was ours. Grand Central. No. Grand Central was not ours. Penn Station was the other key spot, Madison Square Garden, and the Port Authority Bus Terminal. So whatever the goals were in the rest of the city, they were different in midtown, Midtown South and Midtown North. They wanted the junkies collared; they wanted the junkies moved; they wanted the prostitutes moved.

JK Not everywhere does the business community have the ear of the precinct commander, let alone.

Anemone They had juice. Peddling was the other top issue. Peddling.

JK Not a small thing, actually.

Anemone No. So these were issues back then. Bryant Park was a place where you'd send a minimum of two officers on the 4 to 12; two officers on the day tour, to work the park. The problem was, they were making low-level arrests, and now you'd lose the coverage for the officer on the park.

JK What was he supposed to do, not make the arrest? I mean, you've got an overt, open-air drug market in a lot of ways.

Anemone And, in some ways, it was an open-air, non-drug market. They were selling a lot of beat. So you'd collar them, and back then, they'd bring them into the stationhouse; you're keeping him overnight; he's going down; there's a lab request being prepared; there's a voucher; then it comes back "No Narcotic."

JK He's selling oregano. How nice.

Anemone Oh, my god.

JK Can you book him for selling a fake?

Anemone Yes. You do.

JK But for what?

Anemone For the marijuana. He was charged with the marijuana. Actually, they were doing something similar to that with the three-card monte players. We used to

charge them with gambling. Then there was a judge's decision in criminal court saying, "That's not a gamble. That's not a gamble." So then they started charging them with possession of burglar's tools, because it was a theft.

JK Oh. No kidding.

Anemone It was a theft.

JK That was so prevalent in the 1970s, everywhere.

Anemone A little cardboard thing.

JK And they would disappear in thirty seconds. This was so common, to walk down the street and see playing cards just hanging around. Once again, you wonder, if I know this is going on, this can't be legit. Where are the officers? It's right behind the *Times* building, on 42<sup>nd</sup>, between Broadway and Seventh here. How did you get rid of them?

Anemone Well, it was constant pressure. Constant pressure. Sometimes over-specialization. We did it with prostitution. In Midtown South we would send guys out on the midnight shift, and lock them up for loitering.

JK This was Eighth Avenue, Eighth, Ninth Avenue?

Anemone Yes. And that was really the domain for the vice squad guys. But in the southern part of the precinct, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Fifth, Madison and Lex, you had some cheap hotels there that are now, I think, very chichi. But back then you had streetwalking there; you had a couple of those all-night diners, coffee shops, and they'd always be loaded with girls. So the guys would pick them up there, because we had complaints from the community down there. If there was anything left over, after vice took their spin through, the boys would get them off.

JK I am encouraged to hear that there was always a holding action by the NYPD, everywhere, even as things are crumbling around. There is still good, strong policing in vice, on narcotics, three-card monte. But the tide was just so overwhelming in those years.

Anemone And the idea of the desk appearance ticket [DAT] had some consequences of that, that no one really anticipated, people not going to court. So that we were calling them "Disappearance Tickets." It makes it harder to correct the condition, if all you're doing is taking them off the street for an hour, and giving them a ticket. He's not going to honor it, and no one is going to follow up.

JK And if it's for littering, or loitering.

Anemone Or three-card monte, or something like that, where he was eligible for a DAT. Marijuana, possession of marijuana, DAT, or criminal court summons.

JK I encountered one incident of a police officer who went into Bryant Park after it was closed. They tried to close it at 8 o'clock, and he went in to get the loiterers/drug dealers out, and they assaulted him. But he had a radio, and it was apparently a new innovation that beat cops now had a police radio with them. So he was able to say.

Anemone "Send assistance."

JK Whereas a year before he would just have been beaten senseless, and no one would have found him for a couple of hours. It must have been terrifying, to be out there on your own without a radio.

Anemone Well, it really wasn't. It wasn't terrifying. How can you explain it? There was no expectation at the time of a portable radio. You knew that the cars had the radios, and you depended on the citizens to call. I had wrestling matches with guys, here, there, and I had no radio. The cops came because somebody called the police. Somebody called the station.

JK And if they didn't, you're?

Anemone Well, then, you're going to do the best you can. But they taught you in the Academy, "We don't pay you to lose the fight. Make sure you win." Easier said sometimes.

JK That said, did you ever fire your weapon in the heat of instances?

Anemone Oh, yes. Yes.

JK And were weapons fired at you?

Anemone The only time a weapon was fired at me, it actually hit. I was a captain in narcotics, on a search warrant, and my sergeant fired a shotgun loaded with a one-ounce slug, and it hit my revolver, shattered it, and I ended up with fragments, lead fragments in my hand, and a hell of a pain. It knocked me down. It wasn't until later, at the hospital, that someone came in and told me what had happened. They had good news and bad news. Mr. Almonte, whose apartment we were in, had pulled a gun. The good news was they killed him; he won't be pulling a gun at any policemen anymore. I said, "What's the bad news?" "The guy who shot you is still alive. He's a sergeant."

JK Yes, that's good news/bad news. Does this mean he gets a second shot?

Anemone I didn't fire my weapon that night, but on other occasions.

JK Do you want to describe one?

Anemone One was, and I'm very familiar with this: simultaneous, is that the expression? Simultaneous firing?

JK Contagious fire, or something like that?

Anemone Contagious. I'm in the citywide anti-crime unit, working in the 28<sup>th</sup> Precinct, maybe for the first time. The state office building is under construction, that's how long ago this is. There's a radio call, a cop needs help. We're nearby; we respond; we're in civilian clothes; we jump out of the car; everyone's chasing this guy; I'm in there, chasing; I'm younger; running; getting up near the front, and somebody fired a weapon. The next thing I knew, my revolver was empty.

JK The next thing you knew.

Anemone "What the hell did I just do?"

JK And where did those go?

Anemone Yes. In the state office building, somewhere in that construction site. I didn't hit the guy. Somebody caught him. Scared the living, that was the first time.

JK By the fact that you fired, and didn't know you were doing it.

Anemone I didn't make a conscious decision to shoot someone. I didn't even have a target. There was a figure, running. At this point, you don't fire at fleeing felons. I didn't even know if he was a felon. Someone else started shooting.

JK You've got departmental guidelines that say, "Thou shalt not fire at fleeing suspects."

Anemone Yes. Yes.

JK But it's hard to say no at that moment, I guess.

Anemone It just happened.

JK So having that in your background, in your own, personal experience, when you became chief of department, how did you deal with officers who have been in similar situations?

Anemone Tougher than they expected. I was chairman of the Discharge Review Board. That was one of the functions. I personally sat and reviewed every single case that we had. I cleared up the backlog that Timoney and others before him left me, so that it was a quicker and more, the same way, you know, we look for justice to be swift and certain, that's what we did there. We removed all backlog within thirty or sixty days; except for some very rare occasions, every case was heard. And I knew if I saw a report

that was bullshit, I knew it. I'd been there, I'd done that, that's not what happened. Send it back; get it right. For the most part, if it was a mistake of the head, we would train. If it was a mistake of the heart, I fired guys for using their weapon inappropriately.

JK In a fit of anger, or whatever else?

Anemone Yes. Anger; macho; unthinking; uncaring. There was more than one occasion, more than one case.

JK But what's intriguing is that during those years, when the public and the press would become so outraged at the discharge of police firearms, and individual hits by police bullets, that was such a rare occasion, compared to, I mean, in the 1970s, dozens of people are killed every year by, you're firing hundreds and hundreds of rounds.

Anemone Thousands of rounds.

JK Whereas now it's negligible, by comparison.

Anemone Reduced. And some of that is a function of reducing crime, and violent crime. The less of that going on, the less occasion you would expect the use of firearms. If you take out the dog shootings, it's almost insignificant now, the number of times an officer fires his weapon.

JK For killing a dog?

Anemone Yes.

JK Because the last two shots he shouldn't have done, thinking. Maybe there's more to it, but if there isn't.

Anemone That's kind of a tough bar to set.

JK But there isn't margin for error. I can make mistakes. When I'm teaching history, I can make a mistake, and say, oh, you know, I said that was 1813? It was 1812. So sue me. But when your guys make mistakes, you don't have that.

Anemone And that bullet, once it's out, can't be retrieved. I learned early on about it. It's always something very, very near and dear to my heart. The use of force; the use of the firearm, in particular, to make sure they understood how serious this was, the respect for life. I tried, anyway.

JK No, the difficulty is not with the results, because anyone who looks at the results sees how the NYPD has changed over the last forty years. But the public perception seems to have been a little slower to acknowledge that.

Anemone I would agree.

JK I see that here at John Jay. There are two schools here at John Jay. One is the law enforcement making law enforcement more efficient, more humane, stronger, better informed. There's another strain at John Jay which is, "Society is corrupt; individuals are racist; society is unjust. How do we deal with the root causes of crime?" It's a real conflict, in the way you approach. Some of my colleagues, there are statements I don't make. But, still. And the NYPD is always going. How did you become captain? I think we can get you to become captain, and then call it a day.

Anemone Yes. So, well, I'm in Midtown South, November '77.

JK Bryant Park.

Anemone In February of '79 I was asked to head up the NSU-3 unit. So what was it? There had been a lieutenant in charge. He got jammed up, drinking or something, and they wanted me to replace him. I said yes. We worked steady nights in the theatre district, and throughout that third division zone. So you'd go to Madison Square Garden; the theatre district. You'd go over to the East Side, like Bloomingdale's, if you had to. You had the three precincts, Midtown South, Midtown North, and the 17<sup>th</sup>. The unit was composed of the re-hired lay-off cops, the very last groups, so I had fifty-two or fifty-four of them who had been rehired in '78, and they were still in this NSU-3.

JK NSU?

Anemone Neighborhood Stabilization Unit. You didn't work for the precinct commander, you worked for the division commander. So that was a full inspector, actually, in Manhattan. He was a deputy chief. I was their leader, so I had an opportunity to train, in many cases re-train, some of these cops, and to walk with them, and work with them. Everyone was on foot. I would have one vehicle allowed for me, on occasion, and I would use that sometimes to patrol.

JK: I'm sorry. I thought community policing was a later innovation.

Anemone Well, they called it Neighborhood Stabilization. We had no connection with the community, except when the business people spoke to the top guys, that word came down to me. "Here's what you're going to do. You're going to make sure that people who are going to the theatre are not robbed. You're going to make sure that the peddlers, during the Christmas season, are not at Rockefeller Center. You're going to make sure that the concerts at Madison Square Garden, we don't have riots." Yes, sir. And this is what I did, until I ran afoul of Chief of Patrol [William] Bracey.

JK Ran afoul. Do you want to relay that yarn?

Anemone It's a good story. I'm assigned over in the NSU. For some reason I was doing a day tour. There was one detective working, and the detectives we would use as trainers. These are field service specialists, detectives in uniform, working in the

precincts. I had three or four of them to help train the cops. That initial group of people from NSU left, and now there's a new group, a new hires, brand-new, this became their introduction to policing. Rather than going to the precincts, they'd stop here six months, eight months, until the next class graduated. Then they'd move on. They learned a little bit about walking beats, about conditions, etc., and how to work.

JK To keep them out of the culture of the precinct house for a little while longer.

Anemone Yes. And they're learning at least, well, through my filter. And every division in the city had the same setup; different problems, naturally. So I'm doing a day tour, and this detective comes into the office and tells me there's been a cop shot in Midtown South. I was a lieutenant in Midtown South. This detective had been a cop working for me in Midtown South. "Get the car. Let's go." Where is it? Who is it? He tells me their name. Where is he? He's at Bellevue. What about the perp? His partner killed the perp. Okay. So his partner and he are at the hospital. The officer was paralyzed, shot, severed his spine. He's still in a wheelchair. So he's being treated in the emergency room. I'm the highest-ranking guy at the hospital. I had to come from Midtown North to Bellevue. You would have thought there would have been other people there. Nobody. And I see his partner. "Ronny, how you doing?" And he's bleeding, and he's white as a ghost. He killed the shooter. Okay, all right. I said, "Take it easy. Relax." Over here there's a room. I open up the door and it was a little bit more than a closet. "Relax." I opened the door. "Stay away from everybody." I got a little bit of a story from him, and from some of the others, a sergeant at the scene. Okay. Now in comes the new Deputy Commissioner of Public Information, Alice McGillion, in the company of the Chief of Patrol, Bracey. "Hi, Chief, Commissioner. I can give you the." "Where's the officer that did the shooting?" "He's over there, sir." "I want to talk to him." I said, "I can give you the whole." I'm trying not to let him talk to the cop who's in shock and bleeding in the closet. So I bring him over. Maybe he's just going to say hi. He wants a blow-by-blow from this guy. I said, "Chief, he's still in shock. He's bleeding. I'm waiting for somebody to free up to look at his hand." He says, "That's enough from you. Officer? So what happened?" I said, "Kevin, you don't have to answer that." He says, "Are you going to leave, or am I going to have you removed?" I said, "All right. I'll leave. I'm just trying to help you. I have what you need. I have the information." The next day I was transferred. I was no longer the lieutenant. And that was that. He was embarrassed because she was new. He was showing her off. He should have known a little bit better.

JK And you should know that if someone has information, you take the information.

Anemone Give this kid a fucking break. His partner is in the operating room. He killed a guy. And you're not giving him.

JK It's not like he just got clipped by a car, with a double-parking ticket.

Anemone No. So that was that. So they sent me to the 19<sup>th</sup> Precinct, where I worked the same deal with that commander. As a matter of fact, I didn't meet him for a while.

JK Where was the 19<sup>th</sup>?

Anemone On the East Side. East 67<sup>th</sup>, across from the Russian mission to the U.N.

JK Oh, yes. Exactly.

Anemone With the Kennedy School alongside us.

JK Right next to Hunter.

Anemone Yes, yes.

JK That's a high-profile.

Anemone Sure was.

JK The East Side. You may not have the business community, but you have lots of other communities there.

Anemone They also had a strong business community up there, as well. So I was a lieutenant operations officer for them up there. I got involved in a couple of very nice cases, very quick. I saved a woman who was trying to kill herself in the East River. She jumped in. From kids playing a radio loud, at night, 4 in the morning. I tell the chauffeur, "Stop. Let's talk to this guy." He's the lookout for the rape team upstairs. Now they come running down, now the chase is on, and we caught them all. So this new commander sends me a note. "I see you're doing a lot, please show yourself."

JK Who the hell are you?

Anemone "Show yourself." So it was good. So that takes me to '81, and then I guess it was my division commander from when I was in the NSU, who is now the chief of the special operations division. He gives me a call. He says, "I'm going to take you out of the 19<sup>th</sup>, and bring you back to the street crime unit as a lieutenant." I ran a squad over there, until I was promoted to captain a year later, August of '82. So I went back to that place as a lieutenant now. I left in '73, now it's '81. The city is much worse. Guns are a big issue, the cops, it's even more critical. They're looking for 9mms, they're looking for some help. It's a smaller unit, back then.

JK Also, the city is very nervous about too aggressive on crime. They're very nervous about giving the police too much leeway. For whatever reasons, there was not a trust that the police will ever be able to get a handle on this, and we don't trust you guys as much as we don't trust the criminal element. That's hard to, we're doing our job every day, and the city is. There were no more resources, though. I mean, it's not like you could ask for more resources.

Anemone No. That was about the time we were at our lowest. We had declined headcount. In '81, we were at the low level there. We had started hiring the prior year, in 1980. So '81, maybe there was a little bit of an up-tick in the head count.

JK Ed Koch. I interviewed him, and he said that when he greeted the first Police Academy class, he said, "Where have you been?" Or something like that. "We've been waiting for you."

Anemone It's true.

JK The image I had when I talked to him was that this enormous wave of crime had just hit the city, and in about 1980 was about the first time that it began to push back; and that it was gradually one area after another, trying to re-take control of the city. Because, by 1980, it genuinely was out of control in a lot of ways. I would walk into subway cars, I walked in and there was blood all over, and a transit officer came in right behind me, and said, "What the hell happened here?" And I'm like, "I don't know." Shed blood, and nobody here. I was working on 42<sup>nd</sup> Street, and I'd get out at the Eighth Avenue IND exit. I kept expecting to be grabbed every day. There was a gantlet of thugs hanging out at a pinball arcade or something, and I'm like, how is it that I walk through here every day, and I'm unscathed, barely.

Anemone Count yourself lucky.

JK Yeah, I know. How is this happening? But it really was that out-of-control, and the relief of having, suddenly, going on the offensive again, it sounded like that.

Anemone I had taken the exam for captain while I was a lieutenant, while I was in the training class. So I was learning my lieutenant stuff, with a view toward taking the captain's exam, just a couple weeks later, so it kind of helped me, in that regard. I passed the test, and in '82, I was promoted to captain.

JK You were given your own precinct at that point?

Anemone No. No. I was the executive officer back in the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct, in Harlem. So I knew many people.

JK The difference between executive officer and precinct, who would be the precinct commander? Another captain?

Anemone Another captain, but he was a veteran captain. I was a newly-promoted captain. I was to learn at his, actually, I think he may have been a deputy inspector when I went there. He had already been promoted. He went there as a captain. He had been promoted to deputy inspector. He was still in command, and I was his assistant. Where he would work days, I'd work nights.

JK It sounded like the NYPD was very cautious about putting people in positions of authority, until they were absolutely certain they were ready.

Anemone Yes. That's a fair statement. But, you still had some people who would move right up, because they had worked in headquarters, or they knew one of the chiefs. They would bypass. But I learned from the bottom. I was the exec for a few months, then I was given this command of the narcotic unit in Manhattan North.

JK You didn't have any leapfrogs in your career until that last leap.

Anemone Yes. Yes, that's true. I didn't know anybody. I did it all with exams, and spending my time on the street.

JK You mean everyone doesn't?

Anemone How can I meet these guys? They weren't on the street. I was on the street. But it worked out great for me, because Bratton was a different kind of leader. He had Maple going around interviewing people. "Who's the best at this? Who's the best at that?" And my name came up a couple of times. So without an interview, he made me Chief of Patrol, just based on Maple's, who I didn't know, his recommendation, after he interviewed I don't know how many people. So.

JK Let's leave Captain of Narcotics, because that's a big deal, especially up in that neighborhood, at that time. Are you still up for coming here next week, at the same time?

Anemone Yes. Okay.

JK Well, then we would pick it up then.

Anemone Terrific.

JK Thank you very much.

Anemone Oh, my pleasure.

## Louis Anemone

January 19, 2012

JK We were talking about the early years of your career. We want to get to when you were Chief of Department. But your career as Chief of Department obviously was shaped by what you went through as a young police officer, as a so-called middle-management police officer, and you just mentioned the riots of the 1960s, and the riot culture in the city. I wonder if you could expand on that.

Anemone Sure. Again, as a young police officer, in 1967, '68, '69, as other cities throughout the country were experiencing riots, as a result either of the assassination of Martin Luther King or Robert Kennedy, New York City, although we were on the edge a couple of times, and there were some minor issues in some of the neighborhoods in the city, we managed to hold it together. As a young police officer, I was sent to training, disorder control training. That was my first experience with disorder control, or even thinking about it. What would you do in the event of a riot?

JK Who do you arrest? Why do you arrest them? Who do you let go? Who do you chase? When do you stand your ground?

Anemone Exactly.

JK All questions.

Anemone All of that. And our training, very specific, tactical training, and this was the first time I had ever really experienced anything like this, outside of the police firearms range, was held on what they then called Welfare Island. So they had police officers from the firearms unit playing the roles of snipers, shooters, in some of those abandoned buildings on Welfare Island, very intense training, and my first real look at and experience of what to do with the upcoming long, hot summers, what they referred to every year, '67, '68, '69. They were expecting long, hot summers in the city, and we never really had it. The only other piece of tactical advice that I remember, beyond stay together with your partner, don't split up, be aware of booby-trapped buildings, bring your flashlights, was this idea that anything at all that occurred in the street, particularly in the ghetto communities, particularly during the warm summer months, the standing order was get it off the street and get it into the station house. Quickly. Don't play judge and jury and listen to both sides. Get them off the street.

JK When you say "it," you mean an argument over a dice game? An argument over a girl? An argument over a parking spot?

Anemone Anything like that, because crowds collected, and the feeling in the department, at least at the upper levels, as we understood it at the operating level, was anything could trigger the next riot, and they didn't want New York City to be the site of

that next riot. So whether it was a dispute between a store owner and a customer; a fight on the street between two, and you're trying to figure out who's right and who's wrong; who should be arrested and who should be the complainant, they wanted it all brought into the station house. Let the desk sergeant or the desk lieutenant hear both sides, in the calm environs of the precinct station house, kind of defusing anything that might happen, then, on the street.

JK I was doing some research into those years, and found an incident where some narcotics detectives tried to do a street bust, some kids on a stoop in East Harlem, and suddenly they were set upon by a crowd of fifty or 100 kids.

Anemone Not uncommon. That type of situation is not uncommon. And, again, I guess it was situations like that that had the department really instruct the people at the operating level to move it in quickly.

JK I was impressed in that case that not only were they fending off 100 kids, egged on by the Young Lords, but they held onto their collars.

Anemone Oh, they don't make them like that anymore. Oh, boy. So that was the only missing piece that I really wanted to make sure I got into the conversation about the '60s.

JK That's very interesting, because after the Crown Heights riot, you were the man on the point to assess what happened in the Crown Heights riot. So do you want to jump ahead and go, since we're on the topic of civil disorder. And that was probably the worst civil disorder in the city, in a generation.

Anemone It certainly was. It was, I guess, 1991. I was a division commander in the Bronx. I was a full inspector, commanding the 9<sup>th</sup> Division in the Bronx, and I, like many New Yorkers, was watching on the evening news what was going on in Crown Heights, and what was happening. Very disturbing, and it seemed it was getting worse each evening, each afternoon. So after three or four days, myself and some other people, hand-selected people, people that Ray Kelly selected, with the advice of his Chief of Patrol at the time, Mario Selvaggi, were gathered together at the Brooklyn South borough headquarters one afternoon, about 1 o'clock or 2 o'clock. Chief Selvaggi chaired the meeting, and told us we were, in effect, superseding the commanders in Brooklyn South, and that the mayor had had enough, and it was going to end. He wanted us to end the riots.

JK What had Brooklyn command been doing or not doing that permitted it to continue?

Anemone Well, I can tell you, later on, what I did, from the minute I got there, that nobody else did before that. I think it was this sense of they were sitting on their hands; they weren't taking pro-active actions to end the riot. And when I saw how easy it was to do it, it only made it more astounding. The evening before I went out there, there were policemen shot during the Crown Heights riots. A shotgun was used. I don't know if it

was six, seven, or eight cops who were shot. No arrests were made. Again, it's very infuriating. You're seeing this, you're hearing it, you're watching it, you're reading about it. So we had this meeting, and I was given the focal point of the demonstrations, Union and President Streets. That was the exact location where Gavin Cato was killed by a motorcade, the cars in a motorcade. The demonstrators would form up there at that location every day, chanting, and as the crowd got larger, they would then start to walk through the neighborhood. The past experience was that they would engage in violent activities, destructive actions. So the day I got there, they were ready to go for a march. Now the chief who was in command, the deputy chief who was in command at that location, he had my area and a couple of adjoining streets, wanted me to stay there. I said, "Chief, I just left a meeting where I was told to do everything I could to end this. Allow me to leave the corner, and take my cops with me. Let me see what happens." I told the group, "All right, we're ready to march. We're going to take you on the sidewalk. Stay on the sidewalk. Obey the police commands." And I had a cordon of police officers on either side of them to prevent them from breaking windows on the sidewalk side, and to prevent them from getting into the street on the curb side.

JK Keeping them on the sidewalk is a major achievement, because once they're in the streets, it says disorder, and they control the streets.

Anemone It certainly does. And they're creating fear and panic in the drivers of cars, etc. Well, we hadn't gone two blocks when they burst through our lines and into the street, and I gave the order to arrest people. We arrested two or three at that particular point; the rest dispersed as soon as they saw this. We took our three prisoners back to the stationhouse. I returned to the scene with the remaining cordon of cops, and later on that evening a larger group gathered, and, again, the same thing. I told them to stay on the sidewalk, and as we went through the neighborhood, on every instance where people tried to break through the lines, to get into the streets, they were arrested. We ended up making 22, 23, 24 arrests that night. That was the end, for all intents and purposes, of the Crown Heights riots. Twenty-four arrests, two or three earlier in the afternoon.

JK And the fact that you and other high-ranking officers were on the scene meant that there were no incidents, to speak of, between the police officers and the crowd.

Anemone Yes. We were there controlling the cops, directing the cops. In one instance, the group took us through the 71<sup>st</sup> Precinct into the 77<sup>th</sup>, on St. John's Place, and there were objects coming off the roofs. I had instructed the cops, "We're going to stay with this group. I have a team of officers behind us who are going to take that kind of action." And that's what happened. In the past, people had run up to the roof, and the group now on the street was left alone. So we had a group of officers who ran up to the roof, cleared the roofs, threw the debris up there into the backyard. We didn't catch the people who were throwing it, but there wasn't going to be another incident like that. I was there for a week, doing this every night, escorting groups. And after that first night, everybody behaved. Everybody maintained decorum. They did what we asked them to do, and they had an opportunity to demonstrate. And we, meanwhile, put the lid on the

Crown Heights riots. Very basic stuff I learned as a cop, a sergeant, and a lieutenant over the years.

JK Deploy your forces and maintain order on the streets. That's it.

Anemone That's it. I give those cops the direction, the very specific direction and instruction, as to what they can and can't do; what they should do if X happens or Y happens.

JK Were these officers from the precinct, on the spot? Or were these officers brought in?

Anemone These were officers who had never worked together before, from all over the city. They were assigned there for the duration of this event.

JK That's quite a deployment.

Anemone Yes. Really. As the week ran on, there was a shooting in the 70<sup>th</sup> Precinct, a police-involved shooting, which generated demonstrations in the 70<sup>th</sup> Precinct. The only reason I bring that up is, I was asked to go over there to police it, which I did, and everything stayed fine. It was my first introduction to Lenora Fulani. She was leading the group of demonstrators on the street in the 70<sup>th</sup> Precinct. It was a hot time. It was still summertime. Tempers were flaring, and we had a march or two with that group, in subsequent days. It was also during that time that I had an incident with a police commander, on the radio, giving conflicting orders. I had just spoken to the borough commander at the site of this demonstration, and I told him my plans for escorting the group, and he said, "Okay." Then I get a directive from someone who wasn't on the scene, over the police radio, to effect immediate arrests as they left the group. So I told my people no. I went to where this order came from, "What's your location?" They were in a park house, over by the parade grounds in Brooklyn. And in that park house was the staff, all except the borough commander. His exec and the division commanders in Brooklyn South, who had been removed and superseded by us, and were sitting around having pizzas, and coffee. I had a verbal confrontation with the Deputy Chief. I said, "You know how close you came to creating another riot? You're giving orders that are contradictory. If you're not on the scene, you don't have any." They were trying to make up for the four or five days that they had let the Crown Heights thing go on.

JK And now it's just arrest anybody.

Anemone Yeah. And now the pendulum, they thought they had to swing it in the other direction. So that was '91.

JK And there hasn't been an incident in Brooklyn since. Nothing at all has happened in Brooklyn since.

Anemone No. But if you remember, leading up to that time, you had the Korean boycott, which was a disgrace, the way that was handled. In many ways, the police department was responsible for allowing people to violate laws, emboldening them to. There were very few consequences for people who challenged the police, or challenged the rule of law.

JK But that speaks to the political climate of the city at the time.

Anemone It certainly does.

JK As opposed to the police climate. I'm not sure it makes sense to think that the police department went along willingly with that kind of directive or attitude.

Anemone Well, privately, commanders may have not have agreed with it, but in the performance of their duties they went above and beyond, to enforce political decisions. I just think it was a terrible mistake.

JK Civilian control of the police force is always paramount, whether they're right or not. But the result of your involvement in Crown Heights is that you were given the assignment to redefine the police department procedures for this kind of activity. How did you go about doing that, and what was the end result of it? How was it received?

Anemone I was promoted in January 1993, by Commissioner Kelly, to the rank of Deputy Chief, and assigned to his Office of Management Analysis & Policy (OMAP). I was given the specific assignment to take a look at the disorder control policies, protocols, training, management, mobilization, and equipment for the NYPD. At the same time, another newly-promoted deputy chief, Michael Julian, was given the project to work on the squeegees. Quality-of-life issues in the city, and community policing. So he had his chore. This was kind of a new idea that Kelly, we had never seen anything like this in the NYPD, promoting people, giving them responsibility. He allowed me to pick my team, which I did over the next couple of weeks. It was a small team, four or five people, and we began, I began, by reading everything that was written on disorder, whether it was sports related; political related; race related, in the country and in some Canadian cities, as well. I became the department's expert on what other places had done; what went right; what went wrong; why did it work; why didn't it work? And it took a good, hard look at what we were doing, or what we had done in the past. It became apparent that there were some very simple solutions. These simple solutions involved an enormous amount of training at every level of the organization, from the executive staff right on down to the cop on the street. Commissioner Kelly's first order to me was to codify all my thoughts in a booklet. He wanted it distributed to every police officer in the NYPD, and we did that. That's the "Disorder Control Guidelines."

JK Right. A copy right here. I'd only read about it. Congratulations. It was implemented.

Anemone It was implemented throughout the department. It's still being used. The mobilization issues are now codified in the patrol guide. The training is codified in the patrol guide. You'll find most of this, now, in some form or another. This is the presentation copy. There's a smaller, more elongated version that fits right in the cop's pocket, in his jacket pocket. We wanted them to have it. The key thing here was, we very clearly laid out the department's objective and the mission of disorder control, focusing on the team approach, no independent actions; we work as a team, during a civil disorder.

JK Have you looked back at the NYPD's own response? I mean, there were race riots in the early 1970s. There was the Mosque incident, and several others. Did you look at NYPD experiences, and analyze those?

Anemone Including the 1977 critique of the blackout, which we discussed a little bit in our last session. The Tompkins Square Park riot critique. Anything and everything I could find within the department or throughout the country. I read reports from Montreal, from Las Vegas, from Dallas. I received training materials from the English police. Anything and everything.

JK They had their own issues with football hooligans, and that kind of thing.

Anemone Exactly. The Los Angeles experience played into it, as well, talking about the Rodney King riots.

JK Yes. That quickly went from race-generated to random looting, in no time.

Anemone And our Washington Heights experience of 1992. I spent a little time up there when I was with the Special Operations Division. I saw what happened and how we handled it.

JK You had been in Washington Heights in your career.

Anemone Twice.

JK Was that the Kiko Garcia event?

Anemone Yes, it was.

JK That spoke to the absurdity of the political climate in the city at the time, and the very unfortunate position the police department found itself in, vis-à-vis the public and the political establishment. So do you want to talk about Kiko Garcia and company?

Anemone Well, you know, again, the department was not allowed to even defend Officer, oh, my gosh, Michael? The summer of 1992. It was during the July 4<sup>th</sup> weekend, because I was assigned.

JK Michael O'Keefe.

Anemone      There you go. Michael O'Keefe. Good cop, good solid guy. Although his commander, [Deputy Inspector] Nick Estavillo, defended him, there was no public defense by the department of his actions. We all understood that there was no criminality involved here, and it should have been obvious. The forensics, the reports, the study of the incident. But there was still this sense in the city, again, at the political level, to let people blow off steam. That would be the proper response. But what you find, when large groups of people gather to blow off steam, if the police aren't setting any guidelines, aren't controlling it, there's a very fine line, and that demonstration then becomes a mob. We saw that at nightfall up there, burning tires, as if this were South Africa, setting tires into the streets, stopping traffic, pulling people from cars.

JK      And the police were ordered to back off? Were they ordered to back off, "Don't interfere," or was it simply a command decision on the spot?

Anemone      I think it was more of a command decision on the spot. I don't think that there was that same order, but right now I can't say for sure.

JK      The difficulty in all this is that he was a drug dealer. He was a violent, armed drug dealer, and this isn't the only case where an individual who is a criminal, in an encounter with the police, is seen as the victim, and the police are the perpetrators of a crime. This one, unfortunately, went all the way up to Mayor Dinkins, who paid for his funeral or something.

Anemone      He paid for his funeral. It was a very, very tough time to be a policeman; a tough time for police morale, in the face of political decisions like that. Now you reference the fact that it wasn't the first time. I had more direct involvement with a case during Mayor Giuliani's administration, just about two years later. Again, the summertime, maybe September or so, around 1994 or 1995. A police officer on foot, patrolling a vertical patrol in one of the buildings in the 160s, between Broadway and Amsterdam, came across a suspicious fellow who ran from him. The officer gave chase; the fellow ran into an apartment; shut the door; barricaded it. The next thing that happened was that the same fellow ended up five flights down, in the backyard. The first people to get to him, because the officer was still in the building, calling for additional assistance, were the local drug people, whom he worked for. They told him then, "Say that the cops pushed you." All of a sudden, that particular order became *the* story, *the* truth. There were witnesses suddenly appearing out of nowhere. I responded to the scene, and fielded a couple of calls from Mayor Giuliani. I mean, every five or ten minutes. "Lou! What's going on? Lou! The TV is saying this. Lou! The radio says that. Lou!" I said, "Mr. Mayor, the door is barricaded from the inside." I couldn't get in the apartment. We did, but I had to come down the fire escape, break the window, and force my way in. And that window was locked. This fellow slammed the door, locked it, he thought he was jumping out the fire-escape window, and he went out a window where there was no fire escape, fell, and was injured. Later on, he confessed. The cop wasn't there. The cop didn't push him. He hit the wrong window. And we had a group in the street, ready to start again the Washington Heights, Version 2. We immediately called cops in. We shut down

both ends of the block. Nobody else allowed in. I was giving interviews on the street, unheard of, within minutes of this case happening. "No, no, no. This cop is right. It didn't happen that way. We'd be very interested in interviewing any of the witnesses here who think otherwise. I have plenty of detectives here from Internal Affairs and the local precinct. We're ready to speak, and to hear any stories." So we shut that down, but it took that kind of response, that kind of decision-making, to get our story out. What I guess I'm getting at is, in some sections of the city the drug culture is so entrenched, they are the main employment, and they have enough people out on the street that they can make up any story they want and produce witnesses to it. It's just very, very troubling, and a lot of people outside of law enforcement aren't aware of this. They think that that's a fairy tale. But I saw it happen, in Kiko Garcia's case, and in the case of this other incident, the man out the window.

JK What's troubling is that it seemed plausible to the press, and plausible to the political establishment, and plausible to the so-called community leaders and the public, that, "Well, it's certainly possible, if not likely, for the police officer to have thrown him out of the window instead of arresting him." But that's the climate of distrust, which came, for a whole generation of trials, I mean, the whole phrase "the Bronx jury."

Anemone Exactly. Larry Davis is the signature case.

JK The signature case. Yes. Well, he did have William Kunstler and Lynne Stewart as his counsel, making up stories as they go along. But the jury bought it, mostly.

Anemone Yes. He was convicted of possession of a weapon. There was no way they could get the weapon thrown out. Otherwise, he could have walked free.

JK He ultimately did not spend another day of freedom in his life. But the argument presented in court was that the police officers had been using him as a drug-enforcer, and he decided to go straight, and suddenly the officers had to kill him. But that's entirely plausible.

Anemone Oh, my god.

JK That's how upside-down the whole world had come.

Anemone Really.

JK But this is not long before the Dirty Thirty, and the 77<sup>th</sup> Precinct.

Anemone Buddy Boys.

JK Buddy Boys, in Brooklyn. Because they were doing exactly that. So it's uncomfortable when the police are accused of doing this when it's not the case; the problem is that there *was* this going on within certain elements of the police department.

Anemone Absolutely true.

JK In the narcotics area.

Anemone Yes. Absolutely true.

JK We're jumping ahead to talk about the Dirty 30 case. Where were you positioned in your career when this broke?

Anemone I was the Chief of Patrol. This was 1994. Commissioner Bratton was the police commissioner, and I wasn't privy at that point to all the inside information on the case. What I do know is that on one morning I was asked to join him, and Jack Maple, and John Timoney for the early-morning roll call at the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct. This is the morning where he addressed the platoon. He said he was going to take those badges and retire them. This is from the indicted officers.

JK It must be quite a shock for the guys just coming into roll call, and seeing, "Uh oh." Not even just a chief, but the whole array.

Anemone The executive staff, Chief of Patrol, Chief of Department, and the Police Commissioner. So it was kind of a tough time. I'm trying to recollect. The other fallout from that, I guess, was that there had been a continuing leak of stories, or information about what was going on in the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct. It wasn't any longer a secret. We had an officer who was threatening suicide in the stationhouse, in the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct stationhouse. So I responded, Timoney responded, Jack Maple responded. It was finally defused. He went to the hospital. But we had a spirited, very frank, as they say, discussion in the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct at that point, Jack Maple taking the commissioner's side on this. As I remember, Timoney and I kind of arguing that, hey, it's time to put an end to this. Push the Mollen Commission, push the DAs, or the federal prosecutors to start indicting people. Because this uncertainty was now having ripple effects. There were people in the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct, I didn't know, but Maple and Timoney knew, who were wearing wires at that point.

JK Against their own.

Anemone Felt that, or suspected that, at the time. This was creating an awful lot of tension. There wasn't going to be any more damaging evidence gathered as a result of this. We were pushing for that to happen, and shortly thereafter, I believe, it did. The other tragic piece of this. One of the captains that I assembled on my team in Crown Heights, a great guy, honest as the day is long, straight-arrow, Terrence Tunnock, committed suicide in early '95, because he thought that he didn't follow up on a case where he told people to voucher drugs in the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct. I don't even know if it was ever figured out if they did voucher, or if that was one of the cases where they stole drugs or money. But this troubled him so much, and he spoke to a couple of different people about it, and killed himself.

JK You don't think that it takes the life of honest cops, but you're not surprised when one of the officers under indictment, or under arrest, takes his own life. But when an honest police officer.

Anemone It was so traumatic, for me, personally, because I knew what a good guy he was. Here's a guy who used to take the subway to work, he'd wear his uniform, as a captain. He lived in the city. He lived in the Bronx. But he'd take the subway to the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct; he'd take the subway back home from the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct.

JK Not only an honest cop, but a real New Yorker.

Anemone Yeah. Exactly. This was the only really negative time I had with Bratton. Because, as it turned out, on the day of Captain Tunnock's funeral, I approached the commissioner at the time. I said would he be at the funeral mass? He said he didn't do suicides. I said, "Well, I'm going up there. I'm going to be there." He said, "I'm not ordering you to, and I'm not telling anyone else to go." So I was there, and there was the borough commander at the time, from Manhattan North, at the funeral in the Bronx. But the rest of the executive staff was not there. That hurt. But that was, he was a good man. Every year they have an anniversary mass. I usually try to make it. I've made it four or five times I guess, in the last couple years.

JK Did you institute any changes after the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct incident concluded?

Anemone Well, I'd be hard pressed to think of any specific changes that we implemented as a result of that.

JK It's just bad men doing bad things.

Anemone That's what it was.

JK Or good men doing bad things.

Anemone And a lack of supervision, a lack of good management. I took a look at everything I could find about it. I spent a lot of time in Manhattan North as a captain, a deputy inspector, and I knew there were bad guys in some of these different precincts. I had a particular focus on the 34<sup>th</sup> Precinct at the time. I'd been on jobs as a duty captain, or a duty inspector, where I didn't like the way things were unfolding. I'd tell the captain, "Hey, take control up here. We'll search one room at a time, under the supervision of a supervisor, and then everything gets recorded." "Yes, sir. Yes, sir." It bothered me then, but the rules, everything that we needed was in place. All they had to do was take it seriously, the sergeants, the lieutenants, the captains. The only other change I think, I don't know if I can say it came directly out of that, but I created, in '95, a duty-chief, a steady cadre of duty chiefs. I gave them a list of very specific duties. They ended up taking me to court, they sued about this. But I wanted them to respond to these different types of assignments, radio calls. Oftentimes, they would sit in their office and wait for the phone to ring. That wasn't my vision of what a duty chief should be. I always felt that

supervision had to be out in the field. You had to be visiting police facilities; you had to be showing up on important radio calls; important assignments; and you had to surprise people at different places, just to get a feel and a flavor for whether or not the cops were being supervised at all, and whether or not that supervision knows what they're doing. It's a big organization. We have a lot of stars, a lot of good people, but sometimes the cops weren't getting the supervision that they deserved. The leadership they deserved.

JK On the one hand it's leadership, and you can try and lead, and try and manage as much as you want, but there is a culture among the officers of not ratting on another officer, even if you know what he's doing, and what he's doing is bad for the precinct. I'm not doing it. I know what he's doing. That's his business, not mine. How do you break through that? You can't.

Anemone Well, I've never given up on that particular aspect. For example, over the years, personally, I've sent people to the farm, for alcohol abuse, repeatedly, over the years. Every place I've ever worked. I came to the realization that over-indulgence in intoxicants was not a help while people were working. That's one instance. Then, by leadership, I think I've trained other people to kind of think the same way about this; to take a critical eye at absences on Fridays and Mondays, and Saturdays and Sundays, and excessive sick, otherwise healthy people, excessive sick reports. Interview people. Get to know the people who work for you. Then I rewarded people who did a real good job at getting to know their people.

I was a precinct commander in the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct. This idea of, rather than, as headquarters at the time required, an annual corruption assessment, and an annual corruption review by the precinct commanders, which were lengthy reports, and really maybe showcased some people's writing abilities, but they weren't realistic. I talked to my sergeants. Every payday we had a commander's conference, and I'd sit down and talk to them. I'd tell them, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct, I don't care whatever else, is a hotbed of drug activity. We've got cops at every different age level here in this precinct. We have some from different areas of the city, who may, if they're tempted, go the wrong way. It's your job, as a sergeant and a lieutenant, to stop it before it happens, by your example; by your teaching; by your sharp-eyed observations. One of those sergeants came to me in '85 or '86. No, later, it had to be later than that, '87 or '88. He had been to an assignment. He came back to the stationhouse. The cops were in front of the desk now, vouchering found property. He said, "I think they were stealing. I think they were about to steal the drugs." I said, "What makes you say that, Tom?" "Well, I came in. I saw the one guy over here. He looked at me, and he pulled his hand back. When I went over there, there were drugs. He didn't tell me. The other guy was doing something else." That was the first and only time that someone came to me, as a precinct commander, with that serious of an allegation. I took it seriously. Both the cops were transferred, they were placed on modified assignment, during the Internal Affairs investigation. I rewarded the sergeant locally, in the precinct. But a lot of the cops looked askance at this, and I had to speak at roll calls about it. I said, I don't care who they are. The sergeant is in the right in this particular case. He saw something that was wrong, something that each and every one of you here know that you're not supposed to be doing. His feeling was that they were going to come back later and take the drugs. They moved it from where it was; they put it

somewhere else. I said, he did the right thing, and he's looking out for the rest of you, to keep you on the straight and narrow. It was a tough place to work, the 3-2, but one of the things we were able to do, through leadership, through direction, we didn't have a cop fire his weapon in the two and a half years that I was there. Not one of the precinct cops fired his weapon, and they were shot at; they were shot; they were running on jobs, taking guns off the streets.

JK I was going to say, it wasn't Bayside, Queens that made their patrol.

Anemone They took pride in their work, and I took pride in the work they were producing. But you had to have one eye, always, they say about me, "Anemone never met a cop he didn't like." But that's not really true. I always had my eyes open to the possibility. I had seen a lot, coming through the ranks, and people have a way of disappointing you.

JK And there's a history, going back to the 1950s and the 1970s, and then the 1990s.

Anemone Although it's a little different here, now, with the narcotics. The narcotics, and the money, and the availability of it. It is a temptation.

JK I just can't get over, sometimes, how much you have to lose by being caught doing this, as opposed to the temporary gain that you have from the cash that you're going to get. There *is* a lot of cash involved, but compared to a thirty-year career and a pension, and a criminal record, how does someone make that balance?

Anemone The risk and the rewards. But people don't always look at things like that. People are impulsive at times. People can succumb, for the strangest of reasons, for no reason. This idea of instant gratification in our society. I wonder, as the cops are younger, are they more prone to say, well, I want it *now*. I want to buy that new car. I want to buy that house. I want to buy a new set of clothes *now*. I don't want to wait for it, save for it. How much does that play into this?

JK But that moment, when you walk into that room, and there's a pile of cash, or a mound of drugs. "Will they miss it if I take one or two packets?"

Anemone Exactly.

JK "I'm working my butt off out here, and what do I get for it?" There are lots of ways to justify it, in that moment. But that's the moment that you cross. It seems that when the department focuses on corruption, it doesn't focus on policing. It's either we'll focus on corruption or we'll focus on policing. We can't do both.

Anemone Ah. And that's, I think, what I believe we changed, or challenged, that thought process. Bratton never backed away from policing. Giuliani never backed away.

JK You were saying that Bratton, Giuliani never backed away from policing, but when a corruption scandal is even hinted at, there is a temptation to, "Okay, everybody, drop this, and make sure everyone is clean."

Anemone Now, that very aptly describes the pre-Giuliani NYPD. And, I wonder, now, if we're in that same kind of a mindset now. I'm not certain. But back in the day of Bratton and Giuliani, the Bratton years, the Giuliani years, later on with Safir, I never had the sense that we were ever asked not the police, because of the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct episode. Just make sure it doesn't happen anywhere else. There was a lot of training, a lot of discussions on the 30<sup>th</sup> Precinct, what were the results. The final result was, do a better job with the leadership, picking people commanding these places; giving them a little leeway with the people they put in place. That might have been one of the changes that came out of that – flexibility for the precinct commanders.

JK Flexibility. I was going to ask, was zero-tolerance your policy?

Anemone Well, you know, there was an awful lot of confusion. I think Bratton himself will tell you that zero-tolerance was never his term. It was maybe something the news media jumped on. I don't know. My view of it was that you had to police different neighborhoods differently, and that every police officer, however, as part of their equipment, should be attuned to the different laws that might help them control disorder; reduce crime; improve the quality of life in the neighborhoods where they were working. What do I mean by that? They had to know about the laws about riding bicycles on the sidewalk, for example. They had to know that a bicyclist had to obey traffic-control devices, the same way an automobile had to. They had to understand that jaywalking, at times, is a summonsable offense. They had to understand that drinking beer in open containers, of beer or alcohol on the streets, is against the law. Public urination is against the law. Street-corner crap games, dice games, are against the law. And in different times, and different places, we've had to have zero-tolerance for those infractions. That doesn't mean, now, that on a Saturday afternoon, in the summer, in East Harlem, on 118<sup>th</sup> Street and Second Avenue or something, you had to go up to somebody sitting on their stoops and arrest them for drinking wine or beer, as they were playing dominoes. That isn't what we meant. What we meant was that at the times and places where you had bad guys who were creating unsafe conditions, or creating crimes in the community, you had those people in those locations identified. Even though they may not have been committing an assault or a robbery at that time, we wanted police interactions with those people; so that if they were shooting dice, that would be a perfect time for an officer on foot patrol to stop them and tell them they're all under arrest. Or, if they were drinking beer in an open container, on the street, to stop them, and engage them.

JK I found a quote of yours from 1994, when you were beginning Compstat: "I don't want any captain, lieutenant, or sergeant to think that dealing with drinking beer in the streets in the summer is beneath them; that this is the NYPD, and we've got more important things to do. We've got to work from the bottom up."

Anemone There you go.

JK It starts with drinking beer on the streets.

Anemone And those are perfect opportunities, then, to identify the people who are there, who engaged in it, and we wanted them to have, or to produce, a government approved photo-ID. So that if you're going to get a summons we would know that it's really you we're writing the summons to. That's a made-up name.

JK There were a lot of those phantom summonses in the 1970s and '80s.

Anemone There sure were. There sure were. And now, as the officer starts doing this, and starts running the name checks, and warrants start popping to these different people, or you find out that one of these guys wants to talk to the cops about a crime he knows about, committed by someone else. There are so many good stories that evolve from that. And the general public, as opposed to the '70s and '80s, perhaps, post-Knapp years, they now see cops being engaged with the people who are causing fear in the community; the people that the residents are afraid of; the people who the residents know, and everyone knows, are ultimately engaged in the drug trade, or something like that. You now have cops stopping and taking action against these people. It's a way to build trust. We talk about having to trust the community. But you can't get it from day one unless you earn it, and we want the police to show hey, we're taking your complaints seriously. We're going to do everything we possibly can to address them. Just give us a chance, and watch us. Judge us on our deeds now, not on our past reputations.

JK This, also, is part of the broken-windows revolution, because police, prior to this change in thinking, concentrated on major crimes, and preventing or responding to major crimes; whereas, the public wasn't concerned about rape or murder, necessarily. That's not what comes up in community meetings. It comes up as public urination; the teenagers with their boom boxes; the drug trade on the corner; the prostitutes.

Anemone Or in the lobby, smoking marijuana in the lobby, and they have to walk past them to go to work, or bring their kids to school; stepping over the junkies on the sidewalk.

JK How long did it take before the police and the public were on the same page, as to what needed to be done?

Anemone I'm going to say it was probably a year and a half or two years. But I think a lot of this, we were doing good work, and maybe the public could have come around sooner. But you had a couple of things going on. Bratton was a great communicator. He believed in the media, and using the media to tell his story. So we had a lot of good stories, but we had the work to back it up. But he made sure, whether it was John Miller doing it, for him up front, and Giuliani was also very, very adept at that, getting that good story out there. So that if you had a state-of-the-city address, or a budget address, it always came around to policing, to the successes in policing. We gave him that platform to build upon. The competing side of that, the opposing side to the good news, and the

good work, was just the day-to-day, and the long history of negative reactions, or negative stories, whether it was the Dirty 30, all of those can set you back quite a bit. You're trying to move forward, you're trying to improve those relationships, and then you have something like a Diallo, or Louima, and lord knows how far back that set us. Then you had a mayor, Jack Maple told me once, he said, "He's the type of guy who probably, when he went to school, tougher kids would take his lunch money, or his lunch, every day, and he's waited all these years, until now he's in a position of authority. He's got to get back at the world." He had a mean side to him. He had a vicious side to him. So, we're doing good. We're trying to get a good message out, and then he could set you back six months with his antagonistic style, his lack of empathy.

JK But you stuck it out.

Anemone I did. But I didn't enjoy. I had a conversation once with this fellow who used to write for the *Village Voice*.

JK Wayne Barrett?

Anemone Wayne Barrett. Wayne Barrett. He said, "You and I are alike, Lou." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "We both started at this side of the pendulum, liking Giuliani, liking everything he stood for. But as you get to know him, the pendulum starts to swing to the other side." I said, "Well, that's probably a very accurate description." He was the right guy for the city at the time he came into office. He just could have been a better guy for the city. He could have been so much better, but he had no interest in doing that. He would look to be antagonistic, pick a fight, in many cases where one wasn't necessary.

JK The big story, from my perspective, is, over the last twenty, twenty-five years, we have improved the quality of life and the criminal justice environment in New York City immeasurably. It's a much safer, cleaner, more productive, more desirable city, in so many ways. At the same time, the police department has improved; fewer individuals shot at and killed by the police; fewer bullets fired, just in general; fewer complaints, actually; even an improved racial climate, between the police, even controlling for stop-and-frisk.

Anemone Right.

JK But incidents, as you alluded to, do come up that set everything back, and bring out all of the anger and resentments of generations, if I can be so broad. Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo, together, were the two big ones. But also, the Frank Livoti case, and Baez. I know that was a legally contentious case for you, for years. If you want to discuss that case, that would be, in a way, it's loyalty on your part to your officers.

Anemone Yes. Yes, it is. It's a tough case. Before we start with that, and I'll give you what I remember from that case, and my involvement with it. Another thing that happened to me. In 1975 I was a sergeant in the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct, and we received a transfer.

This is after, now, the layoffs. We had seen a lot of the units, specialized units, disbanded, or reduced in size, and those officers were sent to precincts.

JK Yes. They almost retired the mounted unit.

Anemone Exactly.

JK Unless, they had to raise their own money to stay in business.

Anemone Exactly. And there was a smaller-sized mounted unit, even at that. They did lose people. So beyond that, we certainly received a transfer in from Queens, a good, solid cop Bruce Anderson, a dynamite cop from the 1-0-3 Precinct, the top precinct in Queens. He lived out on the island, and they increased his travel time dramatically to send him to the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct. They put him in my squad. I was a sergeant at the time. Bruce's problem in Queens was he had wrecked a couple of police cars, aggressively looking to get to the scene of a call. His heart was in the right place. His commander had had enough of it, and had him transferred to the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct. A week later, Bruce was dead, coincidentally, in a vehicle accident. He was driving. He collided with another police car going to the scene of a call for help from cops, shots fired. Bruce was killed, and thrown from the car. They stripped his personal belongings before the cops got there. It stuck with me for years. I was the only supervisor working that night. I had a cop working the desk. We had to do an awful lot of things. I said, you know, I wonder if this captain in Queens, ever stopped to think, was there something else I could have done with this guy? Did I have to transfer him someplace else? I don't know. My view, as it developed, as I became a person who commanded three different precincts or a division, transfer, for me, is not the right, it's like sending your problem somewhere else. It's an admission of failure, or it's an easy way out in many cases. I didn't want to be that kind of guy, and I didn't want to be the kind of boss who allowed it. That's my prelude.

I went to the Ninth Division. Frank Livoti I met very early on. He worked in the 46<sup>th</sup> Precinct, which, of the precincts I had in the Ninth Division, that was the busiest. It was probably number two in the borough of the Bronx at the time. They used to wear T-shirts, "The most dangerous square mile in America." The homicides; the shootings; the drug use, it was just out of control up there. The cops had good spirit and good morale, and Frank was a very, very smart young cop. He was a PBA delegate at the time I met him. He represented the cops there. He worked the steady midnight shift, probably the busiest midnight shift anywhere in the city. What else can I tell you about him? He liked opera. He'd go to the opera every so often. Charming, well-spoken, well-educated, and he was the type of guy who wouldn't yes you to death. I'm the inspector, I tell him, I don't know how it started. I said, "You know what? Why don't you come up to the borough tonight, and drive me." I had duty on the midnight shift. So anytime I had the midnight shift duty, if he was working and available, he'd be my chauffeur, and we'd talk. He had some very good observations about police work. One of them being, "You know," he said, "I haven't fired my gun since I've been in the job. I've defused a couple of situations; took guns away from people who actively resisted, and I did it all with my hands, or my nightstick. I get a very low-medal, department recognition. These other guys, who are quick to pull out their guns and start firing shots at people." This is 1990, 1991 that he's

telling me this stuff. He said, "They get these great medals, just because there were gunshots involved. Is that right?" And we'd go back and forth on this particular topic.

So now he's working. I guess he used his hands. He didn't use his gun, he ends up choking somebody. But before that, well before that, he got into a pushing match with a lieutenant in front of the desk, at the 46<sup>th</sup> Precinct. I knew the commander. I knew the lieutenant well. At the time Frank was driving a different lieutenant, who I knew well, steadily, on midnights. He was his chauffeur. He put his hands on the lieutenant, and pushed him and shoved him. It was quickly broken up, and the precinct commander's response to this was to have him, he wanted him transferred. I was the Chief of Patrol. I asked the division commander, the guy who took my spot there, to go over, have a look at this thing, and, see what you can do. Number one, he's a PBA delegate. Number two, was he threatened? Was he instigated to raise his hands? Was the lieutenant hurt? Get me all the facts. You can always ring the office, what's going on. His call back to me was that it wasn't as bad as it initially sounded. Frank did put his hands on the lieutenant, on his chest, but the lieutenant was in his face, threatening to do something with him. I said, "What about the precinct commander?" "No, he wants him transferred." I said, "Well, did you talk to him?" He said, "No, no. I talked to him. I explained that your feeling is that you don't transfer your problems; you work with them." There were a number of things he could have done with Frank Livoti in that situation. He didn't. It didn't work out. Frank stayed in the 46<sup>th</sup> Precinct, and shortly thereafter he choked Baez. And now they wanted to know why I didn't allow this transfer. Would it have been any different had he gone somewhere else? Would they feel better if he had been the new version of Bruce Anderson?

JK The argument that, "He should have been transferred, and none of this would have happened," made no sense.

Anemone No sense at all. No sense at all. I wanted them to handle him, work with him. From what I knew of the guy, and I knew him better than I knew a lot of cops, at that point, I knew him very, very well, I didn't see him as being an unreasonable guy who wouldn't respond to discipline, positive discipline. "You know what, Frank? This is going to cost you ten days' vacation. And every time you have to come in on those ten days you should have been off, you can think to yourself, 'Next time I'm going to control myself. Control my hands.'" That might have been the better solution. Instead, we got involved in this back and forth; should he have been transferred? Shouldn't he? Why did you defend him? Because I knew the kind of cop he was. I said that at a borough president's meeting at the time. Freddie Ferrer was the borough president, and it was almost like a setup. They invited the commissioner, and he didn't want to go. He sent me. I said, "I'll go. I know the cop, and I know he's doing the kind of work, he's conscientious. He was out on the street. He was taking the guns off the street." And I said, "That's the kind of work these people up here want him to do." Suspend judgment on this choking thing, this early on, until the evidence is in.

JK But his life is completely destroyed, between being convicted of civil-rights, federal civil-rights violation.

Anemone      He beat the state case, and then, his mouth. He brought it on himself. Because he was also a little arrogant. He knew he was smart, he knew he was a tough guy, but he was a little too, pronounced in his comments. I think the federal attorney said, "You know what? Let's take another look at this. Let's see if we can't." And they did: violation of civil rights. He went to jail. He's out of jail now. I met him once since he's been out. And no, he was not a cousin, and there was that rumor running around, Lenny Levitt, that he was my cousin. He's not my cousin.

JK      It's a tough situation when you try to do the right thing, when you have reasons for doing what you do; yet something goes wrong, and everything can be second-guessed.

Anemone      Oh, yeah. It is. And I accept that. That goes with the territory.

JK      As I said, the department has improved. There are a whole series of incidents in the city that poison the racial climate, and then you have seem to have eased, and then you have Louima, and a year later, Diallo, which sets everything back years, and brings out the same kind of public agitation about police brutality, police violence, investigations from Amnesty International and Humans Rights Watch, accusing the NYPD of being worse than South Africa. That kind of thing.

Anemone      Over the top.

JK      Absolutely. Which isn't to excuse, or to minimize what happened in those two cases. And you were at the top of the department at that time.

Anemone      Both times.

JK      So you've got a problem in several directions. You've got the public reaction; the actual police situation that you have to deal with; what the cops do; why did they do it; was it right thing; how do I handle this? But you also have, what's the public perception of it? And it was a media storm that didn't abate easily.

Anemone      Yes, and again, I look to Giuliani for being kind of resistant to this whole idea.

JK      Resistant to what idea?

Anemone      This idea that initially that it could have been true. We had a briefing. I forget what day of the week the Louima stuff occurred, but we had a briefing in the police commissioner's conference room, first thing in the morning. And IAD had mentioned the facts, such as they had at the time; the allegation that something was shoved up his rectum; that it occurred in the 70<sup>th</sup> Precinct in the bathroom; blah, blah, blah, blah. Safir's initial reaction, and I'm sure he got it from Giuliani, was something lawyers had been telling him to say, or something he made up. When I sat there and listened to the whole bit of evidence, I guess it's a little bit later on, maybe, later that day,

I said, "Commissioner, this has the ring of veracity to it. It sounds true." "What do you mean?" And he ended up being on the phone with Giuliani back and forth. "Okay. We're going to suspend this one; place that one on modified assignment, etc." Okay. I said, "And what about the commander?" He said, "Well, he was off." I said, "Listen. You don't have something like that happen in a precinct bathroom unless there's a culture in that place that would accept it as no-big-deal. I've commanded three different precincts. I'll be damned if anyone would ever think that they could do something like that in one of those precinct bathrooms, and get away with it." And we discussed that back and forth. I said, "I love Jerry O'Connor." Jeremiah O'Connor was the precinct commander there. "But you can't stop below him. He's got to accept responsibility for this." And he was also removed, at that particular time. He felt terribly about it. He's a deputy chief today, but he went through a couple of very tough years, as a result of that. But I didn't see any way around not doing that.

JK Well, you have to send a message to the department that says that anyone who acts like this in your command, the man at the top sets the tone. Period.

Anemone Exactly. We had the same issue with the 1-0-6 stun gun, years earlier. There, they went overboard. They went up to the Chief of Patrol, and the borough command. But, certainly, at that precinct level, you don't dare do that if you're running the right kind of an organization, at that level.

JK That seemed to be the culture of that precinct, because they were making street arrests, and getting their confessions, and the whole system was fine with it. What impressed me, when I looked into that incident, was that to straighten out that precinct they sent in a Captain Ray Kelly.

Anemone Yes, the 1-0-6. Yes.

JK To straighten it out. I thought, well, that's something that doesn't come up in his career stats.

Anemone He had just come back from Harvard. He was getting his MA, I guess, up at Harvard, and he was put in there. Then, later on, he had the 71<sup>st</sup> Precinct, after the 1-0-6.

JK You can't that kind of stun-gun behavior taking place. I can't imagine it taking place today. When I read that that took place at that time, in those circumstances, I say, okay, it's those years. It's that situation, of drugs on the streets, and high crime rates. But I can't imagine that taking place today. Although.

Anemone Again, it wasn't all that long ago for the Louima, '97. I wouldn't say no, no never. It may be a variation on it. Anything is possible. And I trace it all back to the leadership at the precinct. That leadership has got to be there. They've got to be coming in and checking things out on the weekend, and at night. You can't do a Monday-to-Friday, 10 to 6 and expect to keep your hands clean. It doesn't work like that. You've got

to be on the shop floor. You're running three shifts; they've got to see you on the three shifts.

JK So where did you go as Chief of Department? Did you just show up places?

Anemone I brought a chauffeur from the 32<sup>nd</sup> Precinct, a cop I knew from when I was a sergeant there in '73, Gene Mullahy. Brought him to headquarters when I started as Chief of Patrol, and I told him, "Gene, create a book. Every day I want you to document where we were; what we did; who we saw. I want to visit," at the time, in '94, "every police precinct in the city. I don't know how long we're going to have this job, but I want to try to do that. If we go to scenes of cops getting shot, or cops shooting, I want that documented, as well." So he kept that for that year, '94, '95, '96, '97, '98, '99. I visited every police precinct facility in the city, at all different times, different days, different hours of the day; every housing police facility, because we later on merged; every transit police facility; some of the narcotic division facilities; some of the detective unit facilities. I think that was it. But I told him, "I definitely want to hit every single precinct So the 1-2-3 in Staten Island was the last. It's the place with the screen door.

JK Staten Island, the forgotten borough, in every way. But it's not quite as sleepy as it was.

Anemone No, not at all. So we did all that. I visited. We worked weekends. I showed up at different demonstrations or events. I certainly came out on the overnights, when I got a call about a shooting or something.

JK And the Diallo shooting. Did you handle that the same way you handled the Louima?

Anemone Well, I sent my guy, confidential aide, to the scene, as soon as I got the beep. He went up there, he reported back to me. "A lot of bullets were fired. There's no gun," which I knew early on. All right. "Get the crime-scene photos. I want a copy of the crime-scene photos. The sketch, the whole bit." Give me the package. People in the office would do this; when I'd show up, now, in the morning, I'd have a package on each of the cops. To this day, I'll tell you, it was a tragic mistake, but it was a mistake of the head, not the heart. There was no criminal intent; there were no criminal actions by those cops. It was a travesty that they were indicted, and had to suffer that. It was also a tragedy that Diallo was killed. But they were tactically incorrect. There were a couple of supervisory issues. Four of them in a car, to me it's a waste. To put out two-man cars, or if you had to have three-person cars, fine. You put three in the car. It's not the optimal solution. This idea of going, turning around, coming back, you get out. If there's something there that you see, you have four in the car? Two of them should get out; get out of the car, and approach on foot.

JK So it could have been better policing, and better policing.

Anemone      When you approach, in civilian clothes, and I've had a lot of experience as a cop, as a lieutenant, in that very unit. And our best arrests, mine and other people's, were when we surprised, used the element of surprise. Not that you stop the car; you stare; you wave someone over; the four of you get out at once. You walk up. You don't like what you saw? Okay. Keep going. Come up with a quick plan, and have somebody, or two guys, kind of walk up. You don't make eye contact, and you grab the guy. Now you'll see whether or not he has a gun, not that you give him an opportunity to run, and now he's running in the lobby; somebody falls; somebody shoots; they think the cop is shot; you have high-gloss paint on the door. Even the reflection from the camera showed up in the pictures. I said, "You know, that could be interpreted as." They're looking and they're seeing this flash; they're hearing gunshots. It gets so crazy.

JK      Similar to the Sean Bell shooting in recent years, the same kind of over-reaction.

Anemone      More cops don't equal less confusion. Just the opposite. You think, "Well, I've got four of us, six of us, eight of us at the scene." Uh-huh. That's when things go wrong, go haywire.

JK      That's when group-think takes over, and everyone is.

Anemone      Or no-think. You get that kind of mob approach.

JK      The difficulty is that they are policing places that, I mean, it was turned into a racial incident because the New York police are obviously racist. They're going after a black man "just because." But the fact is that that's who the criminals are in that particular place, and what are they supposed to do?

Anemone      They were up there specifically on a rape pattern, a stranger-rape pattern. This was a service to the community that turned into a horrible tragedy. But the tragedy, on the one hand, was for Diallo and his family. Now, the response ended up creating a tragedy for those four cops and their families.

JK      And the NYPD getting a black eye.

Anemone      Oh, yeah.

JK      As we say, we make mistakes; we can correct it tomorrow. You make mistakes; you're on the front page of the *Post*. And your goal is not to be on the front page of the *Post*? Were you ever on the front page of the *Post*?

Anemone      Front page of the *Post*? I don't know. Don't know. I'll have to think about that. "Top Cop Shot."

JK      Well, I'll take that as a no. The big revolution was Compstat.

Anemone      Oh, my gosh, yes.

JK And you were there at the inception, and throughout your time in police headquarters. How was this implemented? What were the discussions? And where do you want to go with that?

Anemone So let's start with early in '94. Commissioner Bratton convened these teams, functional versus geographic, there some of us were working on that. Another one was on precincts, organization or reorganization. Another one had to do with detective issues. These were teams composed of people like myself, Chief of Patrol, borough commanders, precinct commanders. We worked on all these different issues. Re-engineering teams, he called them.

JK These are police officers, career police officials, who had not been in these positions before Bratton.

Anemone Never.

JK All of you had been leapfrogged into police headquarters, so to speak.

Anemone Well, some of us had. Some of the other members of these committees were actually field commanders, or people from the field, at lower levels of the organization. There was a moderator, or a facilitator for each group, and each group worked on issues and made recommendations. But it became clear. I knew the mission was to reduce crime, reduce the fear of crime, improve the quality of life. I knew a little bit about precinct organization, having had three precincts. I knew where they needed help, etc. Flexibility for the commander was number one. But all of this was bringing us – and this came up in Jack Maple's mind; he clarified it for all of us – leading us to, we had to follow up with all this stuff. We had to talk a little bit more, once these committees disbanded and everyone goes back to their respective jobs. How are we going to follow through? How are we going to see that everything that we can do about reducing crime is done? He came to Bratton, I know gave him the okay. Then he came to me, and he said, "What do you think about this idea? We'll bring different groups of the city in. We'll do it in the press room, the second floor." I said, "Okay. Tell me a little bit more about what you're thinking. We'll talk to them about it. Fine."

JK It's a big deal to bring everyone in, from all over the city, bring them in. You don't do that on a whim. It's a lot of logistical organization, to get to that point. So he's suggesting, "Let's just bring everyone in"?

Anemone Yes. And let's see what their objections are ahead of time. The first thing everyone said, or just about, from the people who were pushing back, was that it takes too much time to get this information, to get this data. So Jack said, "Can you spare a couple of people?" I said yes. I had a sergeant and a lieutenant, John Yohe and Billy Gorta. He said, "Let's take the busiest precincts," (Jack was a good thinker) the 75<sup>th</sup> Precinct, the busiest precinct in the city, with the most violent crime. Let's have these guys, a pin map, on a map of the 75<sup>th</sup> Precinct, all the crimes that we're interested in – the

robberies, the shootings, the homicides, the burglaries – and see how long, and time them. How long does it take to get the reports? To put the pin? It ended up being twenty minutes a day, for the busiest precinct in the city. Two guys, twenty minutes, or forty minutes for one person. Or an hour. I think we estimated an hour. And if that's the 75<sup>th</sup> Precinct, the 17<sup>th</sup> Precinct should be able to do it in a whole lot less time. So we kind of cut the rug out from under all those arguments right off the bat. Then we said, "Bring those maps, use acetate overlays," which is what my guys did. They drew the blue crayon on an acetate, and that was the robberies. Then they had the red for homicides, the green for shootings, and then you'd see those hot spots show up, as the acetates were laid one on top of the other.

I had come to headquarters with these things, and very soon thereafter the objection was, we need this to be computerized. This is so hard. We're doing it by hand. Jack was able to get a grant for computers, so that every precinct in the city had a laptop. It was a PC. The crime analyst would input in all the data; then all that data was transmitted to the borough, and then to the Chief of Patrol's office, downtown. So we all had the same access, to the same data, with the same frequency – once a week. Then we refined that to where they were doing it every day. We put the numbers in every day, they'd send the numbers to us every day, and then it became, now let's get into the details of these cases. So what started as a map that each person would bring individually, we ended up with moving this whole setting to the Command and Control Center, where we had multiple screens. One screen in the center was always the map; then John Yohe would work in the computer, and then put up the visualizations for the different crimes, a discrete color and a discrete symbol for each crime, and by shift. Side maps would be other things that we did at headquarters. For example, your staffing, by day of the week and time of the day, would be on one. Crime by categories, by time of day and day of the week. "Hey! You've got everyone working Monday to Friday. But look at the robberies -- Friday night, Saturday night, Sunday night!"

This all became a conversation; a problem-solving exercise. "Oh, yeah, we have too many guys selling drugs. I don't have enough people." Oh. Okay. So now Narcotics started to show up at the meetings. Everybody's complaining: "What are you guys doing for me?" To the point where in '98, I guess, or '97, Narcotics was reorganized on a geographic basis. You had a dedicated sergeant and a team responsible for specific geographic areas in the city, narcotics, street narcotics enforcement. Then you had other people doing the inside stuff. These people would all show up and stand there with the precinct commander, and we could discuss cases; we could discuss general deployment issues, crime issues, and talk about solutions. The beauty was, everyone in the room heard the good stuff, the successes, and they also heard the failures. So saving, kind of time. "Well, I'd better not try that. That didn't work. Let's go down a different path," to come up with a solution. Or, "Hey, that's a great idea. I have the same problem. I can use that."

JK It comes out of mapping, that the motivation is, or, the motivating factor that changes the thinking in the police department is visualizing the problem on two-dimensional maps, which can present lots of data.

Anemone Yes.

JK As a historian, I remember they did the same thing with public health. They traced a cholera outbreak to one particular water pump by mapping where the cholera victims lived.

Anemone There you go.

JK And then, "Oh, it's that pump that it comes from." But that was 100 and some years ago, and the police department, the visualization, that's quite a revolution.

Anemone This is all Jack Maple. He talked to everybody. I spoke at length with him. We were co-chairs for the meetings. We had to be on the same page. But he would tell people at the meetings, "Think of this Compstat system, these maps and all this data, and the reports, the weekly reports, as our version of the British radar system. It's an early-warning system, and the sooner we can get the data, the sooner you can see what's happening, the sooner you can respond. Spotting those German bombers out over the Atlantic, rather than waiting for them to be over the heart of London. You can send up your RAF to intercept."

JK But it's one thing, as you said, one thing to know that this is where the hot spot is; this is where we have robberies when. But now the problem comes to be policing. Okay. Now what?

Anemone Yes. Well, the tactics. And, again, because we built in this flexibility for the precinct commanders, we made it absolutely clear, and you can see it in action at the meetings, the precinct commander might say, "I have no unmarked cars." Turn around. "Who's here from motor transport division." "I am, Chief." He needs, solution, right there at the meeting. Motor transport would supply cars. Other units would supply whatever it was that was needed. I'd turn to a borough commander on occasion, and ask him, "Why isn't this staffing increased? What are you doing? Do you have resources available to you that you can share, or share more frequently, with this guy, who's under the gun right now with violent crime?" The other piece of it is, in discussing cases, you'd hear some very innovative solutions, different tactics that worked, whether it was a sting operation for prostitution, or a chop shop, or a mobile mini-checkpoints to capture the stolen-car thieves. Once we had released that creativity, and we told them, "Listen, it's okay to fail. The sin is in not trying and not caring. Give it a shot. Let us know." And it had to be legal, moral, and effective. A three-pronged test.

JK Legal, moral, and effective. How much of this is another crack in the old NYPD culture? Because the idea that even a precinct commander could introduce new tactics must have been quite the, and to be listened to, and taken seriously, as opposed to, "That's not the way we do this."

Anemone It was a refreshing change. One of the first things that came out of these re-engineering committees, we allowed the precinct commander to fit the SNEU team (Special Narcotic Enforcement Unit) in civilian clothes. What a dramatic, dramatic

revelation, that they'd be able to make better arrests, testify more honestly, if they were allowed to wear civilian clothes and get closer to the people who they were arresting. I said the meeting itself became a problem-solving exercise. Some days the problems were solved; other days they were just put off for a second meeting, but everybody's thinking. You had a little bit of competition there, among those commanders, who were looking forward, some of them, to the opportunity to get up in front of the executive staff of the police department. Here you're a captain, or maybe a deputy inspector, everyone in the room now hears your name; they know what command you're working in; and you have a chance to have a conversation with Deputy Commissioner Maple, or Deputy Commissioner Norris, Chief Anemone, Chief O'Boyle, and people are taking notice. "Well, there's a bright thinker. There's a guy or gal who's got his or her head screwed on correctly. Let's take note of that." This is a whole new opportunity. So it was a challenge. You had a whole lot of people fighting it initially, but there were people who saw, "Hey, this could be a career-starter for me to jump ahead. I know what I'm doing. I'm looking for this opportunity to show my stuff."

JK Based on merit, as opposed to who your rabbi is.

Anemone Exactly. Exactly. Although you never eliminated that. That was never eliminated. But there were more people from field commands receiving recognition, and promotions, and rewards, than ever before. It wasn't strictly the headquarters' clique anymore, and that was good to see. It was good for morale, good for everybody.

JK You had a reputation as not being a nice person in Compstat. Is that accurate?

Anemone Well, there are some people who will tell you, you know, "Gee, it was great to be at the meeting with you, Chief," and I think I reflected, at the meetings, the people that I was having this conversation with. When the people on the other side of that room, people at the podium, exhibited to me that they had no sense of urgency about reducing crime, reducing the fear of crime, or improving the quality of life in the community, I had very little patience for that. As we moved on to '95, and '96, and '97, and this is not a new process anymore, it's been institutionalized at this point, in the department, and I had answers from precinct commanders, or narcotics commanders, "Oh, that's tough," or "Oh, that's hard, Chief. You know how hard that is." On occasion, I would respond in a not very nice fashion. At the same hand, if I had a conversation with someone who showed me that they were doing the right thing, or who brought a couple of cops down to the meeting, to tell us a little bit about something they did that was particularly noteworthy or heroic, I wasn't that same person. I was nice. I was *nicer*. I was glad to see. But if someone had to be the conscience of the organization, that was my role. I was in uniform. There was no way I was ever going to let anyone, at a meeting, say something that could be misconstrued by the fifty, sixty, or 100 people in the room, as a tacit endorsement of, "Oh, this job is too hard," or "I can't do it," or "I don't want to, the people aren't worth it," or "It's public service homicide." You'd be surprised at the things that were said at these meetings. If I heard it, you could bet that I'd be vocal about it. I'd raise my voice, and everyone took note, "Uh oh. This guy made a mistake, a serious mistake, trying to sell that bullshit by the chief." I did my homework; I expected every

one of them to do their homework. There is no way I should know as much as any of those precinct commanders about cases, or about their conditions, or what's going on. And on occasion, when I did, I let them know that that's unacceptable in this day in age. Now the problem with all this is, if you or I are having a private conversation about that, that's one thing. This is done in a room with 100 people or more, all levels of the organization, that was the downside of it. But I don't think you could turn an organization like the NYPD around as quickly and as dramatically if you're not willing to break a couple of eggs along the way; bruise a couple of egos. It's not going to happen. There is a long history of people not going down that way. This was my chance, my opportunity to see if I could impact, and it became clear to me that you had to be a tough guy to do it. No regrets.

JK I wouldn't think there would be. I read John Timoney's book, *From Beat Cop to Top Cop*, and he, in describing Compstat, said, people who visited Compstat came away with the wrong message. Either they thought the purpose of it was to verbally abuse the people who were presenting, your deputies and commanders, and make them squirm under such abuse, and he at one point said, but this is also a reflection of the NYPD and New York, and of course it's going to be a little abrasive, a little direct, and a little less polite than maybe it would be in some other precinct, in other cities. Compstat's been replicated in a lot of other places, but it's hard to say whether they got the right message as to what he purpose of it was.

Anemone When I went to, as a consultant, after retiring, in 2003, Chief Bratton, at the LAPD, had gotten the assignment there in October of '02, I went out in June of '03, to reconfigure his Compstat process, and it became very clear to me out there, and I ran afoul of a lot of the people out there, and I was a mere shadow of what I had been at the NYPD.

JK Your New York self, a mere shadow.

Anemone Yes. And they were *still* objecting to the fact that I would even ask questions, challenge their assertions, or ask pointed questions about results, etc., etc. But Los Angeles was a better place as a result of the changes, as a result of that.

JK A different police culture, entirely.

Anemone Yes.

JK And the methods have to reflect that culture.

Anemone Yes.

JK It is surprising. The comment that really sticks with me, from my conversation with John Timoney, was his remark that the NYPD has such a "deep bench," that captains and lieutenants at NYPD are qualified to be chiefs in half the country; and that the NYPD really is a model for the rest of the country. Is that a fair assessment?

Anemone Well, I don't know that every sergeant or every lieutenant, but he's correct. We have a deep bench, and you appreciate it more when you get into the business I'm in now, this consulting, when you go to different organizations, police organizations, throughout this country and internationally, and you see the level of commitment, the level of knowledge, the level of experience

JK And the level of expectation.

Anemone Yes. Exactly. So that the NYPD really produces some fine, fine people. We seem to have had, in the last fifteen years or so, another resurgence of disciples from the NYPD going to different departments throughout the country. This happened about the time of the Knapp Commission, when Pat Murphy was commissioner. Then for years it really didn't happen; now we've had this, in the Bratton years and post-Bratton years, we've produced some really fine people who have taken positions all over the country.

JK And usually with some dramatic results.

Anemone Oh, yes. Absolutely. A lot of them will tell you, well, we're bringing Compstat, or their version of Compstat, to this new assignment. It's a performance/management system. It's adaptable. It's flexible. But you do need a personality. You need someone there who is going to devote their time and energy to it. By the time I retired, I was just about as burnt-out as I could be. I was physically and emotionally exhausted, two meetings a week; Compstat every week, just about, every year. Then we created Trafficstat, one of the other weekdays. That was once a week, the same idea, the same approach, reducing traffic fatalities; serious injury accidents.

JK But you had also come from two very horrible episodes – Louima and Diallo.

Anemone On top of everything else. Yes.

JK I could understand the sabbatical.

Anemone I needed a sabbatical. But there's no provision for a sabbatical.

JK You couldn't escape to the Harvard Business School like everyone else did?

Anemone No. I needed it.

JK It was, it sounds like, the right moment to resign. And it's been a very different set of circumstances since then, with, number one, 9/11, and number two, I'm just thinking, how do you put into words the increased technology and surveillance that the NYPD, the intelligence aspect; the stop-and-frisk, the aggressive stop-and-frisk in communities, which has its own controversies. That, to me, seems to be it was a good idea applied at the time that we needed it, and now it's taken on a life of its own. How many times do

you have to stop the same eleventh-grader, who explained last time that he's on the math team? In that way, it's a different NYPD.

Anemone I wouldn't disagree. I wouldn't disagree at all with that. Again, it gets down to this idea of discretion, and the idea that if there is something happening someplace, chances are it's not happening in seventy-six precincts equally. You've got to be judicious in the tactic that you're using; and, again, applying it to time and place, for a particular purpose. That's got to be clear to everybody that's involved. And if not, if it's just about numbers, or just about getting more than you did last time, you're going to run afoul of people.

JK Or making it for show, like putting up tables and looking in people's bags before they get on the subway. It doesn't strike me that that's the best way to prevent a terrorist attack on the subway necessarily.

Anemone Exactly.

JK What have I not asked you about? I know I have not asked you about a lot of things that took place. The Brian Watkins incident, the Utah tourist, which had to be one of the lowest moments in the city of New York.

Anemone "Dave, Do Something."

JK But that was a moment, also, of really good, old-fashioned police work, in getting those kids at Roseland; for the police officers to figure out the kids were here; where would they be going? And there they were.

Anemone Yes. This was another Jack Maple belief, and I believe it myself. In New York we have great, great detectives, with the great capability to solve cases. High-profile cases, cases that get publicity, are going to be solved, with the very, very rare exception – Judge Crater; the Second-Avenue Deli homicide.

JK That was never solved.

Anemone No. With very rare exceptions. But we have the resources, we have the people we can put on those cases. We created a cold-case squad, which we can talk a little bit about, for some of those that fall into the cracks, some of those cases. But what we tried to create in the NYPD was that sense that, take every case, and approach every case, as if it were a high-profile case; as if you had just read the details in the *Daily News*, on your way into work; or on the front page of the *Post*. And now you were expecting the captain, or the squad CO, to look for results from you. That's kind of the secret to getting things. Because it's a lot of little cases, or cases that don't quite make the publicity splash, that have to be solved. The prime example, just generic, and this occurred many times, and again, after a while I would just jump out of my seat if I heard somebody explaining it this way. You'd ask a question about a particular shooting. "So what happened on this case?" "All we know, Chief, is a car pulled up at the emergency room at Bellevue, rolled

this guy out, and they took off." "Anybody get a plate number?" You'd ask those kind of, No. No. No. "Well, how about the victim?" "Well, he was uncooperative, Chief. He wouldn't tell us where he was. He wouldn't tell us who did it." And they would expect that that would be, in the old NYPD, that was enough. Uncooperative complainant; a couple days later they'd close that case. Now Jack's point, and then after he left, I just kept hammering away at it, stop right there, Sergeant or Lieutenant. Let me ask you: If this were a homicide, would your victim be cooperative? No. Well, treat every fucking shooting as if it were a homicide. You don't stop because the guy doesn't want to tell you. Fuck him. We want to know. Who is he? Is he on parole? Does he owe time? Who are his associates? This is what they had to start doing with every one of these cases. Is it a lot of work? Yes. And then my rejoinder to them, yeah, and it's hard work. No kidding. It's hard work. How hard to you think it is for the people who are trying to step over and duck, getting their kids to school; or coming home from work late at night? Raising a family in some of these sections of the city. How hard is it for them? They've got to dodge the junkies or the shooters. And you're telling me about hard? Come on. There's no comparison. So we told them, "Listen, in the future, I don't want to hear that excuse. Every shooting is going to be, for my mind, like a homicide. So I expect you to go through the same steps you would for a homicide." Unheard of. "You know how many shootings we have?" Well, our point was, there will be a lot less if we start handling them the right way.

JK This wasn't his first shooting; it's not going to be his last shooting.

Anemone Yes. Yes.

JK The gun has been used before; it's going to be used again.

Anemone How about the case of the guy who shows up at the hospital, very similar, maybe he was with friends or something; a gunshot wound in his leg, blah, blah, blah. Okay. Yeah. "Did your detective get the clothes?" Yes. "He got his clothes from the nurse?" Yes. "Well, let me ask you: Was there a bullet hole on the outside of the pants?" "Uh -- uh." "Can somebody find out?" On the break, we found out there was no bullet hole on the outside of the pants. What does that tell you? That he probably shot himself. A lot of these cases, guys would show up with bullet wounds, and we tell them, you know, I was chairman of the department's Discharge Review Board. We had thirteen, or twenty-three, or thirty, whatever the number was, officers who shot themselves, over the last year. We go to the range twice a year. We fire 200, 300, 400, 500 rounds, and we're still shooting ourselves. How likely is it that these guys, who don't go to the range to practice, and only have to go up to the rooftop of the projects, are more proficient with these semi-automatics than we are? Start looking for self-inflicted wounds. Where was he shot? Their stories fall apart, if you just take it seriously, create that sense of urgency.

JK But that's also changing the way you look at the city, which is: the city's chaos; everything is beyond control; there's no dealing with the people who are out there. Let's just keep a lid on what we can keep a lid on, and make sure we go home at the end of the shift. That's a different approach, which is, "No, we can get a handle on this."

Anemone Yes. This is the Bratton/Giuliani theory: Police do make a difference. Criminal conduct is learned behavior. The police can affect behavior, very simply stated. You know, when I was a young, brand-new precinct commander, I forget who it was who told me, "You know, Louie, there are three things you've got to remember. The only three things that are going to hurt you as a precinct commander." Yeah? What's that? "Corruption, cops, and the community."

JK Other than that, you're home free.

Anemone And the crime never entered into it. Watch the corruption. Don't allow your place to become a corruption nest. Make sure the community is happy. Placate the community. Don't give those summonses on Sunday, in front of the minister's church, when they're double-parked, and other things like that. The cops, keep the PBA, keep good relations with the PBA. Don't get them crazy, where they're going to picket your house, or your stationhouse, or your home; or the mayor or the police commissioner. That was it.

JK No one cared about the crime stats? The precincts kept crime stats, obviously. But they just went from the precinct into a file folder.

Anemone Into a file folder, and it went downtown once a month. I'd keep, as precinct commander, daily counts in pencil, in my office: burglaries; robberies; murders; stolen cars the top FBI/UCR [Uniform Crime Reports] categories. But none of the stuff was looked at in a timely fashion by anyone. Not at the borough, they were just looking for that monthly report, which is basically a statistical compilation. Although we did have robbery meetings in the boroughs, because in the '80s, we had 100,000 robberies in the early '80s. So they came up with an idea of putting cops in uniform on posts in robbery-prone areas, on overtime. This was the approach. You can't do anything about it during the regular shift; you need overtime to do it. And now we had borough robbery meetings. They'd invite Transit, Housing, precinct commanders, somebody from the Robbery Squad, and no detectives.

JK And no patterns. No one was looking for patterns.

Anemone No, no. It was a statistical recitation. The chief would frown if you had more robberies this month than you had last month. That's where the conversation would begin and end. All right, 19<sup>th</sup> Precinct. Okay. Twentieth, 23<sup>rd</sup>, Central Park, 24<sup>th</sup>. He'd go around the room. Transit, do you have anything? Housing, you have anything? Invariably, no. Robbery Squad? What do you have? Oh, we have a pattern. A jewelry store. A pattern. Okay. Good.

JK How nice. Good for you.

Anemone So long. See you next month. That's the only time we ever discussed crime. I used to tell people, as a precinct commander, whatever I did to fight crime, to

pump up the cops to do a little bit more, it was in spite of headquarters, it wasn't because of headquarters. I mean, I had to call off operations because I got a surprise visit from the borough, the division CO or the XO. "Okay, guys. We're not going to go out and do that right now. Hide, everyone run away. I've got to have coffee with the boss here, for a little bit." So we changed that culture. It was a cultural change in the NYPD. It's quite an accomplishment. In LA, I don't know that Bratton changed the culture out there. We've been bumping heads with them quite a bit.

JK Timoney had the same problem in Philadelphia and Miami.

Anemone Yes. But he went about it in New York from a different perspective, changing the culture almost simultaneously with changing the procedures, and protocols, and tactics, and focus, and mission. He changed the culture as he went. Again, he got everyone's attention, letting three or four super chiefs right out the door the first thirty days. Amazing.

JK Fifty, '70, '94 -- you had the Helfand Commission, the Knapp Commission, the Mollen Commission, and we're due?

Anemone Yes, I would think we are. You know, you would hate to see it, but I think that this may be more -- the next thing that you see may have more to do with direction, say, from headquarters, and tactics, and policies. I'm thinking more along the lines of the intelligence division and the counter-terrorism activities. That's become a huge focus for the department, and many of the things we're doing now I thought we were precluded from doing in prior years. I know they've had some success with federal courts giving them more leeway, but I suspect that there may be issues there that will surface at some point, either in a lawsuit, or a whistle-blower case, or something. I wouldn't be surprised.

JK You were bound by Handschu.

Anemone Handschu. There you go.

JK And that's been chipped away at, over the last couple of years.

Anemone Yes. I understand the interest in Islamic communities, and maybe Moroccan communities, and mosques. I just know that you can have a tendency to overdo; to encourage informants to become more actively engaged in preparations for a conspiracy, then you can --

JK Informant becomes agent provocateur.

Anemone There you go. It's a very fine line. A very, very fine line. So that's where my concern, or my direction, would be. The other issue, again, as more and more people are deployed to the intelligence division, counter-terrorism duties, they come from one place. They come from patrol. There has to be a recognition, to run a precinct, you need a certain level of staffing, to man the cars, the foot beats, the front desk, telephones, etc. At

the point where you start increasing that head count in the precinct, then that precinct commander can do more with those people. He has the ability to do over and above; to run a sting operation; to create a narcotics enforcement team; or to beef up his anti-crime officers, if he needs it; or a burglary team. As they lose people, those are the areas where those teams are reduced, and then you get back to the point where all you're doing is answering 911 calls, because your staffing is at the minimum.

JK That's what happened after the fiscal crisis.

Anemone It certainly did.

JK It was down 10,000 in five years, and people thought, well, why can't you do more with less? No. There comes a point where you don't have the bodies.

Anemone So if they're not going to be hiring, or increasing head count, I would be concerned that the housing projects are probably losing people. Transit is probably losing head count, and the precincts are losing people.

JK And you cannot rely on technology filling in the gap. Cameras go only so far.

Anemone It helps. All these things help, and they can be force multipliers. But the numbers that we're looking at and the numbers that you're talking about, my fear is that at one point you're going to see an upsurge in crime, and they're going to be so far behind the curve that it's going to take them a while to respond. I hope that doesn't happen, but that's a concern. Street crime, and this idea of the intelligence and the counter-terrorism, you're creating the next corruption or scandal.

JK It's unlikely we'll have the same kind of corruption scandal that we had with the Dirty 30, or even the "grass eaters" of the Knapp Commission.

Anemone Exactly.

JK But this one would be, maybe, at the hands of management.

Anemone I think so.

JK As opposed to the beat cop.

Anemone Yep.

JK Well, that's a good novel. Anything else you think I should include in this go-round? I mean, we can go year by year, and you'll have something to say about everything.

Anemone I think we've covered a lot. I'll give it some more thought. On the ride home I'm sure I'll say, "Oh, I should have said this or that, or brought this up." But we'll

have an opportunity, at least, to decide whether or not, if there's enough here to spend more time.

JK I'll get you transcripts, and we'll communicate about the documents and records.

Anemone Yes.

JK Thanks, Chief.

Anemone Thank you.

End

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