

THE TACTICAL PATROL FORCE OF THE NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

- by -

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Particularly in the larger metropolitan departments, today's police administrator is confronted by an overwhelming range and intricacy of problems. The increasing crime rate during the past decade has easily outpaced the best efforts of most law enforcement agencies to contain it. Various reasons have been given for this uneven battle, and in a discussion of this type attention should be focused on the subject of patrol.

The patrol beat is the basic geographical and organization unit of the department. It is the level at which the policies and plans of the department are translated into action and at which their effectiveness is best judged. The sum of the effectiveness of individual beat patrol officers, determines the effectiveness of the department in the accomplishment of its primary mission to prevent crime.¹

Since World War II many departments have modified older systems of foot patrol placing greater emphasis on the utilization of radio motor patrol and the development of more sophisticated techniques geared to quicken the police response to calls for service. In this process

¹City of Chicago, Police Department, Special Orders No. 63-22, April 15, 1963, p. 1.

also, and of sustained interest to higher echelon police administrators has been the formation of mobile task units as adjuncts to the normal preventive patrol functions. O.W. Wilson, in his book, Police Administration, wrote of the mobile striking force:

In addition to the routine preventive patrol which is basic to all good police service, many departments need auxiliary mobile striking forces which can be called upon to meet the unusual situation or the concentration of criminal activity in certain areas. These forces can be sent rapidly in the case of emergency, or their activities may be planned ahead as a result of study of incidents which because of their repetitive pattern may be expected to occur.

The commander of the mobile force should be responsible to the chief of the patrol division, but he should be prepared to assign his men as a supporting force to any division when he feels that the request is justified or when preliminary studies indicate the need.²

As part of this movement, the Tactical Patrol Force of the New York City Police Department was established on December 2, 1959.

Factors Leading to the Establishment of the Tactical Patrol Force

Since 1955, police manpower had been distributed throughout the city based upon "Police Hazards" present in each patrol precinct. Manpower allocations, therefore, provided an equitable distribution of the patrol force

²O.W. Wilson, Police Administration. (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1963), pp. 249-250.

based upon average requirements throughout the year. However, crime incidence rates fluctuated by type of crime, location, season, and time of day, because the criminal selects the time and place of the crime (for an infinite variety of reasons). Consequently, no practicable formula or method had been devised that could predict precisely where or when an increase in the crime incidence pattern would take place. Prior to the formation of the Tactical Patrol Force, significant temporary crime rate increases were met by detailing to the command effected personnel from other commands; this technique however, seriously impaired the capabilities of the command from which the manpower was withdrawn.

The maintenance of a striking reserve force is mandatory for the military services. The quasi-military nature of police work does not obviate this requirement; reinforcements must be immediately available to any part of the line structure that has been threatened.

It had also become generally recognized that "the crime curve shows a marked peak between 6 P.M. and 2 A.M."³ Acceptance too had been accorded to the principle that saturating an area with uniformed patrolmen is a strong deterrent to criminal activity.

³Smith, Bruce, Police Systems in the United States. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 134.

And finally, the community itself becomes much more alarmed over crimes involving personal violence than about any other type of criminal activity. People in an area subjected to some unusual criminal violence are best assured by the man in uniform and on foot. Invariably the fear of the citizens is reflected in the newspapers. Community groups begin to exert considerable pressure on the police administrator to do something whenever a pattern of crimes of violence turns radically upwards.

In 1958, as a result of these factors, the New York City Police Department's Bureau of Planning and Operations was directed to study the problems and to make necessary recommendations. In essence they recommended the creation of a specialized unit of city-wide jurisdiction, highly mobile, and that it be employed as a reenforcing unit to a command temporarily faced with increasing crime patterns. Consequently, the Tactical Patrol Force was formed.⁴

Purpose of this Study

The four objectives of this thesis are as follows:

- a. To describe and analyze the policies and practices that have become an inherent part

⁴Much of this information was gathered from the following source: McCarthy, William P., "Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Tactical Patrol Force for the Period from January 1, 1960 to March 31, 1960." A report to the Chief Inspector, May 4, 1960. (Typewritten), pp. 1-2.

- of the Tactical Patrol Force's modus operandi.
- b. To analyze the organizational structure and administrative arrangements under which the Tactical Patrol Force carries out its duties,
 - c. To present and evaluate the role of the Tactical Patrol Force in performing a specialized function within the New York City Police Department.
 - d. To recommend improvements in the operations and practices of the Tactical Patrol Force.

Importance of this Study to the Police and Public

Throughout the United States today there is developing an urgent awareness of the crime problem and the depth of ignorance about it, so much so that on July 23, 1965, President Johnson established the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, through Executive Order 11236. Their general report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, embodied all the major findings the Commission had drawn from an examination of every facet of crime and law enforcement in America. On page 96 of this text a set of questions were posed concerning the extent to which different patrol techniques result in arrests and lead to the fear of arrest.

There has been a good deal of discussion in police circles about foot patrol versus motor patrol, one-man patrol, versus two-man patrol, fixed patrol

versus fluid patrol, whether or not to use detectives on patrol, and other such technical matters. Lack of knowledge about deterrence has meant that many of these operational patrol decisions have been made on the basis of guesswork or logic, rather than on facts.⁵

It is hoped that this study will be of factual value in providing some insight for administrators contemplating the possible application of fluid patrol techniques to their departmental operations.

Also, during the past three years, several of the larger cities of this country have experienced major civil disorders. Consequently, police agencies are seeking approaches which will enhance their capabilities of not only preventing these disruptive circumstances from occurring, but of properly controlling them should they be initiated. Because of these factors the philosophies and operating concepts of such specialized units as the Tactical Patrol Force are being examined in depth. However, it should be noted that the purpose of this paper is not merely to emphasize the riot control or civil disturbance aspects of the Tactical Patrol Force; this would be but one of its several other and equally pertinent themes.

⁵A report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society." (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 96.

The police force has the power and it is their duty to protect life and property. We have read above how "the community itself becomes much more alarmed over crimes involving personal violence than about any other type of criminal activity." The matter of public safety is foremost in the expectations of the community. Whenever the police department successfully develops measures designed to increase the public's margin of personal safety from criminal activity, the degree of support and cooperation it receives from the people of the community it serves increases also. For it is to the public that superb service must be rendered; it is to the public that the police officer is indebted for the very existence of his office.

Also, one notes in municipal government today that elected officials are being held more accountable for the manner in which public monies are being expended. No longer does it suffice to simply provide police and fire services, sanitation facilities, or an educational system, without assurances that the quality of services so provided is the best investment available. This is particularly true in the case of the metropolitan police department, the "cop on the beat" being the closest and most visible representative of city government. The application of new patrol methods relates directly to the financial interests of the citizen body.

Methodology

This thesis is centered on the Tactical Patrol Force of the New York City Police Department. Though it is the hope of this writer that beneficial conclusions applicable to other agencies may be drawn from this paper it must be pointed out that New York City is unique in the complexity of its patrol applications. It should also be remembered that although fluid approaches to the older and more traditional systems of patrol have been discussed for many years, it has only been recently that field applications of these techniques have been implemented on an operational basis.

This paper then will attempt to show the policies and practices effected in the operations of the Tactical Patrol Force. In doing so the opinions of recognized police administrators will be used as criteria in evaluating the practices and procedures of this unit. A considerable amount of library and field research has been done in connection with this paper. Much information will be taken too from text books, public documents and reports, news articles and periodicals, speeches, some private material, and the published operating procedures and rules of the New York City Police Department. Statistics will be used where applicable. Many observations will be made also from the author's own experience, having spent a tenure of more than three years in the Tactical Patrol Force.

Each of the succeeding chapters will deal with a specific facet, always with the intention of relating one chapter to another, and all chapters to the main subject. Chapter II will deal with "The Organizational Structure and Growth Pattern of the Tactical Patrol Force." Organizational charts and a table illustrating the annual personnel complement of the Force from the year 1960 up to, but not including, 1967, will be cited.

Chapter III will be concerned with "The Patrolman." Because he is the foundational support of the patrol operation, the manner in which he is selected and trained will be presented. The relationship of "esprit de corps" and incentives to efficient performance will be discussed, as well as the means utilized for purposes of evaluation.

The subject of Chapter IV will be "Patrol Practices and Procedures." Among the items that attention will be given to are "Operation 25," saturation patrol, the practice of patrolmen working in pairs and their relative freedom of movement, the use of portable radios, principles of supervision, and auto vehicle spot-checking procedures.

"Special Operations" will be the topic of Chapter V. "Operation Decoy" will be explained and a brief discussion will be made of "Operation Thief Trap." The institution, application, and functions of the formalized car stop program will be examined.

"The Response to Emergencies and the Policing of Special Events" will be the subject of Chapter VI. The concept of "instant manpower" as incorporated into rapid mobilization plans will be studied. To demonstrate the role of the Tactical Patrol Force in the policing of special events, examples will be taken from the visits of such world luminaries as Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, Pope Paul VI, and President Lyndon B. Johnson.

In Chapter VII "The Areas of Civil Disorders and Riot Control" will be explored. Discussion will be devoted to the basic causes of urban riots as found by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Emphasis will be placed on such interrelated areas as the dilemma of the police position, the need for mutual understanding and cooperation between the police and the community, the origin and development of a riot, and the role of the Tactical Patrol Force in riot control.

Finally, Chapter VIII will summarize and conclude the major findings of this thesis. Suggestions will be made with the positive aim of improving the role of the Tactical Patrol Force in the New York City Police Department.

CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND GROWTH PATTERN OF THE TACTICAL PATROL FORCE

The New York City Police Department is a composite of many divisions, bureaus, offices, forces, precincts, units, and squads. All these parts are interdependent and interrelated coordinating their functions in varying degrees for the accomplishment of the department's primary goals, that are:

- a. Protect life and property
- b. Prevent crime
- c. Detect and arrest offenders
- d. Preserve the public peace
- e. Enforce all laws, ordinances, and provisions of the Administrative Code over which the Police Department has jurisdiction.¹

To carry out these functions effectively a proper grouping of activities and designation of responsibilities among these parts is necessary. Specific plans of structural organization are established and retained only so long as they facilitate the purposes for which they were created. The rationale of organizational planning should generally

¹City of New York, Police Department, Rules and Procedures. Chapter 1, Paragraph 1.0.

tend toward the following principles:

1. The work should be apportioned among the various individuals and units according to some logical plan.
2. Lines of authority and responsibility should be made as definite and direct as possible.
3. There is a limit to the number of subordinates who can be effectively supervised by one officer, and this limit seldom should be exceeded.
4. There should be "unity of Command" throughout the organization.
5. Responsibility cannot be placed without delegating commensurate authority, and authority should not be delegated without holding the user to account for the use he makes of it.
6. The efforts of the organizational units and of their component members must be coordinated so that all will be directed harmoniously toward the accomplishment of the police purpose, the components thus coordinated enabling the organization to function as a well-integrated unit.²

Organization Chart--May 1, 1960

The organization chart of the Tactical Patrol Force dated May 1, 1960, is depicted in Illustration 1. This previous framework conveys a simplicity of structure which further reflects both a relatively small personnel complement and a limited scope of activity. On March 31, 1960, the personnel complement of this unit was as follows:³

²International City Manager's Association, Municipal Police Administration. 5th Edition. Chicago: The Association, 1961, p. 45.

³Supplied by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on November 27, 1967.

Deputy Inspectors	1
Lieutenants	2
Sergeants	10
Patrolmen	<u>131</u>
Total	144

Patrol by the Force was provided in the precincts and on the dates indicated below.⁴

<u>Dates (First Quarter)</u>	<u>Precincts</u>
January 1 and 2	5, 7, & 9
January 5-8	13 & 15
January 9-15	5, 7 & 9
January 19	Training
January 20-22	66 & 68
January 23-February 4	42
February 5-14	81
February 15-23	14, 16 & 18
February 24-March 1	14 & 16
March 2-15	20
March 16-29	41
March 30 and 31	73 & 75

In the first quarter of 1960 it will be noted that the Force's squads were confined to a maximum of three precincts on any given date, and that these precincts were located in the same Borough.


In 1960 the primary functions of this unit were:

1. To patrol in areas of high crime incidence between the hours of 6 P.M. and 2 A.M.

⁴Ibid.

ILLUSTRATION 1

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE TACTICAL PATROL FORCE DATED MAY 1, 1960



The above illustration supplied by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on November 27, 1967.

2. To serve as a striking reserve force in the event that any part of the line structure had been threatened.

Organization Chart--October 1, 1967

In further analyzing the structure of the Tactical Patrol Force, an organization chart dated October 1, 1967, is also presented (Illustration 2). This is not done simply in a "then and now" fashion, but to more purposefully convey a clearer understanding of the manner in which this unit, during the intervening years, has had to adapt itself to the following circumstances:

1. An annually increasing personnel complement.
2. Wider patrol coverage.
3. Enlarged responsibilities.


Table 1 shows the personnel complement of the Tactical Patrol Force during the years 1960 through, but not including, 1967. In this seven years span the size of this unit has nearly tripled.⁵ This increased manpower has resulted in widening the range of the Force's operations.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police in An Organizational Study of The Police Department, New York City, New York, commented:

⁵As of this writing (December 8, 1967), the personnel complement of the Tactical Patrol Force is approximately 650 men.


ILLUSTRATION 2

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE TACTICAL PATROL FORCE DATED OCTOBER 1, 1967



NOTE: Under each of the above (8) Operating Elements there are three (3) Squads, each of these Squads containing one (1) Sergeant and twenty-five (25) Patrolmen.

e.g.,



The above illustration supplied by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on November 27, 1967.

TABLE I

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT OF THE TACTICAL
PATROL FORCE 1960-1967^a

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Deputy Chief Inspectors					1	1	
Inspectors	1	1	1	1			1
Deputy Inspectors				1	1	1	1
Captains	2	2	2	3	4	4	5
Lieutenants	4	4	4	5	6	5	7
Sergeants	12	12	17	24	20	23	23
Patrolmen	150	143	197	223	281	278	439
Probationary Patrolmen		50	25	69	24	71	1
Totals	169	212	246	326	337	383	477

^aThese statistics supplied by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on November 27, 1967, and cover the third quarters (July 1-September 30) of the years indicated.

In New York, as in most large cities, the police department is continuously faced with special problems or conditions that require additional attention from the police. In order to meet these recurring needs on a continuing basis most large departments establish a tactical or task force patrol unit.

The New York City Police Department has pioneered the concept of a well-organized mobile force capable of saturating an area to meet unusual demands. The department's Tactical Patrol Force has earned the respect of other department units and is highly regarded as an effective and necessary operational tool.⁶

And it was precisely because this unit was regarded as an effective and necessary operational tool that its services were in constant demand, both by precinct commands within the department, but primarily by community groups that exerted emphatic pressure to obtain the protective services afforded by the Force's presence in a neighborhood. As a result, the patrol coverage falling within the Tactical Patrol Force's jurisdiction steadily grew wider. To substantiate this point, the example below is offered from a time interval applicable to the Third Quarter of 1962.⁷

<u>Dates (Third Quarter)</u>	<u>Areas of Operation</u>
July 1-3	79 & 90
July 4-10	25, 79 & 90

⁶International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., "An Organizational Study of The Police Department, New York City, New York." Washington, D.C.: The Association, July, 1967, p. 390.

⁷Codd, Michael J., "Operation of the Tactical Patrol Force for the Period from July 1, 1962 to September 30, 1962." A report to the Chief Inspector, October 15, 1962. (Type-written), pp. 4-5.

July 11-18	25 & 73
July 19-23	42 & 73
July 24-31	42, 48 & 73
August 1	42, 48 & 81
August 2-9	24 & 81
August 10-21	20, 24 & 81
August 22	7, 9, 20, 24, & "Operation Decoy" inaugurated
August 23-30	24 & "Operation Decoy"
August 31	7, 9, & "Operation Decoy"
September 1-4	7, 9, & "Operation Decoy"
September 5	7, 9, 40, 41, & "Operation Decoy"
September 6	7, 9, & "Operation Decoy." Primary Day Detail assigned to Patrol Borough Bronx (43, 46, 47, 48, 50 & 52)
September 8	"Operation Fine Comb" inaugurated in 23, 41, 71, 90 & 104 & "Operation Decoy"
September 9-11	7, 9, 41 & "Operation Decoy"
September 12	"Operation Fine Comb" in 20, 46, 75, 87, 103 & "Operation Decoy"
September 13	7, 9, 40, 41 & "Operation Decoy"
September 14	"Operation Fine Comb" in 34, 43, 78, 80, 107 & "Operation Decoy"
September 15	7, 9, 40, 41 & "Operation Decoy"
September 16-17	7, 9, 41 & "Operation Decoy"
September 18	7, 9, 40, 41 & "Operation Decoy"
September 19	"Operation Fine Comb" in 23, 40, 71, 88, 110 & "Operation Decoy"
September 20-21	7, 9, 40, 41, & "Operation Decoy"

September 22	"Operation Fine Comb" in 26, 48, 73, 76, 109 & "Operation Decoy"
September 23-24	7, 9, 41 & "Operation Decoy"
September 25	20, 23, & "Operation Decoy"
September 26	"Operation Fine Comb" in 7, 47, 81, 82, 109 & "Operation Decoy"
September 27-28	20, 23, 75 & "Operation Decoy"
September 29	"Operation Fine Comb" in 6, 42, 75, 79, 107 & "Operation Decoy"
September 30	20, 23 & "Operation Decoy"

During the month of October, 1967, on certain dates, the T.P.F. (Tactical Patrol Force) has regularly exercised the placement of its squads in three Boroughs (Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn) at one time, providing patrol coverage in as many as eleven precincts simultaneously.

With a moderate degree of foresight and the increased potential capabilities commensurate with an annually increasing personnel complement, an objective observer could predict that within the next several years this unit will also expand its permanent operations to include the county of Queens.

Presenting the primary functions of the T.P.F. could be stated as such:⁸

1. Perform selective patrol in areas of tension or high crime incidence.

⁸ McCarthy, Charles E., "Preparation of an Organizational Manual." A report to the Chief of Patrol, August 10, 1967. (Typewritten), pp. 1-2.

2. Train members in the proper methods of crowd control, use of weapons and necessary equipment, and maintain reserve supplies of shotguns, gas masks, helmets, riot batons and protective vests.
3. Provide a rapid mobilization and response force to emergencies, disorders or threatened violence between the hours of 6 P.M. to 2 A.M. See S.O.P. 3 S.1962 revision #1, November 25, 1966 (Rapid Mobilization--Tactical Patrol Force).⁹
4. Control pedestrian and vehicular traffic at street locations where motion picture and television production crews are operating.

The specific functions of the Tactical Patrol Force are:¹⁰

- a. Supervision of training and direction of command.
- b. Selection, investigation and interview of prospective members.
- c. Development of novel methods of policing serious disturbances.
- d. Maintaining an atypical training program so as to effectively fulfill the command's responsibilities, including weapons, gas masks and crowd control.
- e. Evaluating requests for services of Tactical Patrol Force and making pertinent recommendations.
- f. Assigning personnel and equipment to areas requiring supplemental patrol.
- g. Providing concentrated manpower assignments to areas of tension or unrest.
- h. Providing details for parades, demonstrations, presidential visits, etc., as directed.

⁹This S.O.P. (Standard Operating Procedure) will be explained in Chapter VI, "The Response to Emergencies and the Policing of Special Events."

¹⁰McCarthy, op. cit., p. 3.

- i. Creating operating innovations particularly designed to cope with unusual crimes or conditions.
- j. Functioning as part of the Emergency Task Force when so directed.
- k. Supplying personnel to locations within the city where motion picture filming is taking place.
- l. Maintenance of reserve supplies of shotguns, gas masks, helmets, riot batons and protective vests.

The Administrative Staff's General Functions

The general functions of the Administrative Staff are

to aid and assist the field operations with general clerical duties, reports, roll calls, payrolls, court appearances, vacations, time records, dissemination of information, notifications to operating personnel relative to assignments due to decentralization of the unit, and coordinating operations. In addition, to provide and assign members to Film Details and maintain necessary records in connection with this daily operation.¹¹

The Statistical Analysis and Deployment Section's General Functions

The general functions of the Statistical Analysis and Deployment Section are "to aid and assist operations in the analysis of crime incidents and determining operational areas and posts. Evaluating the unit's operations and also the personnel of the unit. The deployment of personnel based on

¹¹ This information furnished by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on November 30, 1967, from the T.P.F.'s "Functional Guide."

the above."¹²

The Offices of the Administrative Staff and the Statistical Analysis and Deployment Section

Since June of 1961, the Tactical Patrol Force has housed its operations above the 4th Precinct station house, on the 3rd floor of 16 Ericsson Place in Manhattan. The offices themselves are not actually offices in the plural sense, but an office, one office, measuring approximately twenty-five by forty feet in area, that has by means of six foot steel and glass partitions been compartmentalized into four subdivisions. And among these four sub-offices are cramped the "private" office of the Commanding Officer of the Tactical Patrol Force, thirteen desks (including the Administrative Lieutenant's and Sergeant's desks), a dozen wall lockers, supply and filing cabinets, radio storage and charging racks, approximately a dozen telephones, a duplicating machine, and several typewriters. The bulbs affixed to the high ceiling shed light far below the standards of intensity given by fluorescent lumination. The physical layout of this office is not compatible with the efficient handling of an annually increasing administrative and clerical workload. This is a complaint not uncommon to many other branches of the New York City Police Department,

¹²Ibid.

where personnel daily perform office duties in buildings constructed during the turn of the century.

Though George R. Terry, in his book, Office Management and Control, was directing his comments to private industry, what he wrote could certainly be applied to the offices of police agencies:¹³

Office layout has a number of objectives. Among the more common are to facilitate an efficient flow of office work; to assist good supervision; to use space effectively; to locate equipment, machines, and aisles conveniently; to add to the employee's comfort; to impress favorably customers and visitors; and to provide for future expansion, contraction, or move, as the case may be. All are important, and all are provided in an excellent layout.

The congested condition of these offices constitutes a day-to-day operating problem. The supervisory personnel of the Force have always been aware of this defect, and periodically attempts have been made to improve the operating layout. For the most part these attempts have been frustrating, not because of a lack of ingenuity, but simply because too much has been crowded into too little floor space.

The Film Detail

A problem that has continued to be of concern to metropolitan departments is the degree to which non-police functions should be assumed by their agencies.

¹³Terry, George R., Office Management and Control. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Fourth Edition, 1962), p. 341.

Administrators are always petitioning city executive bodies to permit their departments to concentrate on the task of fighting crime and that these efforts not be imposed upon by the assignment of such duties as the enforcement of certain Health and Administrative provisions of the law and, to an increasing extent, the issuance of summonses for traffic violations. But as has often been the case, the counter argument is the contention that a certain job has to be done, somebody has to do it, the result being that police departments and many other agencies also, find themselves performing tasks that logically do not fit into their organizational patterns. In the instance at hand, the subject with which we are concerned is the Film Detail.

For many decades New York City had conveyed through the medium of motion pictures the image of a metropolis rich in art and cultural heritage, a warm, colorful city, vivaciously sympathetic and captive to the old world charms of Chinatown, Little Italy and Yorkville, interested in, appreciative, understanding and receptive to the carefree, artistic, Bohemian life of the Greenwich Villager, enjoying the gaiety and entertainments of Broadway, the climax of the legitimate theater, striving for the sophisticated elegance of Park Avenue, the successes of Madison Avenue, witnessing the intricate financial manipulations of Wall Street, the image of New Yorkers, a conglomeration of peoples, that as a group truly represent New York without

losing the self-identity which shows them also as representatives of innumerable nations, heritages, customs, and beliefs. But in the years just prior to Mayor John V. Lindsay's term of office, New York City was becoming less and less the subject of cinema exposure. To a measurable extent this was damaging not only to the prestige of a great city, but more precisely to the industry of tourism, a big and important business which offered to the non-resident an endless variety of entertainment, unique experience, and pleasant memories. To the City of New York this industry provided substantial revenue. Among the reasons given by movie makers for the decrease in New York City's movie making activities were the city's extremely burdensome and costly requirements concerning fees, permits, and licenses. To many producers this situation became an unsurmountable obstacle and with no alternatives remaining they ventured to big cities in other areas, mostly the West Coast. Mayor John V. Lindsay realizing the tremendous value of once again having New York City as the locale of movie production, did everything possible to eliminate the former bureaucratic processing that had been required, and by doing so, hoped to regain the benefits to be derived from having New York in pictures again. To a prominent extent his objectives were accomplished.

The City of New York, at the direction of Mayor Lindsay and Thomas P.F. Hoving, the administrator of recreation and cultural affairs, will sponsor a three-day festival

of New York films here April 3 to 5.

The festival, designed to call attention to the city both as a location for filming and as a production center. . .¹⁴

And as one would realize considering the populousness and vehicular flow of New York City, the control of pedestrian and vehicular traffic at the scenes of filming locations presented a problem. It was for these reasons that this detail was assigned to the Police Department, and within the department to be jointly the concern of the Chief Inspector's Investigating Unit and the Tactical Patrol Force.

The Chief Inspector has designated the Chief Inspector's Investigating Unit to be specifically responsible for the overall supervision of this department's activity relating to motion picture and television filming within the City of New York, with members of the Tactical Patrol Force policing said activities, in uniform.¹⁵

The T.P.F. was specifically chosen for this task for the following reasons:

1. A constant availability of manpower during the daytime hours of 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. during which time the larger part of this activity occurs.
2. The decentralized nature of the Force's structure, as well as the promptness with which men can be notified and assigned, with a minimum of inconvenience to the men themselves, to any part of the city where filming may be located on a given day.
3. Provide a manpower pool that is acclimated to movement from one location to another. This is important because under normal circumstances the scene of

¹⁴New York Times, January 31, 1967, p. 50.

¹⁵City of New York, Police Department, Temporary Operating Procedure No. 305, July 17, 1967.

filming activities may cover several locations within an eight hour period.

e.g., Battery Park, Empire State Building, Grand Central Station, etc.

4. The assignment of T.P.F. men present to the public and the movie industry the impression of courteous and competent patrolmen, well uniformed, who can adapt quickly to changing situations with a minimum of supervision.
5. Provide for the patrolmen a sometimes welcome break in the repetitiveness inherent in the constant working of 6 P.M. to 2 A.M. tours of duty.

These then are the reasons why the Film Detail has become the province of the Tactical Patrol Force. It should be noted, that the daily allocation averages four to five patrolmen.

Summary

This chapter attempted to highlight the organizational structure and growth pattern of the T.P.F. In its formative years, its limited duties were enacted by a relatively small personnel complement, usually operating within a single Borough and invariably in a maximum of three precincts at one time. However, within a six year period both its general functions and personnel complement have increased considerably. This growth pattern has been absorbed into a larger and more structurally detailed framework. Today, the Force's daily operations cover three Boroughs and effect the regular deployment of eight (8) Operating Elements, with each Element consisting of three (3) squads.

CHAPTER III

THE PATROLMAN

The patrolman is the foundational base of the entire patrol operation, the success of the patrol operation, in turn, being an absolute requisite for the culmination of the department's overall policies and objectives. The patrolman, whether on foot or in a radio motor patrol car, is the front line soldier occupying the highly strategic position, the middleground between a safe and peaceful society and those criminal and reckless elements who would attempt by their unlawful acts to wreak havoc upon social order and democratic freedoms.

Thus all the devices for popular and administrative control---the enactments of legislative bodies, the aims of governmental executives, the hierarchies of structural organization, and the expenditure of great sums of public money upon men and equipment ---all converge at last upon one focal point: the policeman. The manner in which he customarily reacts to the various stimuli applied to him therefore holds considerable importance for the realities of police service. To treat the individual policeman as a largely passive factor, who is moved hither and yon on the chessboard of police strategy, is a convenient and even necessary device for the purpose of generalized thinking and planning; but to complete and to execute such plans without considering the possibilities and the limitations of flesh and blood is to invite failure.¹

¹Smith, Bruce, Police Systems in the United States. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1960), p. 18.

Entrance Requirements for the Position of Patrolman

Before an individual may be appointed to the position of Patrolman in the New York City Police Department, he must first meet the minimum requirements that have been established by the Department of Personnel of the New York City Civil Service Commission. Once having satisfied these preliminary requirements, he must next pass a series of mental, medical and physical tests which are conducted by the Civil Service Commission. In addition a thorough background investigation is undertaken by the Police Department for purposes of ascertaining the candidate's good character, moral temperament, and in general, his suitability for police work.

Attention here will be devoted to the City of New York's present policies regarding the entrance requirements for Patrolman. This will be done in order to provide the reader with a clearer insight concerning the basic qualifications, character, mental, medical and physical attributes demanded of a candidate prior to his being appointed to the position of Patrolman.

The following information has been extracted from Amended Notice of Examination No. 7017 issued by the City of New York, Department of Personnel, City Civil Service Commission:²

²The City of New York, Department of Personnel, City Civil Service Commission, Notice of Examination No. 7017, May 24, 1967.

Age Requirements: Patrolman: The Administrative Code provides that only persons shall be appointed Patrolmen who shall be at the date of filing an application less than 29 years of age; and the Public Officers Law provides that persons shall be at least 21 years of age at the time of appointment.

(Note: certain exceptions are made for those who were engaged in military duty.)

Minimum Requirements: At the time of appointment candidates must be graduates of a four year senior high school or have a high school equivalency diploma or an acceptable G.E.D. certificate issued by the Armed Forces.

At the time of filing, applicants must be United States citizens.

Also, at the time of appointment as a Patrolman, possession of a valid New York State motor vehicle operator's license is required.

Proof of good character will be an absolute prerequisite to appointment. The following are among the factors which would ordinarily be cause for disqualification: (a) conviction of a misdemeanor or an offense, the nature of which indicates lack of good moral character or disposition toward violence or disorder; (b) repeated conviction of an offense, where such convictions indicate a disrespect for the law; (c) repeated discharge from employment where such discharges indicate poor performance or inability to adjust to discipline; (d) addiction to narcotics or excessive use of alcoholic beverages; (e) discharge from the Armed Forces other than the standard honorable discharge. In accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Code, persons convicted of a felony are not eligible for positions in the uniformed forces of the Police Department. In addition, the rules of the City Civil Service Commission provide that no person convicted of petty larceny, or who has been dishonorably discharged by the Armed Forces shall be examined, certified or appointed as a patrolman.

Those appointed as probationary Patrolmen must serve a probationary period as provided in the Rules of the City Civil Service Commission existing at the time of appointment.

(Note: this is a period of nine months.)

Tests: Written, weight 100, 75% required.

The written test will be of the multiple-choice type and will be designed to test the candidate's intelligence, initiative, judgment and capacity to learn the work of a patrolman. It may include questions on police situations, reading comprehension, arithmetic reasoning and vocabulary.

Candidates who pass the written test will be required to pass a qualifying medical test and a qualifying physical test. No second opportunity will be given to candidates who fail the qualifying physical test; or who fail to appear for the qualifying physical test, except those on active military duty.

The physical test will be designed to test the strength, agility and power of candidates. Candidates will take the physical tests at their own risk of injury, although every effort will be made to safeguard them. Medical examination will be required prior to the physical test and the Department of Personnel reserves the right to exclude from the physical test any candidate who is found medically unfit. Candidates will be required to achieve a mark of 70% or higher on the physical test in order to qualify. Medical and physical requirements as posted on the Department of Personnel's Bulletin Board must be met.

Candidates shall be rejected for any deficiency, abnormality or disease that tends to impair health or fitness. Such causes for rejection include but are not limited to defective vision, heart and lung diseases, hernia, paralysis and defective hearing. A history of any psychoneurotic disorder may disqualify. Persons must be free from such physical or personal abnormalities or deformities as to speech and appearance as would handicap them in the performance of their duties as a Patrolman.

Candidates who fail to attain the pass mark set for any test, subject or part of the examination shall be deemed to have failed the examination and no further test, subject, or part of the examination shall be rated.

The above information highlights the fundamental and most important qualifying attributes required of a candidate for Patrolman. However, it is not a complete listing in so far as this is not necessitated by the subject presently under discussion.

The Police Academy

Upon being appointed to the position of Probationary Patrolman, the new member is assigned to Recruit Training School located in the Police Academy. The Academy itself is a new, modern, air-conditioned, eight-storied edifice of glass and granite located on East 20th Street between Second and Third Avenues in Manhattan. It is one of the most impressive buildings of its kind in the country. Included within its structure is a large, fully equipped gymnasium-drill hall, an Olympic short-course sized 30x75 foot swimming pool, an up-to-date firing range, dozens of classrooms, a lecture room with 100 seats, a simulated station house for training recruits, a fully equipped theatre with a seating capacity of 495 people.

The civilian-turned-patrolman gets his first baptism of fire as a cop through the Academy. What he learns and retains greatly influences his future years as a member of New York's Finest. Once he graduates he doesn't leave the Academy behind for its curriculum is so planned that almost every conceivable type of course is available to him to help mold him into a specialist in any number of scholastic and criminalistic fields.³

The training of the recruit is divided into three

³City of New York, Police Department, Spring 3100, Vol. 36, No. 1, January, 1965, p. 19.

specific fields: academic, physical, firearms.

The academic part of the recruit's training is taught by superior officer's of the rank of Sergeant or Lieutenant. These men are dedicated career officers with many years of extensive and varied experience in different areas of assignment within the department. Most of them hold Bachelor's Degrees with a great majority of them holding degrees and scholastic achievements above the Bachelor's level. They bring to the classroom an ideal combination of the theoretical and the practical. The following is an excerpt from the Academic Instruction Syllabus of the Recruit's Training School.⁴

This course of instruction is intended to present to the recruit, the fundamentals of modern police work and general knowledge necessary to make him a competent, professional police officer at the level of Patrolman.

The academic school term consists of lectures, demonstrations, playlets, practical exercises, class discussions, workshops, field trips, motion picture films, reviews, and tests. Four hours of academic instruction are presented each day that the recruits are at the Police Academy. Approximately four months of academic instruction are required to complete the training period.

The program is organized in five divisions. Each division contains several courses of related material. Each course is devoted to one phase of police work. The entire program of about three hundred hours is supplemented by approximately 100 hours of on-the-job training in field commands.

⁴City of New York, Police Department. Academic Instruction Syllabus of the Recruit's Training School, Issue Revised: July, 1967, pp. 1-3.

The following divisions and courses form the academic portion of the Recruit Training Program.

<u>DIVISION NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COURSES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
I	Introduction to a Police Career	5	25
II	Police Procedures and Techniques	8	72
III	The Police, The Government, The Law	6	66
IV	The Police Role in Human and Race Relations	12	65
V	Demonstrations and Exercises	5	83
	TOTALS	<u>36</u>	<u>312</u>

COURSE LIST

DIVISION I

"INTRODUCTION TO A POLICE CAREER"

<u>SERIES</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
A	Orientation and Indoctrination	9
B	Ethics and Conduct	8
C	Equipment and Department Property	3
D	Department Organization	3
E	Reports, Records, Orders	<u>3</u>
		<u>26</u>

DIVISION II

"POLICE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES"

A	Aided and Accident Cases	7
B	Patrol Procedures	18
C	Traffic Procedures	14
D	Investigations	3
E	Summons Procedures	8
F	Arrest Procedures	12
G	Prisoners	5

H	Police Emergencies, Disasters and Civil Defense	<u>5</u> 72
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DIVISION III

"THE POLICE, THE GOVERNMENT, THE LAW"

A	City Government and Cooperation with Governmental Agencies	2
B	The Courts	3
C	Criminal Law and Modus Operandi	32
D	Municipal Law	12
E	Evidence	2
F	Public Morals	<u>15</u> 66

DIVISION IV

"THE POLICE ROLE IN HUMAN AND
RACE RELATIONS"

A	Psychology and the Police	6
B	Human Relations	5
C	Race Relations and Civil Rights	5
D	Crime and Delinquency Causation	17
E	The Constitution and Due Process	3
F	Assemblages	3
G	Police Ethics (Chaplains)	5
H	Workshops on Human Relations	8
I	Critique Term Paper	1
J	Guest Lecturers	5
K	History of Negro in America	4
L	Puerto Rican Culture and Customs	<u>3</u> 65

DIVISION V

"DEMONSTRATION AND EXERCISES"

A	Demonstrations	17
B	Field Trips and Duty	23
C	Practical Exercises	17
D	Review and Testing	17
E	Driver Training	$\frac{9}{83}$

REQUIRED READINGS

1. "Crime and Race" by Marvin E. Wolfgang
Institute of Human Relations Press
American Jewish Committee---1964
2. "Case Study of a Riot" by Lenora E. Berson
Institute of Human Relations Press
American Jewish Committee---1966
3. "Police and the Civil Rights Act" by
IACP International Association of Chiefs
of Police----1965
4. "The Puerto Ricans: Strangers, then Neigh-
bors" by Clarence Senior
Quadrangle Books---1965

The above curriculum provides ten credits toward an undergraduate degree in the Police Science Program of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The faculty of the Police Academy makes every effort to encourage the new patrolmen to continue their schooling by taking advantage of the many educational opportunities offered by the Police Department.

The physical program consists of sessions that are held four days each week for a period of three hours each. A total of one hundred ninety-two hours

of training is scheduled over a four month period.⁵ This training is geared to develop an over-average degree of strength, endurance, agility, coordination and skill, preparing each new patrolman for the rigors of a job that at times taxes his physical being to the utmost. For cops must do everything. From racing along a darkened street to vaulting a backyard fence, rushing up a flight of stairs, carrying the sick and injured, shinnying up bridge cables, diving into icy waters, walking the streets in every conceivable type of weather, standing on a traffic post under the broiling sun for hours and spending hours on end at a fixed post.⁶

Physical hardiness is a prerequisite for any and all of these tasks. Recruits receive such training in the new gymnasium designed to make all conditions ideal for staff and student alike.⁷

Much of the time is spent in calisthenics, accentuated by pushups, situps, squat thrusts and running. Judo is taught and practiced, Recruits are acquainted with the vulnerable parts of the body, the various weapons and attacks, and also practice balance and leverage control. They run through a series of leg trips, forward and backward

⁵ Ibid., p. 54.

⁶ Spring 3100, op. cit., p. 20.

⁷ Ibid.

rolls and side and break falls. They cultivate proper front chokes, side headlocks, bridging and wristlocks--- all absorbed with the thought in mind that one day just one of these may save their lives.⁸

Finally, the recruits receive a minimum of fifty-four hours of firearms training, during which time each member fires a minimum of 340 rounds of ammunition with his .38 calibre special service revolver with a 4" barrel either Colt or Smith & Wesson. Firearms training is held at an outdoor range, with firing at the 7 - 15 - 25 and 50 yard target distances, or, during the winter months at the Police Academy's indoor ranges at the one distance of 20 yards.⁹ These modern firearms ranges are located in the basement of the new building. There are four ranges with twenty-two firing points. Also, two ranges are equipped with situation movie projectors and screens. When using these, the new member of the force watches situational targets moving on a screen forcing him to judiciously consider his response to the situation in light of legal right and duty, safety to others and need for use of the firearm. Upon firing the apparatus records and points out the results of the shots in terms of his ability to hit the subject aimed at and what the slugs actually hit.¹⁰

⁸Ibid.

⁹Academic Instruction Syllabus of the Recruit's Training School, op. cit., p. 47.

¹⁰Spring 3100, op. cit., p. 22.

Recruits are given as much combat type training as possible. There are two classrooms available to the range officers, each capable of seating some fifty students at a time. They will be used for instructing recruits in the manual of arms for the revolver, safety regulations on the street and on the range and for explanations of the fundamentals of single and double action firing.¹¹

Classroom work will include lectures on defensive combat-type firing. Before actual range firing, briefings will be given on the type of firing to be done during the day. Instructors will explain to the probationary patrolmen the situational uses of the firearm and the legal rights and duties of policemen in regard to it.¹²

Recruits will be introduced to the various types of weapons they'll meet on the street, ranging from home-made zip guns to sawed-off shotguns, rifles, machine-guns and a wide variety of pistols. Visual aid presentations will round out the training.¹³

While in the Police Academy the recruit leads a well ordered, disciplined life devoted to the mental and

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

physical demands of his new chosen profession. In each of the three areas of concentration, that is, academic, physical, and firearms, he is being constantly supervised and rated. Not all the recruits who enter the Police Academy will be rewarded with the success of graduation. In each class there are several individuals (approx. 1½%-2½%) who will fail the courses of instruction given, primarily because of either a lack of sincere effort or an inability to master the studies involved. Consequently, they will be dismissed from the Police Department.

Probation and First Grade Status

Upon graduation the recruit remains a "probationary" patrolman for approximately another four to five months. During this interval, the practical or on-the-street nature of the training that he received in the Academy is being further evaluated. Emphasis here is placed upon the manner in which he handles himself in situations ranging from the apprehension and arrest of an armed robber, to the processing of a simple aided case involving, for example, a citizen who trips and injures his ankle on sidewalk curbing. Only after the satisfactory completion of a nine month probationary period does he receive the permanent appointment of Patrolman. And it is important to note, that it will not be until he has completed a total of three years "on the job" will he receive the financial remuneration, benefits, and status

of a first grade or veteran Patrolman. The time, expense, and training, that go into the making of a cop are factors which the average New York City citizen is unaware of.

Many people today are under the impression that it takes little more than the taking of a gun, a badge, and a uniform, to transform a citizen into a police officer. In the years to come, due to the increasing complexity and professionalization of police service, the entire process outlined above will become even more time consuming, expensive, complicated ---but ever more rewarding.

Staffing the Tactical Patrol Force

In 1959, William P. McCarthy, the first commander of the Tactical Patrol Force decided to make it an elite unit. To do so would mean setting the standards high. In order to accomplish this, recent graduates of the Police Academy were called back for interviews. Only young men, under thirty years of age, with a short time in the Police Department would be considered. In addition, they would have to be over six feet tall and above average in intelligence. Surprisingly, with all of the adverse working conditions involved, there were more than enough volunteers. To obtain supervisors proved more difficult. Sergeants, older for the most part and family men more settled in their ways, were reluctant to accept such assignment. It was finally determined that recently promoted detectives, that is to say, detectives promoted to the rank of patrol

sergeant, who aspired to reassignment, ultimately, to the detective division, would be the most receptive. A group of these men were interviewed, and most accepted.¹⁴

When the Force was established, if men already assigned to precincts volunteered and were found suitable, they would be assigned to the unit. Over the years however, the staffing procedure has become formalized. One of the lieutenants assigned to the Tactical Patrol Force addresses each class of recruits at the Police Academy. Explaining the work of the unit, he points out the advantages and the disadvantages of assignment. Usually there are more applicants than there are vacancies. Each volunteer is required to complete a questionnaire. His academic, physical, disciplinary and personal background investigation records are scrutinized, as well as his I.Q. score. On the basis of these, if a man is obviously not acceptable, he is not interviewed.¹⁵

Any man considered good potential, is given a preliminary interview by one of the Tactical Patrol Force supervisors. Here the goal is to assess the candidate's maturity, poise, appearance, as well as his reasons for wanting to join the Tactical Patrol Force. The interviewer

¹⁴Sullivan, James T., "Personnel Management in the Tactical Patrol Force," (unpublished paper presented to the Police Science Department, Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Public Administration, The City College, January, 1963, p. 2).

¹⁵Ibid.

attempts to measure the man's self-control and his ability to adjust to situations created during the interview. The man's reasons for joining is important. If, for example, his interest is in the steady tours offered solely in order to attend school, the interviewer will have certain reservations. The Force is a high activity unit operating in the most hazardous areas of the city. Each man is expected to carry his share of the burden. Therefore, a Tactical Patrol Force man can expect to make many court appearances, which would of course interfere with his school schedule. This is made eminently clear to the applicant, and if he is willing to work under those circumstances, an individual determination is reached. Those interested only in school and apparently unwilling to perform, will receive no further consideration. At the conclusion of the interview, each candidate is rated in one of three categories. The first category is the most acceptable; the second category is acceptable; and in the third are those considered unacceptable. Those who are to be considered further will be interviewed by the commanding officer or his deputy, and their decision is final.¹⁶

¹⁶ McManus, George P., "The Impact of Specialized Police Patrol Techniques In Major American Cities," (unpublished Thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration presented to the Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Public Administration, The City College of The City University of New York, June, 1965), pp. 38-39. From an Interview with Deputy Chief Inspector Michael J. Codd, Commanding Officer of the Tactical Patrol Force, January 19, 1965.

Orientation

The new member's first day in the Tactical Patrol Force is one of formal orientation. He is congratulated upon his having been selected by the Force, and a few words of welcome and advice are given by the unit's Commanding Officer. By means of personal inquiries and the explanations heard during the course of interviews with superior officers, most of the new patrolmen have by this time, an accurate and well founded understanding of the objectives and policies of the Tactical Patrol Force. However, once again this area is reviewed. Questions are invited regarding any doubts or misconceptions that may exist in the thinking of the new men concerning their assignments. The highlight of the day is the assignment of the patrolmen to the Operating Elements of the Force where they will be working, that is, Manhattan South, Manhattan North, the Bronx, or Brooklyn. In making these designations the following aspects are evaluated:

1. Present squad shortages.
2. Residence of the new member.
3. Existing squad car pools.

Within this framework, every effort is made to assign the patrolmen to Operating Elements where the inconveniences of travel to and from work will be minimized. The new man is also notified of the squad with which he will be working, and the name of the Sergeant who will be his immediate supervisor.

Among other administrative details that are attended to on Orientation Day are the following:

- a) Issuance of Personal and Tag Summons Books.
- b) Explanation of T.P.F. arrest processing systems.
- c) Explanation of T.P.F. court procedures.
- d) Payment of organizational dues.
- e) Notifications and procedures to be effected when ill or injured.
- f) Format involved in ascertaining daily assignments.
- g) Personal safety on street, particularly when engaged in motor vehicle spot-checking duties.
- h) Explanation of reimbursement procedures applicable to bridge and tunnel expenses, and for gasoline expenses incurred during travel to and from assignments throughout the city.

Training

Prior to his being assigned to the Tactical Patrol Force, the patrolman has already received a high quality of substantial training in the academic, physical, and fire-arms areas. Also, he has had the initial experience of applying some of this training during the performance of several precinct tours of duty while still in the Police Academy. In fact many rookies may have had occasion to work with the T.P.F. However, it now remains the task of the Force to "tailor" the new patrolmen to its own specialized operations. This tailoring process encompasses two divisions:

1. Formal Training

2. On-the-Job Training.

The first facet of formal training involves one day of Crowd Control Instruction, which will be repeated on an annual basis. This eight hour schedule is comprised of the following subject areas:¹⁷

- a) Orientation and Discussion of Patrol and Disorder Problems---This topic outlines the day's agenda and introduces some of the problems which might be encountered during the course of normal patrol duties, which if not initially handled in a proper manner may possibly lead to a disturbance of serious proportions. The appeal made here is to the good judgment, professional competence, and ability of the patrolman to recognize potentially critical situations, to react properly to them, and to make known to their superior officer the details of the situation encountered.
- b) Close Order Drill---Composed of military marching and facing movements designed to develop precision and immediate response to oral commands.
- c) Instructions and Use of the Gas Mask and Combat Vest---Instructions as to the carrying, fitting, wearing, and utilization of the gas mask and combat vest.
- d) Bus Drill---Emphasizes the rapid and militarily precise method of boarding and exiting from buses that are ordinarily dispatched to the scene of a major emergency. The importance of presenting a well trained, finely coordinated, and disciplined image is stressed. This image alone can do much to effectuate the dispersal of a disorderly crowd.
- e) Squad Formations and Disorder Tactics---This subject deals with the three principal squad formations of riot control: the wedge, diagonal, and line.
- f) Unarmed Defense and Use of the Baton---The patrolmen observe demonstrations and practice the application

¹⁷ This subject outline was taken from the following source: McCarthy, Charles E., "Training Schedule For Tactical Patrol Force Personnel." A memorandum for all Tactical Patrol Force personnel, October 13, 1967. (Typewritten), p. 1.

of forward and backward rolls and side and break falls, balance and leverage control, various types of body throws, and certain come-alongs and restraint holds. The development of skill in the proper use of the police baton is taught.

- g) Use of Firearms Under Riot Conditions---The legal and proper use of firearms under riot conditions is explained. However, once again the maturity, good judgment, and professional competence of the patrolman is appealed to. The indiscriminate and purposeless use of firearms is soundly discouraged.

The second facet of formal training involves a Special Task Force 1-day course, which will also be repeated on an annual basis. This eight hour session takes place at the Police Academy's outdoor shooting range located at Rodman's Neck on Eastchester Bay. On separate days, members of the department's Motorcycle Units and Emergency Service Division are also recipients of this special training. This eight hour schedule is comprised of the following subject areas:¹⁸

- a) Shotgun Familiarization and Firing. Patrolmen are familiarized with the Model 37 Ithaca 12 gauge Police Special shotgun. They fire this weapon over various distances on both a "controlled fire upon command basis" as well as individually. Firing is also directed at clay targets released from a shooting trap to develop the patrolmen's skill at hitting moving targets.
- b) Special Weapons Demonstration. The range officers demonstrate the use and effects of various weapons which the patrolman may encounter upon the street.
 - e.g., .22 calibre bolt action rifle with scope,
 - .30-.30 or .35 calibre lever action carbine,
 - .30-.06 Military Model M-1 Garand,

¹⁸ City of New York, Police Department. Spring 3100, Vol.37, No.7, July-August, 1966, pp. 9-19.

various inexpensive military weapons of foreign manufacture, homemade molotov cocktails.

- c) Lectures on, and the viewing of films on Crowd Control, and the demonstration and practicing of squad formations.
e.g., wedge, diagonal, line.
- d) Lectures devoted to the use of the nightstick, handcuffs, defense, smoke bombs, use of revolver plus bullet potential.

The next segment of formal training, received not only by the T.P.F., but by each member of the department, is the annual outdoor combat shooting cycle held also at Rodman's Neck. Instructions are given by firearm's experts on the fundamentals of combat shooting. A situational training film and blank revolver are used to emphasize when and when not to fire in given situations. During this one day, eight hour session, each police officer is issued two hundred rounds of ammunition. One hundred and fifty rounds are fired from the service revolver and the remaining fifty rounds from the off-duty gun. These rounds are discharged over various distances. The principle combat firing positions taught are the point-shoulder, kneeling, and prone positions. Barricade shooting emphasizes the value of using maximum cover in various situations.¹⁹

Also, each member of the department annually participates in an indoor shooting cycle which takes place at

¹⁹Ibid.

the various indoor ranges located throughout the city. The emphasis here is on fixed target shooting in a standard firing position over a distance of twenty yards. It is during this cycle that each member of the department is annually qualified in the use of the revolver. Members are also awarded designations above the qualifying requisite.

e.g., Marksman
Sharpshooter
Expert

The unit training television program comprises the final section of formal training. This is an on-duty program broadcast via station WNYC, Channel 31, Mondays through Fridays, from 4-4:30 P.M., in ten cycles each year. In conjunction with the program a Training Bulletin is prepared for each cycle and is sent to various Unit Training Officers throughout the department, and to commanding officers of each patrol unit. Highlights of the bulletins are broadcast twenty times a month, thereby reaching all members of the patrol force.²⁰

The telecasts are received in various station houses and commands. At the end of the broadcast the Unit Training Officer gives a half hour lecture, either expanding on the particular program or taking other items relevant to

²⁰City of New York, Police Department, Spring 3100, Vol. 36, No. 1, January, 1965, p. 23.

his command and discussing them. Typical of the subjects covered are Narcotics, Use of Force, Juvenile Delinquency, and Automobile Larceny.²¹

Undoubtedly, an important and substantial part of a T.P.F. man's training is concerned with on-the-job street experience. The initial five month period of the new patrolman's assignment to the Force, which incidentally, approximates the remaining tenure of his probationary period, is of prime significance in the tailoring of a T.P.F. patrolman. However, this is not to imply that training is then completed and that a man has reached the optimum of his learning capacities. Rather it is meant to stress the influential and formative aspects of these early months of assignment. The attitudes and work habits developed at this point will have a major part to play in the patrolman's over-all success as a police officer.

Specific internal procedures of the Tactical Patrol Force tend to maximize the training benefits applicable to new patrolmen. Perhaps, it is best to begin with the individual squad sergeants. We have seen that most of these men were former detectives recently promoted to the rank of patrol sergeant, and had been selected by the T.P.F. from a group of volunteers. For the most part, they joined with

²¹Ibid.

the motive of possibly being reassigned to the Detective Division as detective sergeants. They are dedicated, career orientated officers, who would not have progressed as successfully as they have done, if in the first instance they had not been excellent patrolmen, and highly competent detectives. They are young in age for their rank averaging thirty-four years. They provide good example and fine leadership qualities to the patrolmen whom they supervise. And each of these sergeants always works with the same squad; where the squad goes, the sergeant goes. It is also of interest to note that Tactical Patrol Force sergeants are not involved with many of the administrative duties ordinarily assigned to a precinct patrol sergeant. Matthew J. Neary, in his thesis, Motivating the Foot Patrolman, wrote:

In addition, these sergeants do not perform switch-board duty, are not assigned communications to investigate, and are not assigned "license zones" to check. Thus, the supervisory aspects of their jobs have been enhanced, while the work aspects have been substantially reduced. Each is responsible for a definite group of men, and in turn, is responsible to one of the patrol lieutenants.²²

Because the supervisory aspects of the sergeant's job are enhanced by a lessening of administrative duties,

²²Neary, Matthew J., "Motivating the Foot Patrolman," (unpublished Thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration presented to the Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Public Administration, The City College of The City University of New York, June, 1962), p. 89.

more time is consequently devoted to the important function of training. The sergeant instructs his subordinates relative to new techniques and tactics. In many instances he is rendering advice and lending his assistance. This training function becomes accentuated in the Tactical Patrol Force simply because of the number of new men graduating from the Police Academy, and without having had any on-the-job street experience, are directly assigned to the Force. Also, it must be remembered that this Unit's operations are of a specialized nature and do not in many ways coincide exactly with the Police Academy's Syllabus of Instruction, which is basically geared on the correct assumption that approximately ninety per-cent of the graduating probationary patrolmen will be assigned to regular patrol precincts. With this realization in mind the squad sergeant pays particular attention to his new men. Supervisors make a point during the new man's probationary period that he always works with a partner, and invariably that this partner be a senior T.P.F. patrolman with substantial experience and a good departmental record. To make certain that the new patrolman does not pattern his work habits solely on the techniques learned from one senior partner, and because no two patrolmen work in precise fashion, he is introduced to, and works with several veteran patrolmen. It is hoped that during the course of these work relationships he will be taught by each of these men effective techniques that

will measurably improve his own competence. All during this time the squad sergeant is appraising the new patrolman's performance and making constructive criticisms whenever applicable. The patrolman is encouraged to ask questions and invited to readily discuss and seek the advice of his sergeant on, for instance, patrol situations in which he feels a degree of uncertainty. Several minutes during the course of each patrol tour, the squad sergeant talks with his men. This brief but daily patrol visit can be an invaluable training aid.

Though steady assignment to a Radio Motor Patrol Car is usually the province of senior patrolmen with good records, the squad sergeant attends to the fact that on a few occasions new men, with either a senior patrolman or himself in company, be temporarily assigned to a Radio Motor Patrol car for the purposes of familiarizing the probationary patrolmen with the operation of a radio car, automobile methods of patrol, call signals and use of the radio, and the role played by the patrol car in the T.P.F.'s over-all operations.

Another internal feature of the Force which is of significant value in the training of new patrolmen, concerns the inherent variety of the T.P.F.'s areas of operation. A patrolman assigned to a patrol precinct is responsible for a fixed area within prescribed boundaries where police conditions basically do not fluctuate outside of a

fairly steady range. Periodically, the precinct patrolman is detailed for perhaps a day or two to another area of the city where special problems are being encountered. However, the normal operations of the Tactical Patrol Force cover several precincts simultaneously, and all these precincts are characterized by a variety of uniquely serious problems. For two days a T.P.F. man may be assigned to a residential neighborhood plagued by burglaries and hallway muggings, the next four days to an overcrowded tenement district with a heavy incidence of narcotics use and violent street crime, the next week to a precinct having youth gang problems in its parks and recreational centers, and so on. In addition to this he is often called to the scene of tense situations bordering on the edge of large scale civil strife, and to demonstrations which require expert police handling to insure that activities are kept within the dictates of legality. Consequently, it can be readily understood how this range and variety of operations, this depth of experience, grooms a Tactical Patrol Force patrolman into a police officer of extensive abilities.

The Relationship of "Esprit de Corps" and Incentives to Efficient Performance

"Esprit de Corps" is defined as "the common spirit

pervading the members of a group."²³ Any interested observer who has worked in, been associated with, or has studied the Tactical Patrol Force, readily concludes that there is a common spirit pervading the members of this organization. It is a factor which plays a leading role in the success of the Force. And due to the fact that one is dealing with an intangible entity not susceptible to calibration, one can only speculate as to the reasons for its continuing existence. Perhaps, it is best to begin with the patrolmen. For the most part they regard being a police officer not merely as a job, but as a career. They would not be satisfied simply with being a patrolman if the opportunity existed whereby they could be a better patrolman. By some, these attitudes are negatively criticized as being idealistic faults attributable to the inexperience of youth. But in a more meaningful and personal sense a positive, active, devoted affiliation with one's duties and responsibilities constitutes one of the strongest bulwarks of law enforcement agencies today. The following is taken from an article which appeared in the Police Management Review:

²³Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. (Springfield, Massachusetts: G.&C. Merriam Co., Publishers, 1953), p. 281.

The key word in his oath of office is the word "faithfully." By pronouncing this term, he assents to the fundamental doctrine of public service that he bears arms in favor of a higher allegiance than his own self interest and that he will remain steadfast in the conscientious performance of his duty---even at the sacrifice of his life.

This loyal attachment to a principle remains strong notwithstanding the technical attacks on our system of criminal justice and despite the increasing examples of public discontent as exemplified by recent draft card-burning exhibitions, mass disorders, and open defiance of rule by law. The police officer's fidelity to a noble cause so often goes unsung today ---if not merely unrecognized.²⁴

Other, more tangible aspects of the Force tend to engender a spirited work relationship. The members of a squad are constantly working together. From their very first day in the unit they are working with and being taught by fellow officers of equal rank. Though healthy, mild forms of internal competition are encouraged, particularly among squads working in the same Operating Element, a willingness to share knowledge rather than to covet one's "tricks of the trade" predominates. Due to extensive job-connected travel the patrolmen regularly share car pools. And all being of about the same age, many of them newly married, much off-duty socializing is done together. The Force itself sponsors unit-wide social functions throughout the year. Some men attend school together and those aspiring to the rank of sergeant form study groups for the

²⁴City of New York, Police Department, Planning Bureau, Police Management Review, September, 1966, "A Tyranny of Indifference," p. 3.

mutual benefit of all. In such ways "esprit de corps" is strengthened.

The existence of positive incentives within the Tactical Patrol Force has a direct bearing on its efficiency of performance. In fact, these incentives can be regarded as a counterbalancing factor offsetting the comparatively poor working conditions of the Force. This idea was touched upon in Matthew J. Neary's thesis, Motivating the Foot Patrolman:

Their working conditions, based even on the standards of the regular foot patrolmen, must be termed poor in comparison. Approximately 90 percent of their duty is performed at night, principally between the hours of 6 P.M. and 2 A.M., and in the worst neighborhoods of a city that is famous for poor neighborhoods. In addition, they are constantly being moved from one such section of the city to another, often necessitating extended traveling on their own time. Yet the performance is clearly superior, the men are apparently more interested in and satisfied by their work, the morale is high and the disciplinary problems are low.²⁵

In examining this seemingly dichotomic situation, one must cite the incentives that are an integral part of the Force's operating features. First, there does exist a pride, an element of status, in belonging to a more select group, an elite unit that has received a reassuring measure of departmental and public acclaim. Due also to the fact that the Force operates in areas of high criminal activity, the opportunity for outstanding individual performance is increased. In a relatively short period of time a

²⁵Neary, Matthew J., op. cit., p. 87.

patrolman who seriously applies himself can compile a much better arrest record than if he were assigned to a precinct of low or moderate criminal activity. And as we will see in the next Chapter, the officers in T.P.F. employ more flexible street patrol techniques. The compilation of an outstanding record, particularly but not solely as pertains to arrests, greatly increase a man's opportunity of being recommended for permanent assignment to the Detective Division. For those whose performance is not outstanding, but is in the higher evaluation ratings, re-assignment to another specialized detail or to a preferred precinct is available. Those whose performance is below average for the unit are reassigned without preference, but also without stigma, to regular patrol precincts. Generally, each man spends an average of two years in the Force. However, anyone in the unit, at any time, can request and receive such reassignment without preference. Usually, when this occurs, it is due to the working hours required of these men. The voluntary nature of the assignment, combined with the gradual weeding out of the poorer performers, are selectivity factors which contribute to the performance record of the group.²⁶

Another incentive which prompts many graduates of the Police Academy to join the Tactical Patrol Force is the realization that within a relatively short period of time

²⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

they can acquire a wealth of experience not readily obtainable in any other fashion. Their prime interest is in the development of personal ability. And to some, the Force is a fundamental and uniquely introductory way in which to inaugurate a career which will probably span a minimum of twenty years.

Finally, a small part of a man's over-all decision to join the T.P.F. may be that he prefers the steady schedule offered by 6 P.M. to 2 A.M. tours. The fact that he will continuously work four days on and two off without variance is appealing as opposed for instance to normal precinct patrol duty where he will work "around the clock," that is, 8 A.M. to 4 P.M., then the following set of tours from 4 P.M. to 12 midnight, and then a set of tours from 12 midnight to 8 A.M. With a steady schedule there is the advantage of being able to plan one's activities on a more orderly basis. This reasoning enters into the thinking of many family men.

Evaluation

Monthly records are kept of each patrolman's activity and are broken down according to the types and numbers of arrests made, that is, felonies, misdemeanors, and offenses. Note is taken of any exceptional arrests or unusual police action. The number of personal and tag summonses issued, and the violations for which they were issued, is also included in this monthly listing. These

records are kept up to date and form part of the patrolman's personal file.

Also included in a man's personal file is his former occupational background and prior military service, his I.Q. score, Police Academy record, educational background, special skills, and the kinds of Departmental Recognition that he may have been awarded.

When vacancies occur and requests are received from the Detective Division or specialized areas of the department, the Commanding Officer, one or two captains, two or three lieutenants, and the squad sergeants concerned, discuss the records of the top fifteen or twenty men and vote on the matter of which ones will receive the recommendations. In addition, certain more desirable assignments within the unit are apportioned among the higher ranking members, subject again to the approval of their supervisors.²⁷

²⁷Ibid., p. 90.

CHAPTER IV

PATROL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

In recent years there has developed an apparent trend among the larger city police departments to establish highly trained special patrol units within their patrol divisions. These units are composed of the finest men in the patrol division, highly mobile, and capable of handling a variety of situations. In introducing the topic of the patrol practices and procedures of the Tactical Patrol Force, the special systems of patrol utilized by these groups will be examined. Among the examples that will be cited are San Francisco's "S" Squad and Chicago's Task Force. The New York City Police Department's 1954 patrol experiment "Operation 25" will be studied, as well as its present patrol experiment, "Operation 20." Information regarding the use of saturation patrol will be presented. All of this is done with the realization in mind that many of the lessons learned from these special patrol systems and experiments have in varying degrees been incorporated into the Tactical Patrol Force's methods of operation.

Special Systems of Patrol

In 1958, to combat a pronounced upswing in the

violent street crimes of robbery and rape, the San Francisco Police Department established its "S" Squad. This groups' operations were well planned and relied upon extensive analyses of statistical information relative to the peak hours of illegal activity, street locations, and methods of operation. Each unit of the special squad was assigned to a patrol area, the size of which was proportioned relative to the incidence of crime in the area. The boundaries were flexible and could be adjusted instantly to meet a particular need. The men, although working as a patrol unit, wore civilian clothes and rode unmarked radio cars. The majority of the units were equipped with walkie-talkies which thwarted any criminal usage of the standard police frequency. One of the key weapons of the "S" Squad was the dilligent use of the field interrogation form or report. The squad's concerted drive and success seemed to discourage crime in former key-trouble areas.¹

The Chicago-Police Department has a specialized unit within its patrol division that is the size of many smaller city police departments. This special force totals two hundred and forty men. Within the special unit there are no less than forty sergeants who provide a high degree of personal supervision. The task force is normally used

¹Gourley, G. Douglas, and Bristow, Allen P., Patrol Administration. (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1966), pp. 22-23.

in its entirety. Rather than splitting up the unit on varying shifts and in a multitude of districts, the force saturates one district at a particular time. The purpose of the force is not to provide police services but to cut down or eliminate a high crime rate in an area. A rash of market holdups in a particular area, for instance, would get the full attention of the task force. Chicago has found this massive deployment of manpower to be extremely effective.²

The New York City Police Department's "Operation 25" was a patrol experiment in the 25th precinct in Manhattan's upper east side Harlem area, and covered the four month period from September 1, 1954, to December 31, 1954. The prime objective of the study was to ascertain if the crime rate in this area would decrease, and to what extent, if police coverage were increased. Prior to the experiment, the precinct was manned by 138 patrolmen. The average foot beat covered ten city blocks. The area itself was one of crowded tenements, most in rundown condition, and inhabited on an evenly mixed basis by whites, Puerto Ricans, and Negroes.

On the first of September, 276 men were added to the precinct force. From the police academy came 206 newly graduated recruits. Six additional motorcycle men were

² Ibid., p. 23.

assigned to traffic. The detective squad was enlarged by the addition of two sergeants, eleven detectives, and eight patrolmen that were used as drivers. The latter were assigned to a detective car and with a plainclothes man as a partner were used as a cruising patrol unit throughout the district. A special juvenile detail composed of three lieutenants, one sergeant, eight patrolmen, and five police women was created. A narcotic squad of one lieutenant and twelve detectives operated solely in the 25th. Sixteen patrolmen formed a special shift that went on duty at 6 P.M. and ended at 2 A.M. In former studies these hours proved to have the greatest rate of crime. There were no other staggered shifts.³

Other important features of "Operation 25" were the following:

1. Before the operation began, participating officers received twenty hours of orientation. The operational details and objectives of the experiment were explained. Locations that called for special attention were listed. Pictures of known criminals were viewed until the officers became familiar with their faces. Because of the high percentage of Puerto Ricans living in the neighborhood, basic lessons in conversational Spanish were given.
2. Foot beats were decreased from ten city blocks to four city blocks, and were layed out on a straight line basis so that a patrolman could always see his total street area. Those officers in vehicles concentrated on the side streets stemming off the main foot patrol avenues. Consequently, a criss-cross pattern with a completeness of patrol coverage was effected.

³ Ibid., p. 27.

3. Each patrolman received a high degree of personal supervision. Also, each officer was held individually accountable for the crime on his post. If a serious crime was committed and no arrest made, the captain on patrol interviewed the officer assigned. The captain's typewritten conclusions and recommendations were sent to the Police Commissioner. Though this facet of the operation was distasteful to the patrolmen, the rationale behind it was that since the beat area was only four blocks and in a straight line, each patrolman should be able to prevent street crime or arrest the perpetrator.⁴

The results of the experiment were rather dramatic. The four-month period was compared and contrasted with the same period for 1953. In 1953 there were 1,102 felonies reported in the precinct as compared to 488 in 1954. This is a decrease of 55.6 percent. Felonies as a whole in the city had decreased only 4.7 percent. The reporting procedures were the same. It seems logical to assume that due to the increased coverage in the 25th, more crimes would be reported and not suppressed by public apathy or fear. The misdemeanor decrease was equally outstanding. The clearance rate for felonies in 1953 was 20.2 percent and for the 1954 period was 65.6 percent. Arrest statistics rose from 1,069 to 1,557. It must be remembered that the bulk of the patrolmen on the streets were recruits. True, their eagerness is an asset; but with experience the results should have been even better.⁵ "Operation 25" established the

⁴Ibid., pp. 27-28.

⁵Ibid., pp. 28-29.

effectiveness of saturation patrol.

"Operation 20" is another New York City Police Department experiment, presently being conducted to determine what constitutes a model precinct in terms of adequate manpower and equipment. It began in West 68th street's 20th precinct on October 19, 1966. Seventy patrolmen and a corresponding increase of superior officers and detectives were added to the complement of the stationhouse. Additional equipment, including seven radio cars, a supervisor's and a command car, four scooters, one base communication station, twelve walkie-talkie radios and a battery charger were sent to the precinct.⁶

The commanding officer of the 20th precinct was taken off the captain's duty chart and now works during hours most suitable for the effective direction of his command. A lieutenant has been assigned as administrative aide and the remaining lieutenants supervise patrol in a patrol car. Four sergeants, men on the lieutenant's promotion list, have been assigned to desk duty, performing their tours according to the lieutenant's duty chart, and the remaining sergeants, with the exception of the unit training sergeant, perform tours in radio

⁶City of New York, Police Department. Spring 3100, Vol. 37, No. 10, November, 1966, p. 49.

cars or on foot. A patrolman has been assigned to switch-board duty for all tours.⁷

While the increase in the number of patrolmen has been the most visible part of the experiment, other aspects may be more significant. More supervisors and more cars to carry them around the precinct, for example, mean the performance of the individual patrolmen has been more closely monitored and, it is hoped, improved.⁸ Walkie-talkies, while enabling a lone patrolman to call for help, also have meant that precinct headquarters can always keep track of where he is.⁹

The commander of the 20th precinct concluded that the newly employed tactics have reduced crime in the area. This conclusion about the year old experiment is based on a decline in complaints of street crimes coming from the 105,000 persons who live in the 100-odd square blocks that make up the 20th precinct. In a report to Police Commissioner Howard R. Leary, Deputy Inspector Jack Lustig said that if present trends in the precinct continued, the experiment could be considered a success. Compared with the same month in 1966, complaints of such street crimes as mugging, purse snatching and auto theft declined 20.8 percent in August, 12.4 percent in September,

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ New York Times, November 19, 1967, p. 76.

⁹ Ibid.

and 13 percent in October. These decreases came at a time when complaints of street crimes for the city as a whole were substantially higher. The number of complaints received during the experiment's first nine months cannot be compared with the record for the previous year because of a change in crime reporting procedures. Deputy Inspector Lustig declined to comment on all the details of his report to the Police Commissioner, but he did say of the experiment: "I believe the statistics indicate that with the right number of men and the right kind of supervision, the street crime can be reduced."¹⁰

In reviewing the above special systems of patrol, one notes that many of them share certain common characteristics. Among these features are the following:

1. A substantial increase in the number of patrolmen assigned.
2. Increase in the number of supervisors, to provide a high degree of personal supervision.
3. Selection of highly motivated and competent personnel, some of whom may have a relatively small amount of tenure.
4. Variety of specialized personnel being assigned to area.
e.g., narcotics squad, youth squad,
plainclothes squad.
5. Orientation of participating personnel regarding problems of area with an emphasis on good community relations to improve police-citizen cooperation.

¹⁰Ibid.

6. Decrease in foot man's area of coverage, but an increase in his responsibility for preventing crimes and arresting the perpetrators of crimes on his post.
7. Advance planning based on analyses of statistical data.
e.g., peak hours of illegal activity, street locations, methods of operation.
8. Statistical compilation, daily analyses and reporting.
9. An emphasis on cutting down or eliminating crime in an area, as contrasted with the role of providing routine, non-emergency police services.
10. Allocation and use of more equipment, particularly as regards radio motor patrol marked and unmarked cars.
11. Improving lines of communication.
e.g., walkie-talkies.
12. High degree of mobility and the capability of quickly changing patrol coverage area to meet special needs.
13. Utilization of special patrol techniques.
e.g., San Francisco's diligent use of the field interrogation form or report.
14. The establishment of patrol patterns providing a maximum of coverage.
e.g., a mix between foot and car patrol in a criss-cross pattern rather than straight-line, main avenue patterns.

Saturation Patrol

All of the above special systems of patrol involve saturating an area with a large number of officers. Some cities concentrate on one area at a time varying the occupancy of these special details from a two or three day period to an interval of several weeks. In some departments the special task force always works together, and in others,

is split into several squads each responsible for its own district.

A police patrol administrator will want to evaluate various special systems of patrol that have been used successfully in other police agencies. He must bear in mind, however, that any system of patrol that he adopts must be tailored to his particular situation--to his community, his police problems, and his available personnel.¹¹

Although this author recognizes the possibility of a charge of oversimplification at this point, it must be remembered that saturation patrol has inherent disadvantages. On one hand it allows the police administrator to say, "This is what I can do if I have the manpower." A major point that must be considered is that this is too easy an answer. There is too much of a tendency for some police administrators to say in relation to any police problem: "Give me 10 more or 100 more or 1,000 more men and I can do the job," without first trying to improve the efficiency of their operations. When requests for additional manpower are not met, they have an easy answer to criticism, namely: "The city won't give me the men to do the job." This does not mean that when a police department is operating at full efficiency, it will not do a better job with

¹¹ Courley, G. Douglas, and Bristow, Allen P. Patrol Administration. Op. cit., p. 288.

additional personnel, but rather that the use of more manpower is not the only way to solve police problems.¹²

The second point to consider is one of financial cost. In light of increasing police problems and demands for police service, the patrol administrator must seek out every possible means of achieving patrol objectives without raising the cost of policing to prohibitive levels. Saturation patrol is expensive, and its use should be carefully weighed in terms of the results obtained for the amount of money expended.

Finally, the question of when and where the task or mobile force should be employed may all too easily become one of political expediency rather than police necessity. In many of the big cities today, each and every area of these cities is clamoring for police protection. These demands are most loudly voiced by special interest entities and political pressure groups. The pressures exerted by these factions weigh heavily on elected officials and police administrators. As a result, the special forces established within these departments, are sometimes assigned to an area or neighborhood of the city, not on the basis of police need, but as a result of vested interests and political influence.

The case is similar also when an isolated but

¹² Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

unusually sensationalistic crime occurs in an area which is an otherwise calm and peaceful neighborhood. The news media offer such an event intense and widespread dissemination. This publicity combined with, for example, the petitionings of private merchant's associations and community groups, can motivate police department's to provide immediate reassurance in the form of increased police presence. Such units as the Tactical Patrol Force, because of the rapidity and ease with which they can be re-deployed, are often the recipients of such an impetus.

The Tactical Patrol Force's System of Patrol

In attempting to explain the patrol practices and procedures of the Tactical Patrol Force, several factors must be considered. First, the Force is complementary to, and dependent upon, a basic and much larger system upon which it has been superimposed. Second, its operations are carefully planned in advance and requests for its services in a given precinct are evaluated primarily on statistical data relating specifically to violent street crimes or other special problems where the presence of uniformed foot men would be of substantial value. The amount of time that the Force will remain in a precinct is determined by several factors: period required to correct a situation which may be basically temporary in nature, a more urgent necessity for its presence in

another area which under normal circumstances is given priority, or occurrence of a dangerous or large-scale condition elsewhere in the city.

e.g., civil disturbance, major demonstration,
explosion, plane crash.

Consequently, the Tactical Patrol Force may remain in a precinct for a period of from three days to several weeks, though the average stay is one month. These elements typify the Force's day-to-day operations, and thus it becomes incumbent on each member of the unit to ascertain where he will be assigned on each working day. Also, the Tactical Patrol Force is not concerned with twenty-four hour a day patrol coverage, since ninety percent of its operations occur between the hours of 6 P.M. to 2 A.M. The compilation and statistical evaluation of performance records, particularly in terms of arrest and summons activity, are an important facet of the T.P.F.'s operations. Finally, this unit emphasizes the role of correcting by apprehension as contrasted to the characteristically orthodox preventive nature of patrol work.

In Chapter II it was pointed out that the Tactical Patrol Force regularly exercises the placement of its twenty-four squads in three Boroughs (Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn) at one time, providing patrol coverage in as many as eleven precincts simultaneously. Except for rare occasions when because of a shortage of manpower a squad is split, each squad always works together under the

same squad sergeant. Upon reporting initially to a precinct, that is, the first few days of working in a new area, the squad or squads working are given a brief orientation by either a T.P.F. patrol lieutenant or one of the squad sergeants as to the reasons for the Force's assignment and the police problems and hazards to be confronted.

e.g., armed assaults and robberies in the business district, household burglaries, street and hallway muggings, false alarms of fire, purse snatches, gang conflicts, etc.

When present, the commanding officer of the precinct usually offers his comments and insights regarding the problems at hand.

Tactical Patrol Force posts are established within the area which usually, but not always, conform to the already established precinct foot posts. These posts normally do not cover all of the precinct, but do encompass approximately one-third of the precinct's highest crime area. Precinct foot men are no longer assigned to these posts, making them the sole responsibility of the Force. T.P.F. radio cars are also used in this newly established area. However, the precinct's radio motor patrol car's sector coverages remain unchanged.

The roll call is prepared the previous day by patrolmen in the Roll Call Section of the Administrative Staff. Listed are the foot posts and the automobile sectors to be covered, and the patrolmen and superior

officers to be assigned. The task of preparing the roll call, the working layout for each tour, is complicated by arrests effected the previous night and necessitating an officer's appearance in day court, prior court appearances, illness and injuries, military leave, days granted off because of previous lost time, and last minute notifications that a squad is to be assigned to a precinct other than the one where it was originally scheduled to work that day. These last minute adjustments sometimes result in tactical errors, that is, posts being covered by one man where two are required, two new men working together where one experienced senior man and one probationer should be. These situations, considering the day-to-day schedule and often times the last minute changes which the Force is expected to acclimate itself to, are, for the most part, unavoidable. However, should they occur, it then becomes the duty of the patrol lieutenant and the squad sergeants, to confer together and to make appropriate adjustments, prior to the patrolmen's turning out of the stationhouse and proceeding to their respective posts. Because of their experience and familiarization with the technicalities of patrol work, they should feel free to exercise initiative in correcting that which was obviously done in error.

The Tactical Patrol Force's system of patrol features the coverage of foot posts by uniformed men

working in pairs. In the high crime districts worked by the Force it is advantageous to be accompanied by another officer. The majority of the crimes committed involve two or more perpetrators which make for multiple arrests and difficult handling by one man. A common occurrence in these areas is assaults on patrolmen engaged in the making of arrests. In fact, these very factors sometimes play a prominent role in bringing the T.P.F. to a precinct. Then too, the dynamic philosophy of this specialized unit calls for a positively active approach to the crime problem, the employment of correction by apprehension rather than prevention. This rationale in practice requires judicious aggressiveness and a well directed approach which leads to seeking out the potentially criminal situation, as opposed to passively waiting until something happens and then acting. Consequently, the T.P.F. patrolman habitually takes the initiative in going into a darkened hallway or up on a roof where, because of either prior information or observational skill developed by experience, he has reason to believe narcotics are being used. Backyards and alleys, regarded in practice as being out of the working range in the normal policing of a foot post, also come within his jurisdiction. He takes the initiative again by investigating the occupants of a car with a broken vent window or extensive front end damage. These situations, and numerous others, require

caution and certainly the presence of a partner. Psychologically they give to the patrolman a physical and mental edge. If, for example, an officer should be holding four perpetrators on a street waiting for assistance from a radio car proceeding to the scene, his chances of being assaulted or of his prisoners attempting escape is much greater than if he were accompanied by a partner. Also, as we have seen in Chapter III, the system of working in pairs has valuable on-the-job training attributes which tie in directly with the grooming of a T.P.F. patrolman.

In recent years, there is a school of police authorities who negatively criticize the use of two-man foot patrol in tactical units. Their arguments closely parallel those tended forward in the controversy of one man versus two-man car patrol, and pivot on the following premises:¹³

1. From a police budgetary standpoint, a tremendous financial savings is enjoyed by having one patrolman assigned to a post instead of two patrolmen.
2. Let us assume that the city has available 10 men for patrol duty during a particular shift. If the men operate in pairs, the city is divided into five patrol areas. If they operate singly, the city can be divided into 10 districts, each only half as large. Twice the patrol service is thus provided; a patrolman gives twice as much attention to the district; a given police hazard can be inspected or passed during a tour of duty twice as

¹³Points #2 and #3 parallel the arguments cited in "One-Man versus Two-Man Car Patrol" in Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., p. 242.

many times as it would if there were only half as many patrolmen.

3. An officer patrolling alone must give first attention to police duties. There are no distractions other than those he is obligated to notice on his beat, and he is completely self dependent for his own safety and welfare. It has been demonstrated that an officer patrolling by himself is actually safer than when accompanied by a brother officer. The presence of a second officer appears to discourage reasonable caution, either because of pride that prevents the second officer from observing danger or because of failure to take suitable precautions lest the companion interpret caution as cowardice. When an officer is alone he knows that he has no one else to rely upon in the event of trouble. Consequently he is cautious in stepping into dangerous situations and is better prepared to take care of unexpected emergencies.

During the past several months, the Tactical Patrol Force has not been strictly adhering to the practice of covering each foot post with two men. This break with established tradition has been caused by a variety of factors. Of first consideration would be the increasing demand for the services of the Force. On any given date there are always more precincts requesting the presence of this unit than the Force is able to cover---if it were to employ the normal techniques of two-man patrol. Consequently, in an attempt to spread its coverage to more areas the T.P.F. has been left with the alternative of manning posts singly thus almost doubling its ability to take in additional precincts which would otherwise be excluded. Also, as we have seen in Chapter II, the personnel complement of the Force is increasing annually.

By virtue of the expanded operations permitted by these numerical personnel increases, patrol coverage is not only being applied to high activity precincts but is now being applied as well to moderate activity precincts. And in these areas of moderate criminal activity individual foot posts are suited to handling by an individual patrolman. Finally, the important element of season must be analyzed. The spring and summer months are distinguished by crowded street conditions, children out of school, an upswing in the cycle of street crime. They are also the seasons most receptive to civil disorder and riot. These conditions require additional police coverage. However, during the fall and winter seasons the streets are relatively empty, children return to school, a downswing in the street crime cycle is effected, and less police coverage is required. The decrease in the police coverage required permits the T.P.F. to cover posts on a one man basis that formerly required the presence of two officers.

In practice many foot posts are now being covered by an individual patrolman. When an officer desires to investigate a suspicious circumstance or take action in a situation which may require assistance, he is instructed to request the partnership of the man on an adjacent post. If during the course of a tour, he is going to spot-check vehicles being operated on his post, he is instructed to team-up with the man on the adjoining post when so engaged

in these activities.

As of this writing, the author cannot derive any statistical conclusions regarding one-man versus two-man foot patrol coverage in the Force. Whether the overall arrest and summons enforcement activity will increase or decrease remains to be recorded, and, of course, these figures will be but a reflection of the manner in which the working habits and efficiency of the individual officer have been affected. However, from the viewpoint of morale and "esprit de corps" it can be concluded from this author's conversations with Force members over a period of several months, that the majority of officers would prefer the partner system of patrol.

For the past several years rookies attending the Police Academy Recruit Training School have been temporarily assigned to work with the Tactical Patrol Force as part of their field training. During the summer months particularly there is a substantial increase in the numbers of members so assigned. This is a necessary part of a probationer's practical on-the-street training and offers to these new men an opportunity to utilize and observe in practice, the lessons derived from classroom instruction. And to a notable degree these recruits fulfill shortages in manpower distribution scaling which, as was indicated above, are of increased import during the summer months. Both T.P.F. and Police Academy supervisory personnel have

commended the performance of these rookies on the street, for what they lack in experience is more than accounted for in terms of enthusiasm, willingness to learn, and cooperation with veteran officers. But to a minor degree their temporary assignment to the unit does have a mildly depressing effect on the morale of the Force and this can be readily understood considering the "esprit de corps" and group pride of the Tactical Patrol Force's personnel. However, many men also recall that not such a long time ago they themselves were recruits in the Academy and were feeling the same uncertainties and problems connected with a new career that these men are now undergoing. Perhaps it is for these reasons that once out on the street and working together relationships tend to mesh in fine fashion. It should be noted that some of these rookies will develop an interest and liking for the operations and personnel of the Tactical Patrol Force and prior to graduation from the Academy will be among those volunteering for permanent assignment. This then is a uniquely fertile recruiting ground for new members.

The patrol effectiveness of the Force is substantially increased by the use of Motorola "Handie-Talkie" FM portable radios which operate on a two channel system. There are several advantages of the hip radio. Communications can be maintained between:

1. Patrolmen and the station house.
2. Between patrolman and supervisor's car.
3. Between patrolman and T.P.F. radio cars.
4. Between 2 or more patrolmen.

The second channel is for use with a city-wide system to be used only in the event of a serious "unusual" disaster, or special event (motorcade for dignitaries, special security, parades, riots, etc.). The radio is lightweight (33 ounces, size 3 1/8" x 1 5/8") and is carried in a leather case. Batteries are rechargeable and are usually charged during off-duty hours. The cost is about \$650.¹⁴

These radios are invaluable in transmitting descriptions of suspects wanted in connection with a crime, and in obtaining the aid of other patrolmen when an officer is in need of assistance.

e.g., holding prisoners, development of a gang fight or street disturbance.

In a riot or crowd control situation they become an absolute necessity. Presently, the T.P.F. has 90 of these portables with plans to procure additional new radios.¹⁵

Upon leaving the station house, Force members either walk but are also permitted to ride in their own private vehicles to their respective posts. This, of course, is a departure from the rules applicable to a precinct

¹⁴City of New York, Police Department. Spring, 3100
Vol. 34, No. 10, November, 1963, p. 19.

¹⁵Supplied by the administrative office of the
Tactical Patrol Force on January 19, 1968.

patrolman, and is allowed primarily to facilitate the quick grouping of members at a pre-designated mobilization point in the event of an alert. While on post, and in contrast to normal procedures, T.P.F. patrolmen are not required to signal the station house on an hourly basis, or notify the station house in event of having to leave their posts because of personal necessity or during meal periods. This lessening of control does permit the patrolman freedom of movement and may be regarded as an incentive in permitting him a wider latitude as to the techniques he will apply in working a patrol post.

During the course of each tour a moderate degree of personal supervision is exercised. The sergeant or lieutenant on patrol takes opportunity to observe the working habits of patrolmen. At least once during the course of each working day, supervisors will talk to each man and record their visits by signing the officer's memo book. In the Force, there is an emphasis on selecting career minded supervisors who indicate potential or who have demonstrated a better than average ability in constructively handling the problems of human relationships that are their responsibility. And of course the training function is of paramount importance. Though many police agencies rely too heavily on internal mechanical checks as a means of extracting high productivity, this unit relies positively on the good leadership qualities of its

superior officers as a constructive and guiding example in achieving work objectives. This is one of the earmarks of successful supervision and exerts a direct bearing on morale. This idea was touched upon in Municipal Personnel Administration:

The effective leader is likely to view his job primarily in terms of human problems---the management and support of people---rather than in terms of productivity goals and the mechanics of productivity.

The effective supervisor provides less immediate and less detailed supervision than his less effective colleague. He allows his subordinates a large degree of autonomy in doing their work.¹⁶

Conspicuously marked radio cars are utilized as part of the Tactical Patrol Force's operations. Essentially, their prime function is as vehicular reinforcement to the men on patrol, and in addition to the car radio, a portable walkie-talkie is also assigned. Prompt response is accorded to the following code signals occurring within the Force's area:

10-11 Need additional car

10-13 Assist patrolman

10-30 Report of commission of a felony

However, the Force's radio motor patrol cars will also respond to the above signals if occurring within their proximity but outside of the T.P.F.'s area. In cases

¹⁶International City Manager's Association, Municipal Personnel Administration. 6th Edition. Chicago: The Association, 1960, p. 244.

where precinct cars are already engaged and consequently are unable to handle "jobs" waiting to be dispatched by the central communications unit, the Force's radio cars will "pick up" and process these calls for police services. This is often the situation in high activity precincts and becomes accentuated on Friday and Saturday tours.

Since this unit is an integral part of the department's Rapid Mobilization Plans, car crews are alert to the transmission of the following code signals:

10-41 through 10-47 In connection with emergency, vehicles with personnel respond as required by established schedules and the Rules and Procedures

10-48 Supplementary Signal, response not in accordance with predetermined schedules

10-70 Supplementary Signal, Tactical Patrol Force

Signal 10-70 is divided into 2 phases, Phase 1-Signal 10-70 cars and Phase 2-Signal 10-70 bus. Either may be called, there is no predetermined order.¹⁷ These signals relate directly to Rapid Mobilization and more appropriately will be the subject of Chapter VI, "The Response to Emergencies and the Policing of Special Events."

Radio motor patrol cars are also used to:

- a. Transport members of the force to post, or to the scene of an emergency.
- b. Transport prisoners, complainants, witnesses, lost

¹⁷ City of New York, Police Department, Tactical Patrol Force Order No. 40, November 14, 1966.

or abandoned children, lost adults or mentally ill persons to the station house.

- c. Transport complainants or witnesses for the purpose of searching a crime scene area.

On April 26, 1963, Standard Operating Procedure No. 17 was issued establishing systematic automobile checks on a permanent basis throughout the department. The purpose of this directive was stated as an attempt to cut down:

- a. The large number of auto thefts.
- b. The use of the motor vehicle in criminal activities.
- c. Deaths, injuries and property damage caused by the drinking driver.
- d. Illegal operation of vehicles by unlicensed operators.¹⁸

The intensive investigation of autos and occupants by means of auto safety-checks has always been a unique facet of Tactical Patrol Force foot patrol. The team concept of patrol permitted the maximum utilization of foot patrolmen for this purpose. The ensuing years witnessed a steady refinement of knowledge and techniques and dissemination of information to all members. This information developed from experience is passed down to new members

¹⁸City of New York, Police Department, Standard Operating Procedure No. 17, April 26, 1963.

and is constantly in use while on patrol.¹⁹

Particular attention is given to vehicles:

- a. Being operated in a reckless, erratic and dangerous manner.
- b. With observable equipment defects.
- c. With damage indicative of possible involvement in hit-and-run cases.
- d. To which police attention is directed by suspicious or unusual circumstances.
e.g., juveniles or youths operating a car although apparently under age for a license, broken front vent windows, etc.
- e. With none or an improper inspection stamp.²⁰

Figures for the years 1964-1966 concerning the Safety Check program are presented in Table 2. In viewing this table it should be noted that only the prime arrest and summons areas are highlighted. For example, many arrests are also made for leaving the scene of an accident, the larceny of license plates, forged registrations, or in connection with a crime previously committed, such as an assault and robbery or a burglary. During the course of car stops situations are frequently encountered where the occupants of a vehicle are found to be in illegal possession of firearms or narcotics. Among the

¹⁹ Lustig, Jack, "Tactical Patrol Force History."
A letter to the Chief Inspector, October 20, 1966.
(Typewritten), p. 8.

²⁰ Standard Operating Procedure No. 17, op. cit.

innumerable summonses that are obtained as a result of automobile safety checks are uninspected vehicle, equipment defects, improper plates, and operating without insurance.

The Force has developed a high degree of proficiency in arrests for forged licenses. In checking a driver's license certain techniques are employed:

- a. The description of the driver is compared with that on the license and with the photograph if a chauffeur's license.
- b. If doubtful of identity, the signature on the license is compared with a test signature of the driver.
- c. A torn license is examined very carefully. It is inspected for continuity and proper alignment of water mark by holding the license form up to the light.
- d. The letters and numerals of the Department of Motor Vehicle stamp are checked for proper box form and uniformity of size, shape, and thickness.²¹

In addition to these steps each patrolman keeps in his possession, and familiarizes himself with, a list of stamps stolen from Motor Vehicle offices. During 1965, this command comprised 1.5% of total department personnel, yet effected 40.6% of arrests for forgery of motor vehicle documents.²²

²¹City of New York, Police Department, "Automobile Larceny." Memorandum book insert dated 1966, p. 7.

²²Lustig, op. cit., p. 9.

TABLE 2

AUTOMOBILE SAFETY CHECK ACTIVITY OF THE
TACTICAL PATROL FORCE 1964-1966^a

	1964	1965	1966
	<u>Arrests</u>		
Grand Larceny Auto	274	257	466
Intoxicated & Impaired Driving	654	533	475
Forged Licenses	<u>202</u>	<u>192</u>	<u>159</u>
Totals	1130	982	1100
	<u>Summonses</u>		
Unlicensed Operator	4159	5093	5947
Unregistered Vehicle	<u>2372</u>	<u>2380</u>	<u>2695</u>
Totals	6531	7473	8642

^aThese statistics supplied by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on January 30, 1968.

Whereever the T.P.F. has been utilized it has had a substantial effect in reducing street crime. Table 3 indicates a trend of enforcement effectiveness specifically in the arrest and summons areas for the years 1960 up to, but not including, 1967.

Summary

The Tactical Patrol Force's system of patrol incorporates many of the same techniques utilized in the special systems of patrol that have been operational in other large metropolitan departments. Among the many valuable lessons derived from New York City's own "Operation 25" were the effectiveness of saturation patrol and the fashion in which substantial area increases in manpower should be deployed.

This chapter offered observations regarding the more obvious disadvantages of saturation patrol. One of these was the financial expense incurred by this type of technique, and the fact also that though highly effective when properly administered, it is peculiarly subject to abuse.

The Tactical Patrol Force's system of patrol engenders a willingness to work and is geared to maintaining a high level of interest in the responsibilities of street policing. A variety of tasks has served to keep boredom out of patrol. The patrolman is afforded a liberal degree of autonomy and, in general, exercises individual discretion as to the manner in which he will work his post, that is, for

example, when, where, and for how long auto safety checks will be conducted, and the degree and method of emphasis to be placed on respective post conditions ranging from disorderly youths to armed robberies. Efficient vehicle checking procedures, portable radios, and internal mobility schemes are all earmarks of the Force's operations. And finally enthusiasm and youth play a vital, contributing role in the enhancement of the T.P.F.'s effectiveness.

TABLE 3
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY OF THE TACTICAL
PATROL FORCE 1960-1967^a

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Cumulative Total
	<u>Arrests</u>							
Felonies	242	423	727	617	1,049	1,012	1,369	5,439
Misdemeanors	334	839	1,622	1,480	1,795	1,702	2,126	9,898
Offenses	329	450	1,006	775	1,001	1,706	1,577	6,844
Juv. Del.	32	57	121	68	31	79	82	460
Other ^b	27	34	47	41	65	90	67	371
Totals	964	1,793	3,523	2,931	3,941	4,589	5,221	23,012
	<u>Summonses</u>							
Personal	5,853	11,339	13,557	16,608	17,242	19,662	23,443	107,704
Tag	5,230	11,268	14,420	14,975	19,945	17,952	22,188	105,978
Other ^c	27	99	149	90	937	758	524	2,634
Totals	11,110	22,706	28,126	31,673	38,174	38,372	46,155	216,316

^aThese statistics supplied by the administrative office of the Tactical Patrol Force on November 30, 1967.

^bOther arrests would include those for other authorities, family warrants, etc.

^cOther summonses would include those for Administrative Code violations, Park Regulations, Health Code, etc.

CHAPTER V

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Several patrol techniques have been instituted by the Tactical Patrol Force since its inception. Each of these tactics have been created to deal with a particular crime problem in a particular area. They are normally not applied on a continuous basis but periodically as time and circumstances may warrant.

Operation Decoy

It has long been a conventional technique for conducting surveillances by placing policemen in as inconspicuous a manner as possible at locations where criminals were expected to commit crimes. Disguise was used to allow the policeman to be present---without being too noticeable---at the time and place where the person or property of a citizen was expected to become the subject of a crime. The citizen, however, was still the personal victim and target of the criminal. The disguise technique has now been improved and modernized by many police departments, and its objective has expanded beyond capture of the criminal to absorbing the force and shock of criminal attack on the community. In his role as criminal "target" the police officer can now bear

the brunt of criminal violence by placing himself as a buffer between the citizen and the criminal.¹

The art of masquerade was employed in this modernized manner for the first time in New York City in 1962 to cope with an increase in crimes of violence---an increase reflected not only in New York but throughout the Nation. While arrests by police more than outstripped the pace of such crime, Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy felt that more was needed than arrest after the crime had occurred. Expanding on the decoy technique, which had been used previously in isolated cases to deal with a particular crime problem in a particular area, he ordered the use of decoys throughout the city in a mass attempt to divert the attacks of prowlers and to prevent citizens from becoming the victims of such attacks. He directed that members of the Tactical Patrol Force be used in both male and female dress in areas where women in particular had been the victims of assaults, robberies, purse snatches, indecent exhibitions, and molestations.²

"Operation Decoy" consisted of several teams working different areas of the city. Each team was composed of three men - the decoy in female dress and the two backup men in ordinary attire. Because of the distinct hazard of

¹Codd, Michael J., "'Operation Decoy,' Bold Technique Against Crime," F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, No. XXXII, July, 1963, p. 3.

²Ibid.

grave personal injury, only those members of the Force who volunteered to pose as females were so assigned. Each member of the team was required to be thoroughly trained in the modus operandi of the criminal who committed the type of crime involved at a specific location. Each patrolman had to be proficient in self-defense, have a perceptive awareness of violent situations as they progressed from initial stages to implementation, and the skill to react quickly and properly. Patience is also a requisite. The decoy must be prepared to spend hours in an area playing his adopted role, allowing the criminal to develop a lack of suspicion relative to the existing setting and confidence in the success of whatever act he has planned. Although the officers may be fully convinced that a person loitering about the scene of former assaults and purse snatches is bent on a crime, they cannot act solely on this belief. To do so could result in an unlawful arrest, since the person has not, up to this point, committed any unlawful act which would give the officers knowledge of a crime committed or attempted in their presence.

The disguise worn by the decoy is one consistent with the area being worked. If crimes have been committed against the employees of such service institutions as hospitals, clinics, or utility companies, or other enterprises which normally have female employees in transit at various hours, the decoy would be dressed in attire similar

to that worn by the women so employed in the vicinity. If the area is residential, the decoy should be dressed as would a woman who has been delayed in getting home from work or as an average housewife returning from a visit with neighbors. Care is taken to avoid wearing anything out of the ordinary, since this would tend to draw undue attention and perhaps suspicion. Wigs are of great value to the decoys as are cosmetics such as lipstick, eyebrow pencil, and facial powder. The decoys wear dresses which fit them in an appropriate manner. When available, policewomen aid the decoys in donning their disguises. Scores of criminals were indeed shocked to discover that the helpless woman they had attacked was, in reality, a police officer well prepared and fully capable of warding off their attack and placing them under arrest.

The officer who is serving as the decoy must be particularly careful of the manner in which he carries his firearm and shield. These items cannot be carried in the handbag or purse which is the normal appurtenance of a woman's attire. A sudden successful purse snatch or assault and robbery could result in the criminal being armed and possessed of identification, both of which could be used to commit other crimes.³

The members of each team coordinate their actions

³Ibid., p. 5.

for maximum effectiveness. Prearranged signals are vital for the proper protection of the decoy. The decoy must be able to signal the back-up men to move in or move back - or to reposition themselves - when he is about to move or proceed with any previously decided alternate plan of action. The back-up men must be able to inform the decoy when he is being followed by a person who may be about to commit a crime. Each member must at all times know what the others are doing and planning to do.

When first instituted, parks and public recreation and leisure areas where incidents of assaults upon women had occurred were chosen for the sites of decoy patrols. As the program was perfected, its operations were expanded to include whatever parts of the city warranted its application.

In the first 4 months of the operation, from August 22, 1962, to December 31, 1962, there were 178 arrests. Of this number, 63 arrests were made as the result of criminal action against the person or property of the decoy. The principal criminal charge placed against the persons arrested in these cases were as follows:

Grand larceny (purse snatch)	34
Grand larceny	3
Assault and robbery	6
Felonious assault	4
Simple assault	10
Indecent exposure	6

The remaining 115 arrests were the result of the effective use of the decoy technique permitting the officer to be

present while the unsuspecting criminal committed or attempted to commit a crime. The following are the types of arrest involved in this category:

Narcotics or narcotics instruments	50
Impersonating a female	1
Policy (numbers game)	1
Interfering with police officer	4
Possession of burglary tools	7
Burglary	2
Grand larceny (auto)	1
Sodomy	4
Possession of dangerous weapons	11
Malicious mischief	2
Felonious assault	1
Unlawful assembly	10
Disorderly conduct	214

As might be expected in a program of this type, the "Operation Decoy" conviction record has been almost perfect.

This is because:

- a. the officer waits for the actual crime to be committed before he attempts to arrest.
- b. the victim and complainant is a police officer who never fails to show up in court to testify
- c. the witnesses are also policemen who never fail to come to court to testify against the defendant.⁵

"Operation Decoy" has demonstrated its effectiveness whenever and wherever its techniques have been applied.

Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy stated:

"Operation Decoy" was another successful tactic. In this operation, we dressed members of the Tactical Patrol Force in women's clothing, and placed them in areas where attacks on women had occurred. Backed up

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

⁵"Is that 'Pigeon' a Policeman?" Chicago Police Newsletter, Volume III, No. 14, July 13, 1966 p. 5.

by other policemen in plainclothes stationed nearby, the decoys attracted the attention of numerous attackers, pocketbook snatchers, dope addicts and other criminals. These offenders were taken into custody thus deflecting assaults upon women who could not defend themselves.⁶

Operation Fine Comb

This operation was coordinated with "Operation Decoy," and was inaugurated on September 8, 1962, in the 23, 41, 71, 90, and 104 precincts. The Force operated as three-man teams in 50 marked and unmarked cars, 10 cars to each of the five precincts with the greatest increases in crimes. This concentrated motor patrol was designed to seek out danger spots for street crime and those with criminal tendencies, create a highly visible patrol and prevent crime. They responded to all alarms in precincts where they could assist, kept a careful watch on street gangs, and checked hallways, roofs, and other crime potential areas.

Operation Thief Trap

This recently innovated program was geared to apprehend the person who earns his livelihood by stealing articles from parked vehicles. Inquiry revealed high incident areas in mid-Manhattan. A car with a conspicuously placed package on the seat was placed within view of a patrolman stationed in an upper floor of a building and two

⁶City of New York, Police Department, Press Release No. 13, February 23, 1965, p. 4.

patrolmen were stationed on the ground floor of the building in close proximity to the vehicle. With portable radio communication between the observer and the apprehending team it was possible to make numerous arrests of would be thieves. In appropriate areas this was quite successful, especially in the vicinity of Times Square and Radio City.⁷

Automobile Safety Checks---Holiday Season

Another patrol technique that directly involved the members of the Tactical Patrol Force was the establishment of safety checks of automobiles during the holiday season, that is, during Christmas and the New Year. On December 11, 1962, just prior to the start of the holiday season, operational guidelines were formulated with their main objective being the reduction of traffic fatalities during the holiday season, traditionally the worst time for vehicular deaths. Chief Inspector's Memorandum No.1719 was aimed specifically at the drinking driver and called for the establishment of well traveled check-points throughout the city where cars could be easily observed and checked. In establishing a check-point attention was given that proper safety precautions were taken for members of the force and users of the highways. The purposes of the program were stated as such:

⁷Lustig, op. cit., p. 5.

- a. Reduce motor vehicle casualties.
- b. Make the roads safe for all drivers and pedestrians.
- c. Bring greater public awareness of the hazards of holiday driving.
- d. Reduce the incidence of drunken driving to an absolute minimum.⁸

Each check-point was to be conspicuously manned by a team of four uniformed patrolmen composed of members of the Tactical Patrol Force and the Motorcycle Districts. Each officer wore a luminous safety belt and was equipped with a serviceable flashlight. A radio motor patrol car with the turret light operating at all times was assigned to each team for use as a pursuit vehicle. Two tours were worked daily; one from 3 P.M. to 11 P.M., the other from 11 P.M. to 7 A.M. Particular attention was to be given to vehicles:

- a. Operating in a reckless, erratic and dangerous manner.
- b. With observable equipment defects.
- c. With damage indicative of possible involvement in hit and run cases.
- d. To which police attention is directed by suspicious or unusual circumstances.
- e. Operated in a manner which indicates the driver may be intoxicated.⁹

Operational plans did not call for roadblocks or

⁸City of New York, Police Department, "Chief Inspector's Memorandum No.1719, s.1962," December 11, 1962, p. 1.

⁹Ibid.

the stopping of every vehicle. Traffic in New York City would not permit this and such a device would not be justified. Rather it was specified that drivers would be checked when it appeared they were not in control of their vehicles or when their reflexes appeared slow. Courtesy and tact in stopping vehicles was emphasized, and each driver not arrested was given a pamphlet explaining the purpose of the checks. It was stressed that the main target of the campaign was the drinking driver, to force him off the road if for no other reason than to save his own life.¹⁰ Study after study had shown that in fatal automobile accidents when the driver was killed, fifty percent were defined as "legally drunk" at the time.¹¹

The statistical results of the 1962 holiday operation, as cited in Table 4, indicated that 30% less people had been killed than in the same 1961 period. In essence then, the prime objective of the program appeared to have been attained--the reduction of traffic deaths during the holiday season. Consequently, this technique was deemed a success.

In 1963 the Automobile Safety Check Program was introduced at an earlier date and covered the holiday

¹⁰McManus, George P., op. cit., p. 25.

¹¹The New York Times, January 28, 1965, p. 35.

TABLE 4

ACCIDENT STATISTICS, DECEMBER 14-JANUARY 2, 1961 AND 1962^a

Year	Personal Injury Accidents	Number Killed	Injured
1961	2,077	62	3,033
1962	2,245 (+8%)	43 (-30%)	3,306 (+9%)

^a Donnelly, James P., "Survey of Motor Vehicle Accident Statistics," A memorandum from the Commanding Officer, Accident Records Bureau, to the Commanding Officer, Planning Bureau, p. 2.

season from November 22, 1963, to January 5, 1964. During this time a 20% reduction in the number killed was registered compared to the previous year.¹² Though the results in succeeding years have not always compared as favorably with these first two years, the Automobile Safety Check Program has become a permanent part of the Department's patrol operations. It should be noted also that this operation no longer involves members of the Tactical Patrol Force, and has become the province of the Motorcycle and Mounted Districts.¹³ Members of the Force have thus been freed to resume normal patrol operations at a time of year when a noticeable upswing in holiday crime is usually recorded.

¹² Kowsky, Frederick P., "Motor Vehicle Safety Check Activity," A report from the Commanding Officer, Motorcycle District, to the Commanding Officer, Safety Division, on the safety check results, January 8, 1964, p. 1.

¹³ City of New York, Police Department, "Chief Inspector's Memorandum No. 11069, s. 1966," December 13, 1966, p. 1.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES AND THE POLICING OF SPECIAL EVENTS

The primary reason for the establishment of the Tactical Patrol Force as a permanent patrol operation in the New York City Police Department was its excellent record of enforcement activity. However, another, and in recent times equally significant reason was that it provided the Department with a highly trained and mobile striking force which can be quickly dispatched to cope with emergencies, unusual situations, and major disorders. The T.P.F. then constitutes the main striking unit of the department. The military services have long adhered to the principle of a reserve force standing at the ready and waiting for the immediate ordering of its numbers when and where required. Considering the quasi-military nature of large municipal police agencies, their growing adaption to the strike force concept is easily understood.

The Rapid Mobilization Plan

In an article entitled "Instant Manpower," former Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy wrote:

Experience proves that a few policemen, properly directed and deployed during the first few minutes at the scene of an emergency can exert an important influence on the success of a police operation. Sometimes, however, a threatening situation or emergency, a disaster, perhaps, requires manpower and equipment beyond the immediate capability of a precinct or area command.

To speed such required police strength to the stress scene, we use a series of code signals, each of which causes a predetermined number of men, mobile and specialized equipment to respond at once.¹

The technique referred to above is called the Rapid Mobilization Plan. Its dual purposes are to redeploy manpower in sufficient strength to meet a critical police need and to effect the buildup in a rapid yet orderly manner and without stripping bordering precincts and outlying areas of essential police service.²

Essentially the Rapid Mobilization Plan is a code-signal system, the individual signals running from a "10-41" to a "10-48." All of these signals are generally applicable to the normal complement of patrol personnel and to a lesser extent members of the various specialized divisions, that is, the Detective, Safety and Youth Aid Divisions, and plainclothes members on duty in department vehicles in a precinct or division in which the emergency occurs. The signals "10-41" through "10-48" are not specifically applicable to the Tactical Patrol Force since a distinct code

¹Murphy, Michael J., "Instant Manpower," The Police Yearbook 1963, p. 60.

²Ibid.

signal "10-70" has been designated for the response of this unit. But here again, as we have seen in Chapter IV, the Force is complementary to, and dependent upon, a basic and much larger system upon which it has been superimposed. To properly appreciate the role of the Force in its response to emergencies, one must also have a comprehension of the over-all Plan. For this reason, a cursory examination will be made of signals "10-41" to "10-48." In a section following code signal "10-70" will be examined in greater detail.

The first and foundational code-signal "10-41" calls for the response of three sergeants and fifteen patrolmen, and may be activated by an officer of the rank of sergeant or higher at the scene. If more personnel are required then code-signal "10-42" would be issued, requiring the response of three more sergeants and an additional fifteen patrolmen. A lieutenant or above must request this signal. Each successive signal stipulates additional personnel and the authority to transmit proceeds from increasingly higher ranks, thus guarding against the indiscriminate re-deployment of manpower on patrol. For example, the authority to transmit code-signal "10-47" calling for eight sergeants and forty patrolmen derives from the rank of Deputy Inspector or above, or, if not available, a superior officer on duty at the Operations Bureau upon request by a captain at the

scene.³ The various signals comprising the Rapid Mobilization Plan make ample provision for the re-deployment of a predetermined cumulative number of men, and mobile and specialized equipment to the scene of an emergency.

From time to time the Department is confronted with situations in which personnel is promptly required at an emergency, but the response patterns of code-signals "10-41" to "10-47" are inadequate. Supplementary code-signal "10-48" is then of direct relevance. Upon the transmission of this signal, one sergeant and five patrolmen in designated precincts mobilize and respond in the sergeant's four door sedan to a given location. Other personnel and equipment respond as directed. The following are examples of situations in which code-signal "10-48" may be transmitted:

- a. When two or more incidents occur simultaneously, and the predetermined response pattern would require the same personnel to respond to both incidents.
- b. When the emergency situation covers two or more precincts and the predetermined response pattern may require response to one precinct by personnel from adjoining precincts also involved in the incident.
- c. If personnel in excess of those provided by signals "10-41" to "10-47" is required.
- d. If it is necessary to assemble a detail to police an event that cannot be handled on a local basis and there is insufficient time to order the detail in the usual manner.⁴

³Much of this information was taken from the following source: City of New York, Police Department, Rules and Procedures, Chapter 16, "Public Assemblages and Emergencies," 1968.

⁴Ibid.

Furthermore, code signals do not exhaust the potential for calling up and re-deploying manpower. If the Operations Bureau has to provide manpower from outside the borough in which the incident occurred, it considers all available personnel, including those at the Police Academy, in-service training sessions, the firing range, or at other locations where large numbers of members of the force may assemble while on or off duty.⁵ The Department may also extend normal tours of duty, order the immediate reporting of off-duty members to their commands, and cancel scheduled days off.

In order to permit the prompt response of personnel and equipment to the emergency scene, predetermined emergency response routes have been established which facilitate approach to within a short distance of an emergency in any section of the city. These routes are the main inter-connecting arteries of the city's boroughs and can be quickly cleared of congestion for the free movement of emergency vehicles. It is the responsibility of all members of the force, but particularly those in radio equipped department vehicles, to have an operational familiarization with these predetermined routes. Upon receiving a code-signal, radio car crews alert foot and other patrol forces along or near the predetermined route to police it while the re-deployed forces are in transit. In addition, the

⁵Murphy, Michael J., op. cit., p. 62.

superior officer in charge at the scene designates a connecting route between the emergency route and the exact location of the incident.⁶

Code-Signal "10-70"

On January 11, 1962, code-signal "10-70" was established to effect the rapid mobilization and response by the Tactical Patrol Force in emergencies. Between the hours of 6 P.M. to 2 A.M. or at such other times that the Force may be performing a tour of duty, a member of the force above the rank of Captain or the superior officer on duty at the Operations Bureau is authorized to order the transmission of this signal. Code-signal "10-70" is supplementary to existing signals for the rapid mobilization of personnel and equipment of the force in general, that is, signals "10-41" to "10-47" and "10-48." It will bring to the emergency scene a minimum of forty patrolmen and a proportionate number of superior officers including a captain. More men may be sent if requested by the superior officer directing the transmission of the "10-70."⁷

The following are typical conditions under which the Tactical Patrol Force might be requested:

⁶Rules and Procedures, op. cit.

⁷City of New York, Police Department, Standard Operating Procedure No. 3, January 11, 1962, p. 1.

- a. To augment the force previously mobilized at an emergency scene.
- b. To replace personnel previously mobilized at an emergency scene so that they may be returned to normal patrol duties.
- c. To augment patrol at the conclusion of an emergency, pending the assignment of routine details.
- d. To provide a force in reserve at or in the vicinity of an actual or anticipated emergency.⁸

In conjunction with code-signal "10-70" and as an alternate means of refining still further the Rapid Mobilization Plan, a scheme utilizing T.P.F. radio motor patrol autos was established on November 14, 1966. Twelve vehicles from six field elements respond to a specified location with personnel and are used as directed by the commanding officer at the scene. One of the responding autos contains a lieutenant and four patrolmen, three contain one sergeant and four patrolmen, and the remaining eight contain five patrolmen. The Auto Response Force when completed consists of one lieutenant, three sergeants, and fifty-six patrolmen. The Tactical Patrol Force captain covering the area of occurrence also responds and exercises control of the responding force.⁹

On each tour twelve vehicles are designated on roll calls as units of the Auto Response Force by the use of

⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

⁹ City of New York, Police Department, Tactical Patrol Force Order No.40, November 14, 1966, p. 1.

the initials "ARF." Four vehicles are used by superiors and eight for regular sector patrol. Each car is equipped with a portable radio in proper operating condition, to be used for station house contact in the event of a mobilization. Patrolmen assigned to radio motor patrol are cognizant of their inclusion in the support group and of the accompanying responsibility of constant radio monitoring and immediate response.¹⁰

Should an emergency develop which requires the dispatch of Tactical Patrol Force personnel, a designated superior officer in the Operations Unit directs the manner of mobilization and response, either by bus with accompanying autos, or by autos only. Code-signal "10-70" has thus been modified by division into two phases: phase 1--signal "10-70" cars, and phase 2--signal "10-70" bus. Either may be called; there is no predetermined order. These transmissions, while immediately applicable only to previously designated vehicles, will also serve to alert all members on patrol to the possibility of other mobilizations.

Members not designated to respond effect the widest dissemination of the fact that an initial mobilization has been activated. This procedure is measurably facilitated by the use of portable radios. At this point, patrolmen

¹⁰Ibid.

remain on constant alert for further possible mobilization.¹¹

Presently, four buses are assigned to the Force, and on each tour these vehicles are respectively situated in the four principle operating areas of the unit, which are, Manhattan South, Manhattan North, the Bronx, and Brooklyn. When circumstances warrant, additional buses belonging to the New York City Transit Authority are temporarily assigned. These arrangements are made through the Operations Bureau.

The Policing of Special Events

During catastrophies, disorders, and emergencies, the quick and flexible positioning of the Force's personnel and equipment becomes of strategic importance. Since its inception, and on numerous occasions, this unit has been rushed to the scenes of floods, airplane crashes, fires, and explosions. On November 9, 1965, when a massive power failure plunged New York City into darkness and confusion, the T.P.F.---along with other police units---was deployed to critical areas of the city to help prevent the commission of crime during almost total darkness and to direct congested vehicular traffic. And during the Transit Strike of January, 1966, the Force played a substantial role in averting disaster and protecting the public.

¹¹ Ibid.

In addition to providing details for unusual occurrences and demonstrations, a specific function of the Tactical Patrol Force concerns the policing of visits by world luminaries. The fashion in which the Force fulfills this objective relates dynamically to its characteristic features of mobility and group coordination. The following excerpt was taken from an article entitled "Fundamental Presidential & V.I.P. Security:"

Strategically located striking forces, capable of moving swiftly and in teamwork fashion to a natural or physical hazard, exclusionary or limited area or any other vulnerable point should be included in security plans. This group, which should be prepared to take decisive action, would augment the forces already deployed in the security sectors. A second reserve force to be alerted as soon as the first has been committed should also be available.¹²

To demonstrate the role played by the Tactical Patrol Force in the areas of these special types of events, examples will be taken from the following three sources:

1. Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September-October, 1960.
2. Visit of Pope Paul VI, October 4, 1965.
3. Visit of President Lyndon B. Johnson, October 12-13, 1966.

Like London and Paris, New York is a world capital. The placement of the United Nations adds to this city's

¹² City of New York, Police Department. "Fundamental Presidential & V.I.P. Security," Spring 3100, Vol. 37, No. 10, November, 1966, p. 21.

stature as a meeting ground for international leaders. On September 20, 1960, the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations opened. Among participating members were such men as Chairman Krushchev, Prime Minister McMillan of Great Britain, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Premier Castro of Cuba, Minister of State Kadar of Hungary, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, their entourages, and a host of others representing various national and international leaderships. Each of these names was clearly associated with both allied, but in many cases also, diametrically opposed major political philosophies. And because New York is "the melting pot," many of these leaders had audiences ranging from rabid followers to implacable adversaries. Police executives anticipated that the conflict of political philosophies would surface and the groups would demonstrate. Discord might even lead to assassination attempts.

Basically, members of the Department were detailed to one of the following three assignments:

1. The mobile security escort tailored to fit each controversial head of state in accordance with the hazard problem expected. The motorcades assigned to the Communist-bloc officials, consequently received a commensurate degree of security in terms of ample manpower, vehicles, and equipment.
2. Traffic control and direction. The responsibility here focused on the expeditious and safe movement of motorcades throughout the city. The Safety Division was charged with designating

the Primary Route and also a Secondary Route, as an alternate when conditions made the Primary route inadvisable for use. Careful plans were made for a minimum disruption of traffic with the least inconvenience to the public. Constant radio contact insured coordination among vehicular units.

3. The security force stationed about the environs of the United Nations Headquarters and the major "hot spots" where the most controversial delegates would reside. Separate antagonistic pickets were kept a good distance apart, barriers were erected cleared from the streets, and placards banned which could be turned into weapons. Uniformed officers kept vigil from vantage points such as roofs, stairways and areaways, while detectives proficient in particular foreign languages intermingled among the crowd.

A "Mobile Reserve Force" was organized and divided into three units: "A," "B," and "C." The nucleus of this Mobile Reserve Force consisted of members of the T.P.F. who were augmented by close to five hundred men from other commands. A fourth unit, "D," was immediately established when Premier Castro and his entourage suddenly departed from the Hotel Shelburne in mid-Manhattan and moved into the Hotel Theresa at 125th Street and 7th Avenue, each location being approximately five miles apart. All units were kept on nearby reserve status with easy access to the most likely trouble spots. Whenever a threatening situation or a demonstration indicated possibilities of getting beyond the control of detailed fixed police coverage, one or more units of the Mobile Reserve Force would be dispatched to the scene, assemble in formation about a block away, and with skillful

tactical maneuvers help reestablish control of the crowd.

In "Instant Manpower," Michael J. Murphy wrote:

That the Mobile Reserve Force was looked upon as a Tactical support to shore up police strength at threatening situations is well attested to by the number of calls requesting its use. Before the last controversial foreign dignitary would return to his country, Units "A," "B," "C," and "D," of the Mobile Reserve would engage in 173 runs, with a total of 7,605 patrolmen and 799 superior officers responding.

The rapid responses of the mobile reserves reduced the need to resort to force or to maintain coverage of the key spots with still larger residence details.

It marked a growing trend against committing all available manpower to static locations, but indicated the advantage of deploying manpower fluidly. The Mobile Reserve Force maximized police line power and spelled the difference between what could have happened but did not.¹³

Another major event which amply demonstrated the precise role of the Tactical Patrol Force in the policing of special events was the visit of Pope Paul VI to New York City on October 4, 1965. The entire New York City Police Department was committed to the objective of making the Pope's visit as pleasant and as safe as could be assured in view of the millions of men, women, and children, who would, in many cases, wait for hours on the streets of the city for a glimpse of His Holiness. The element of well executed crowd control would be of high significance as well as the facilitation of the Papal motorcade through the boroughs of Queens, Manhattan, and

¹³ Murphy, Michael J., op. cit., p. 68.

the Bronx.

The following are the highlights of Pope Paul's visit taken from the radio log of the Communications Bureau, station KBA 394, on city-wide frequency:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Message</u>
9:34 A.M.	Official Party landed at Kennedy Airport
11:42	Papal motorcade has arrived at St. Patrick's Cathedral
12:38 P.M.	Papal motorcade now at Waldorf-Astoria
3:13	Papal motorcade is now at the United Nations
6:21	Papal motorcade is now at Holy Family Church
6:43	Papal motorcade has reached Cardinal's residence
8:35	Papal motorcade at Yankee Stadium
10:25	Papal motorcade now at the World's Fair
10:30	Papal motorcade has arrived at the Vatican Pavilion
11:31	Pope Paul embarked from Kennedy Airport--- Papal plane airborne. ¹⁴

On Monday, October 4th, the Tactical Patrol Force was divided into eight units and were assigned at 8:00 A.M. to locations indicated in Table 5 as mobile reserves. Authorized reassignments of the reserve units are indicated in Table 6.

Besides the three buses that were regularly assigned to the Force at this time, they had the use of an additional

¹⁴ City of New York, Police Department, Planning Bureau. Police Management Review, May, 1966, "Police Arrangements for the Visit of His Holiness, Pope Paul, VI, to the City of New York, October 4, 1965," (part two), pp. 22-23.

TABLE 5

TACTICAL PATROL FORCE MOBILE RESERVES^a

Unit	Location	D.I.	Capt.	Lt.	Sgt.	Ptl.	Pw.	Bus
1	J.F.K. Airport Intern'l Bldg.	1	-	1	3	40	-	1362
2	J.F.K. Airport Intern'l Bldg.	-	1	-	3	40	-	1361
3	Queens Side of Queensboro Br.	1	-	1	2	40	-	Dept. of Traffic
4	72 St. and 3 Av.	-	1	-	3	40	-	1359
5	126 St. and 3 Av.	-	-	1	3	40	-	1397
6	110 St. and	-	-	1	2	40	2	-
7	57 St. and 7 Av.	-	1	-	2	40	2	-
8	48 St. and Park Av.	-	1	1	3	40	2	-
TOTALS		2	4	5	21	320	6	5

^aThis table taken from the following source: City of New York, Police Department, Planning Bureau. Police Management Review, June, 1966, "Police Arrangements for the Visit of His Holiness, Pope Paul, VI, to the City of New York, October 4, 1965," (part three), p. 14.

TABLE 6

RESERVES REASSIGNMENTS^a

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Reassignment</u>	<u>Reporting Time-P.M.</u>	<u>Vehicle</u>
4	161 St. & Gr. Con- course	6:00	Bus 1359
5	138 St. & Gr. Con- course	6:00	Bus 1397
6	138 St. & Willis Av.	6:00	2 PW
3	161 St. & River Ave.	8:20	2 PW
7	161 St. & River Av.	8:20	2 PW
8	157 St. & River Av.	8:20	2 PW

^aThis table taken from the following source: City of New York, Police Department, Planning Bureau. Police Management Review, June, 1966, "Police Arrangements for the Visit of His Holiness, Pope Paul, VI, to the City of New York, October 4, 1965," (part three), p. 14.

bus on loan from the Department of Traffic, and six patrol-wagons were used to transport the reserves; a motorcycle escort was provided for each reserve unit, in case of need. Two buses filled with reserves accompanied the motorcade: the first preceded the motorcade by about ten minutes to be available as last minute additions for sector personnel; the second bus was assigned to a position in the motorcade to the rear of the official car.¹⁵

Here again the fluid deployment of a mobile force was utilized. In addition to the manpower allocations committed to fixed positions, the immediate availability of a reserve force to reenforce points of weakness was of obvious strategic advantage.

Finally, we come to the role of the Tactical Patrol Force as it relates to Presidential visits, and in this instance, the visit of President Lyndon B. Johnson to New York City on October 12-13, 1966. The personal security of the President of the United States is a police task of supreme importance. One need only recall the assassination of President John F. Kennedy to realize the police agency's degree of vital responsibility, and the always present threats of failure. Four of the thirty-five men who have served as Presidents of the United States have been assassinated and

¹⁵City of New York, Police Department, Planning Bureau. Police Management Review, June, 1966, "Police Arrangements for the Visit of His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, to the City of New York, October 4, 1965," (part three), p. 15.

many more attempts have been made. Since 1865, there have been attempts on the lives of one President out of every three.¹⁶

Anthony V. Bouza, in an article entitled "Security for Dignitaries" wrote:

In connection with the President's safety it is significant to note that, although the primary responsibility rests with the Secret Service, the fact remains that personnel from that agency comprised less than 5 per cent of the security force assigned to the fateful November, 1963, visit of President Kennedy to Dallas. Obviously, even where the President is concerned, local law enforcement agencies bear heavy share of the responsibility for security.¹⁷

On October 12, 1966, the Force was divided and used in two-fold fashion:¹⁸

1. As a static manpower assignment detailed to police routes traveled by the Presidential motorcade.
2. As a fluid mobile reserve force that would accompany the Presidential motorcade during its itinerary.

Along with other units of the Department, three elements of the T.P.F. were assigned to police specific sections of the route used by the motorcade. The tour of duty was from 2 P.M. to 10 P.M. Because of the confidential

¹⁶Bouza, Anthony V., "Security for Dignitaries," City of New York, Police Department, Planning Bureau, Police Management Review, Spring, 1967, p. 12.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸City of New York, Police Department, "Chief Inspector's Memorandum No.99, s.1966," October 11, 1966, p. 5.

nature of Chief Inspector's Memo 99, in which assignments of personnel and equipment were made for President Johnson's visit, this writer will only indicate that the Tactical Patrol Force's fixed coverage was concerned with three motorcade route sections. The following assignment was applicable to each of these areas:

1 Captain
1 Lieutenant & 1 bus
2 Sergeants
40 Patrolmen

In total, there was a deployment of 3 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 6 Sergeants, 120 Patrolmen, and 3 buses. It should be noted also, that once the motorcade had passed the assigned points, these groups were quickly reassigned in the following manner:

1. As a mobile force kept on a stand-by reserve basis in the event that any demonstrations, disturbances, or emergency situations developed at any time or in any location relative to the President's visit.
2. To another point where added manpower might be required.
e.g., Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

The balance of the T.P.F. were assigned as indicated by the following excerpt:

Commanding Officer, Tactical Patrol Force shall establish a mobile reserve which will travel in close proximity to the Presidential motorcade, in order to insure maximum security along the route and those points at which the official party will stop.¹⁹

¹⁹Ibid., p. 6.

CHAPTER VII

THE AREAS OF CIVIL DISORDERS AND RIOT CONTROL

In the forefront of today's current events, civil disorders have become a topic of vital significance. Each of these disturbances, in varying degrees, are exercises in violence. They are powerful forces which will affect the future of American society for many years to come. Undoubtedly no one segment of our country's population realizes this more profoundly than those men and women engaged in law enforcement activities. Underscoring this realization have been such electrifying incidents as the Watts and Detroit riots. The Watts riots in Los Angeles in 1965 took 34 lives, injured 1,032, brought 3,952 arrests and caused property damage estimated above 40 million dollars.¹ The Detroit riots in 1967 took 39 lives, injured approximately 2,000 persons, brought 4,000 arrests and caused property damage estimated upwards of 250 million dollars.²

Since the subject of this thesis is the Tactical Patrol Force of the New York City Police Department, and since a high proportion of both the general and specific

¹"Looting, Burning---Now Guerrilla War," U.S. News & World Report, August 7, 1967, p. 24.

²Ibid.

functions of this unit pertain to crowd and riot control, and serious disturbances, it is only logical that this chapter be included as an appropriate part of this paper. The Areas of Civil Disorders and Riot Control will explore such interrelated subjects as basic causes, the enforcement dilemma, community relations, the police responsibility, a riot's distinctive pattern of origin and development, and the role of the Tactical Patrol Force in riot control.

The Basic Causes

On July 27, 1967, an 11-member commission, headed by Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, was appointed by President Johnson to find the causes of urban riots and recommend solutions. This action was taken against a 1967 summer background which brought racial disorders to American cities, and with them shock, fear, and bewilderment to the nation. The commission was directed to answer three basic questions:

- a) What happened?
- b) Why did it happen?
- c) What can be done to prevent it from happening again?³

The factors involved in answering the question "Why did it happen?" are complex and interacting. The fact that a mood of violence had been created among many urban Negroes was amply demonstrated. The consequences of one disorder, generating new grievances and new demands, became the causes

³Text of Summary of Report by National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, New York Times, March 1, 1968, p. 20.

of the next. But despite the complexities of one city's conditions as compared to another, certain fundamental features usually seemed to surface. And of these, the most basic cause was the racial attitude and behavior of white Americans toward black Americans. The Commission found white racism to be the leading causative factor of the country's civil disorders. It went on to point out the bitter fruits of white racial attitudes:

- a) Pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education and housing have resulted in the continuing exclusion of great numbers of Negroes from the benefits of economic progress.
- b) Black in-migration and white exodus have produced the massive and growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major cities, creating a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs.
- c) In the black ghettos segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure. Crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitterness and resentment against society in general and white society in particular are the result.⁴

And yet, as the Advisory Commission stressed, the above facts alone could not have caused the disorders. Recently, several other powerful ingredients have begun to catalyze the mixture:

- a) Frustrated hopes---the residue of unfulfilled expectations aroused by judicial and legislative victories of the civil rights movement.

⁴Ibid.

- b) A climate that tends to approve and encourage violence as a form of protest, created by white terrorism against non-violent protest.
- c) The police are not merely a "spark" factor. To some Negroes police have come to symbolize white power, white racism and white repression. And the fact is that many police do reflect and express these white attitudes. The atmosphere of hostility and cynicism is reinforced by a widespread belief among Negroes in the existence of police brutality and in a "double standard" of justice and protection--- one for Negroes and one for whites.⁵

Most studies delving into the causes of riots make repeated references to the black ghettos. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society states:

However, riots are every bit as complicated as any other form of crime, and another way of looking at them is as direct and deliberate attacks on ghetto conditions. This is what all the studies, particularly those of the Watts riots by the McCone Commission, an independent non-political body; by the attorney general of California; and by members of the faculty of the University of California at Los Angeles, show.⁶

For the purposes of this paper however, it is important to note the inclusion of the police agency as a cause of riots, and not merely from the standpoint of being a triggering or "spark" factor. In fact, the National Advisory Commission further identified 12 deeply held grievances of Negro communities and ranked them into three

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ A report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 37.

levels of relative intensity. Though these complaints did vary from city to city, the number one grievance in the first level of intensity was police practices. What is even more remarkable is that this complaint was listed ahead of such areas as unemployment and underemployment, and inadequate housing.⁷

The Enforcement Dilemma

The Tactical Patrol Force, probably more than any other unit in the Department, finds itself in a precarious and oftentimes paradoxical position. The bulk of its operations are centered in ghetto areas of the city where, because of demands for increased protection, its services are required. One of the National Advisory Commission's further recommendations was to provide more adequate police protection to ghetto residents to eliminate their high sense of insecurity, and the belief of many Negro citizens in the existence of a dual standard of law enforcement. Reenforcing the demands generated by the Negro community for increased police services have been the results of victimization studies which indicate that a high percentage of the crimes committed against Negroes are perpetrated by other Negroes.⁸

Inherent enforcement difficulties arise from the twofold function of the T.P.F. to provide patrol services

⁷New York Times, op. cit., p. 20.

⁸The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

on the one hand and to properly enforce the law while so doing. Further complicating this situation is the observation that the Force could be called upon to handle a riot one of the causes of which may be a series of aggravating patrol techniques practiced by its own members. This idea has been touched upon:

Tactical mobile units are recent innovations insofar as patrol techniques are concerned. Described variously as Mobile Units, B-Squads, M-Squads or Task Forces, their value is derived from assignment flexibility, thus allowing them to respond on a generally prearranged basis to certain types of incidents or to respond for the purpose of permeating the same with law enforcement officers. The objective is obviously unabashed crime suppression. Practically, the units have a very useful and valuable purpose, for there obviously are situations which justify such action. However, implementation of "get touch" policies, or "dragnet" operations insofar as certain other offenses are concerned can quite easily lead to police behavior, the appropriateness and legality of which are at least, suspect and questionable. A very thin line separates the two, so considerable care should be taken in their utilization.⁹

The T.P.F. patrolman then, in dealing with racial tensions, is much like the "man on a tight rope." His singularly critical position cannot be overemphasized. An improperly performed tactic, or the continuing use of disconcerting patrol techniques, could prove to be a root source of civil disorder. That the Force's services are required

⁹ The National Center on Police and Community Relations, School of Police Administration and Public Safety, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, A National Survey of Police and Community Relations. Prepared for The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, January, 1967. (Field Surveys V), p. 349.

in ghetto neighborhoods remains unquestioned. However, the point of discussion here pivots on how patrol services are performed. As we have already seen, one field practice employed to a substantial degree by the T.P.F. is the spot-checking of vehicles by officers in the normal course of patrol. This practice is an important part of the Force's operations and has produced successful results in arrest and summons activity over the years. However, in many cities, the spot-checking of vehicles as part of field interrogations, particularly when they are performed by a complement of "outside" officers assigned on a temporary basis to an area, are a major source of friction between the police and minority groups. Obviously, vehicle spot-checking is a necessary police practice but considering the community's feelings on the matter it must be exercised with the highest degree of discretion and good intent. It should be utilized as a means of detecting the more serious crimes of stolen vehicles, intoxicated drivers, and forged licenses; not as a practice tending toward a form of harassment, however unintentional, or as a device directed toward minor summonsable offenses where more would stand to be gained in terms of good human relations by courteous words of warning and constructive advice to correct an existing petty violation, rather than the issuing of a traffic ticket.

Community Relations

The best opportunity for the police to escape serious criticism lies in the field of preventive work in race relations. This then, more than any other single factor, is a facet of the highest importance in the police-minority group relationship. Due to their constant contact with all neighborhoods of a city the police are in an ideal position to maintain constant vigilance over the troubled areas, and to assume the responsibility for making known basic causes of unrest to agencies or groups that can eliminate them. All too often, the police, being the closest and most visible representatives of government, are the first to be confronted by the outward manifestations of historical and social changes. That the New York City Police Department is cognitive of this rationale was apparent when it issued Temporary Operating Procedure No.232 which read in part:

It is of the utmost importance that this department on a headquarters level, be informed of all matters involving opposing groups or gangs, not only when incidents occur, but also when information of incipient trouble is obtained or when a prevailing situation indicates there is a possibility of it developing into a serious problem.¹⁰

This procedure stated further:

¹⁰ City of New York, Police Department, Temporary Operating Procedure No.232, May 26, 1967.

All members of the force must be mindful of the urgent necessity to recognize and promptly report incidents which are indicative of, or present a potential for any provocation or disruption within the community. Appropriate action taken at the inception of such an incident is a major factor in the prevention of a large scale disorder.¹¹

Good police community relations are indeed a basic requisite in the prevention of civil disorders. More specifically, the formal purposes of these programs are:

1. To foster and improve communication, and---hopefully ---mutual and understanding in the relationship of the police and the total community.
2. To promote interprofessional (teamwork) approaches to the solution of community problems.
3. To enhance cooperation in the relationship of police with prosecution, the courts and corrections.
4. To assist police and other community leaders in an understanding of the nature and causes of complex problems in people-to-people relations, thereby to encourage intelligent and prudent handling of these problems.
5. To further the professional development of law enforcement personnel, with particular regard to the implications of professionalism in equal protection of the law for all persons, and respect for their rights as persons.
6. To lend stress to the principle that the administration of criminal justice, in all its ramifications, is a total community responsibility.¹²

Though the establishment of formal community relations programs and the designation of a particular unit or groups

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Radelet, Louis A., "Police Community Programs: Nature and Purpose," The Police Chief, March, 1965, p. 38.

of units strategically situated on a "need for service" basis are to be encouraged, there occasionally accrues a side disadvantage. Perhaps, this might best be explained by emphasizing, as has been done above, that the success of community relations programs relies heavily on the total involvement of each and every member of the police agency, but most certainly those uniformed officers who in the course of their daily patrol functions are in regular contact with the members of the community. This was spoken of by former Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy:

Each and every man on patrol is a public relations man---not only for the Police Department of New York, but for all police. Every contact that you make with the people of New York City, whether on or off duty, leaves an impression---good or bad---on the person contacted. It is these every day contacts that are instrumental in developing an attitude of respect and confidence in police, and a corresponding respect for law and order. It has been said in the past that the attitude of the public toward the police is simply a reflection of the police attitude toward the public. This shows us the importance of maintaining a proper attitude toward the people whom we serve. The people in our city differ by race, religion, economic status, and in many other ways. We must, as policemen and as citizens, continue to respect and protect the rights of our citizens to be different.¹³

Difficulties arise, for instance, when patrolmen adopt an attitude that since a formal unit has been designated to deal directly with community relations, hence this area

¹³ From the text of former Police Commissioner Murphy's Special Broadcast to Members of the Force on Practical Human Relations, over Channel 31, WNYC-TV, September 11, 1964.

is no longer their personal concern. On a departmental wide basis this type of rationale is self defeating. Carried further, and more directly applicable to the context of this thesis, we take for example, the constant and successful efforts expended by precinct personnel permanently assigned to a given area to foster a feeling of mutual rapport between themselves and the people they serve. Of course, their position is more favorable and more influential than the T.P.F.'s, if for no other reasons than the permanency of their assignments, and their intimate familiarization with the areas' problems. If, when the Tactical Patrol Force is assigned to work in the precinct, the Force's members are discourteous or overly aggressive in their performance of patrol duties, they quickly ruin the good relationship that was so steadfastly and patiently developed by the precinct patrolmen. This writer is not saying in fact that this situation practically exists. But, there certainly is the possibility that it could exist. Conversely, the best public relations efforts of the Tactical Patrol Force would be to little avail if in turn the groundwork for a proper police-community relationship has not been fostered by precinct members, or if in their dealings with the community they are not held in high regard. Obviously, the answer does lie in the total cooperative participation of all department officers, one with the other, and all together with the community they serve.

In the address above, Mr. Murphy went on further to say:

We are the key figures in preventing community discord. As such, we must be prepared to use positive means as well as the traditional negative means. By positive means, I refer to the exercise of courtesy, tact, sympathy, understanding, dignity and a temperate attitude which will not only maintain, but will increase public confidence, support and respect.¹⁴

Only in this manner will the total job be made easier for each and every man and will the Department, in total, enjoy the esteem of the community.

The Police Responsibility

Civil disorders will sometimes erupt despite the best efforts of a police agency to promote feelings of community harmony. Sometimes though they occur also as a result of improper police tactics. Whenever a singular incident or an interrelated series of events either pose an immediate threat to social order or actually precipitate major civil disorder, a basic question must be asked: "What are the responsibilities of the police?" One cannot answer this question by merely saying that the police duty is properly discharged by meeting violence with violence during a riot. This type of approach would not be indicative of the understanding essential to the realization of law enforcement's goal: the protection of life and property and the preservation of the public peace. Former Police

¹⁴Ibid.

Commissioner Michael J. Murphy in suggesting an answer to this question clearly expressed the responsibility of the New York City Police Department in the area of civil disorder:

The police position is clear. We are intent on preserving the peace and the rights of all men by every legal means. We will protect the rights of all people to pursue their lives and lawful occupations free from illegal interference. We will take appropriate action under the law when the rights of anyone are obstructed. We have the obligation and the duty to meet illegal action with legal action to the degree necessary to restore and maintain law and order. We will not allow ourselves to be placed in the false position of aggressors. We are prepared to meet our responsibilities and we expect others to remember and recognize theirs. We expect and deserve public cooperation, compliance and understanding. True progress can occur only in an atmosphere of reason, responsibility and mutual understanding.¹⁵

How the above responsibility should be enacted is a problem that must be approached with the highest degree of expertise by the administrative echelon of a police agency. Complex questions must be asked, understood, and answered correctly, regarding, for example, how and in what fashion manpower is to be deployed. To be noted are the dangers of under-response versus over-response. Guidelines applicable to the use of force must be set down, and priorities established concerning the types of arrests to be effected and when the criminal processes are to be invoked. Civic peace must be restored quickly with a continued emphasis on keeping loss of life, as well as property damage, to an

¹⁵City of New York, Police Department, Press Release No. 13, February 23, 1965, p. 6.

absolute minimum. This intricate police responsibility must be shouldered without the police themselves unduly aggravating an already tumultuous situation.

The Origin and Development of a Riot

In approaching a discussion of the policies and procedures to be utilized in restoring order to an urban disturbance, one must necessarily begin with an understanding of how such disturbances start and how they grow into full scale riots. Students of police science are in general agreement that there does not exist such a specific entity as the "typical" riot. Each riot has its own peculiarly identifying earmarks and these are strongly influenced by innumerable complex, unusual, irregular, and unpredictable elements within the social matrix. However, a study of disturbances and riots throughout the United States over recent years indicates a generally distinctive pattern of origin and development. The Honorable Howard R. Leary, Police Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, outlined in broad fashion the sequential development in the transition of an incident from its inception to fruition. These various stages were characterized by the following features:¹⁶

¹⁶ Much of this information was taken from the following source: Summary of remarks by Honorable Howard R. Leary, Police Commissioner, City of New York, before The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Washington, D.C., September 20, 1967.

Stage No. 1---The "dry grass," that is, the area that waits only for a spark to burst into flames of disorder. The "dry grass" that is the locale of almost every disturbance is the ghetto, inhabited by minority groups left behind by the prosperous forward surge enjoyed by the greater part of American society. There exists here a high level of frustration and an increasingly louder tone of anger, and always, a feeling of despair.

Stage No. 2---A spark. Almost anything can spark a flame in a dry grass section, but, in fact, it is usually an incident in which the police are involved - perhaps because police are the agency most in evidence in these areas---and almost always it is either an arrest on a crowded street or the policeman's use of his gun.

Stage No. 3---Rumor. Whatever the spark, the rumor can be counted on to magnify the original incident out of all proportion, to distort it, or to present it in its worst possible light.

Stage No. 4---Agitators appear on the scene ready to promote their own aims, ambitions and programs at the expense of the community they profess to serve, by fanning the fears and hostilities of the persons who have gathered as a result of the initial incident and the rumors. Here, too, is a pattern, for the agitators turn almost inevitably to the youngsters, boys from 12 to 16, who have been attracted to the area of the disturbance. In these young people, the agitator sees the willing cat's-paws to do the work the agitator does not dare to do himself. Primarily what the agitator wants is to work these youngsters into such a state of excitement that the idea of breaking store windows comes into their minds, often produced by hints from the agitator. In any case, it is rarely the agitator who breaks the window. It is almost always the young boy.

Stage No. 5---Windows begin to be broken. It is at this point that a deterioration can often be

made as to whether what has been a disturbance will grow into a full-scale riot. For this is a most critical point in policework. What is required here is police in sufficient numbers, first to prevent any further breaking of windows, and second to keep watch over broken ones to head off large-scale looting.

Police Commissioner Leary concluded his sequential analysis by stating:

It may take days; it usually takes the better part of a week. Night after night, agitators are back, trying to whip up the enthusiasm of the youngsters to break new windows wherever the police aren't, trying to find some weak point in the police efforts to protect "the glass." After three or four or five nights of failure to break through, several things happen. One, of course, is that the game loses its zest for the young people. Another is simple exhaustion on the part of the agitators. But from our standpoint, the most important is the fact that the decent, orderly, reasonable forces within the community have had time to work. Those responsible forces within the community that are so often ignored by our mass media today come to the fore quietly. And good sense is given a chance to argue against destruction and disorder.¹⁷

The Role of the Tactical Patrol Force in Riot Control

The recent civil disturbances that have occurred throughout the country have placed a requirement upon law enforcement agencies to be ready for employment to quell such actions. Rapid effective action by a well-trained, well-armed, and effectively led small group of police, can stop a riot before it can create the destruction and havoc that is characteristic of uncontrolled mob violence.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Decisive action, following clearly defined rules of engagement, is the key to success.¹⁸ In the Task Force Report: The Police, the need for municipal departments to establish special riot control units was further emphasized:

The use of tactical units with relation to disturbances, riots, and crowds in itself need not present any community relations problem. On the contrary, since such units generally receive special training over an extended period of time and have greater experience in handling crowds, it is likely that they will be more effective from the standpoint of the police and more disciplined and fair in protecting the public.¹⁹

Indeed riot control has taken on new dimensions within urban departments. And within the New York City Police Department the role of the T.P.F. is vital and substantial. Each and every member of the Force receives intensive and continuous training. Stress is placed upon a disciplined response to orders, the maintenance of a correct objective attitude at all times and under all conditions, and the need for teamwork of a very high order. Members are versed in individual tactics, as well as unit and multiple-unit tactics. Instructions are always founded on the department's traditional philosophy in preferring the show of force rather than the use of force.

¹⁸ From material distributed by the New York City Police Academy's Advanced and Specialized Training Section, in-service training program on Civil Disorder Control, conducted from January 29 to March 14, 1968.

¹⁹ A report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 191.

When, however, as a last resort force must be effected, it must be within the appropriate dictates of legality and judicious police discretion, restrained, and sensitive. Particular attention is devoted to four of the basic riot control formations, that are, the column, the line, the wedge, and the diagonal. Perhaps a brief explanation of each is in order:

- a.Column---generally is used for approach to the riot area. When coming into view of the rioters for the first time and in approaching them, this formation should always be moving in double time. This fast tempo of march is very impressive, psychologically, to the mob members.
- b.Line --- for use when confronting the mob, to advance against it, for a display of force, or to block off an area. This is the usual formation when the unit is in line confronting the mob but not in action or contact. This is executed at a slow to moderate pace permitting the mob adequate warning and time to withdraw. From this formation can be launched the wedge and the diagonal.
- c.Wedge--- used in clearing streets and splitting the mob.
- d.Diagonal-can be directed to form either "right" or "left." Is assumed from the line or from the wedge. Its principal use is in movement against the mob when it is desired for the entire unit or elements of it to drive the mob members in a given direction, such as down a particular street.²⁰

In Chapter III, The Patrolman, it was indicated that formal training also covers such subjects as

²⁰ Applegate, Rex, Crowd and Riot Control. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1964), pp. 213-215.

orientation and discussion of patrol and disorder problems, bus drill, unarmed defense and use of the baton, and the use of firearms under riot conditions.

Once the Force receives a code-signal calling for its mobilization, it proceeds as quickly as possible to the designated area. Plans are immediately enacted coordinating the T.P.F.'s movements and setting up a continuous communicational dialogue with other involved units of the department. Upon arrival at the scene the situation is appraised taking into consideration the objective to be achieved and how this may best be accomplished. The plan of strategy to be formulated will rely heavily on the quantity and quality of intelligence that has been gathered or is being gathered by police executives. Every shred of information must be reviewed with care, analyzed, and if found relevant, retained for possible future use. Good police strategy will be dictated by the knowledge at hand. Overall strategy should be based on the precept: "Contain, isolate, disperse."²¹

Should the Tactical Patrol Force be utilized, its employment would, in most instances, conform to the description given by George P. McManus in an article entitled "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs:"

²¹McManus, George P., "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs," F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, October, 1962.

Speed and decisiveness, coupled with an impressive show of force, should pervade the tactical situation. The longer the mob is permitted to mill about committing acts of violence, the more difficult it will be to handle. On the other hand, the mob, psychologically a coward, will show little respect for an inadequate adversary. Thus, rapid mobilization of the force is extremely important. The field commander will not use his first tactic until sufficient force is available on the scene to make his dispersal proclamation meaningful. In this connection, the mobilizing force should arrive and form out of sight of the mob. They must organize into tactical formations without delay. (Should they arrive and begin to form in full view of the mob, they might be attacked before they have an opportunity to organize.) Once organized, they should be marched smartly to the critical area. Thus, the first impression given the mob is of a well-organized, adequately equipped, highly disciplined force advancing in formation with a resolute purpose.²²

If contact with a mob should be decided upon, the orthodox riot control formations are normally used. But a police agency should not regard these tactics as the only techniques to employ against disturbances, for in the field of riot control effective results can also be readily achieved by creative innovation and the avoidance of excessive force. For example:

In contrast, New York City, during the summer of 1966, employed a different method. When a mob formed, the police did not try to break it up directly. They blocked off streets but left open an avenue of "escape" for the mob. The mob then generally dissipated. No shots were fired by the police in answer to sporadic sniping and the emphasis was on restraint. Despite a week of disturbances, no major riot resulted, police

²² Ibid.

casualties were light, and the department earned considerable praise from the community.²³

The T.P.F. facilitated the use of this method by keeping the dispersing elements of the dissolving mob under close observation until they were out of the trouble area and no longer posing an active police threat. The use of portable walkie-talkies proved invaluable in relaying the movements and activities of these groups back to the coordinating command base station. Also, reinforcements could be quickly assembled if necessary.

In a high proportion of civil disorder incidents the T.P.F. is divided into operating elements and is kept on a nearby mobile reserve status. The Force is located within easy access to the most likely trouble spots and is ready at all times for immediate dispatch. Its activities are coordinated with police manpower that has been deployed on a line basis to cover the several sectors falling within the trouble area. If at any time any part or parts of these line assignments are threatened with a loss of control, or are actually over-run, a T.P.F. operating element is quickly rushed to the scene. Once arrived, the Force's objectives are to bring events under control and to restore order. When this is accomplished, the area point is returned to a line assignment basis (usually with

²³ Task Force Report: The Police, op. cit., p. 193.

more manpower added). The Force operating element is returned to reserve mobile status and waits for future dispatch.

The Tactical Patrol Force enjoys a decided advantage in approaching major disorders because of its employment of techniques founded upon the principles of teamwork. Once upon the riot scene, the supervisory personnel and patrolmen comprising the many squads that are parts of various elements from different boroughs (Manhattan, Bronx, and Brooklyn) are orientated toward coordinating their activities for maximum effectiveness. They adapt quickly to situations placing a premium on group effort. The Report of the National Commission on Civil Disorders directed some of its remarks toward this type of observation:

Traditional police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance---large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command control system. No matter how well-trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual to deal with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual.²⁴

Police departments have generally approached riot control as an exercise taking place within a limited area of from one to several blocks. But the Watts, Detroit,

²⁴Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), p. 485.

and Newark riots covered areas that, at times, enveloped six square miles in a sporadic, intermoving pattern of window breaking, looting, arson, and sniping. (The largest incident that New York has experienced in recent times was the Harlem Riot of 1964, which began on Saturday, July 18, spilled over into Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant section on July 21, and finally began to taper off in downpours of rain on July 23. The Tactical Patrol Force, Motorcycle Precincts, and Emergency Service Division were employed on a continuous basis. The members of the Department were committed to an emergency chart and worked 12-hour tours.²⁵ Few situations called for the application of the orthodox squad formations.

In dealing with disorders, police have traditionally relied principally on the use of various squad formations and tactics to disperse crowds. These tactics have been of little or no value in some recent disorders marked by roving bands of rioters engaged in window breaking, looting and fire-bombing.

Studies made for the Commission indicate that the police are aware of the deficiency. Many police departments admitted that traditional riot control methods and squad tactics were wholly ineffective or only partially useful in the disorders.²⁶

Consequently, the New York City Police Department, along with many other big-city departments, is preparing counter-

²⁵Refer: Shapiro, Fred C., and Sullivan, James W., Race Riots, New York 1964. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964).

²⁶Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, op. cit., p. 488.

measures to handle riots of wider magnitude employing a more sophisticated range of illegal tactics.

However, the standard squad formations will always retain a foundationally conjunctive role in riot control. When properly used in first contact with a large crowd they will usually prove their worth. After first contact and as segments of the crowd begin dissolving into still smaller fragments that, though broken up in mass, may still pose threats of window breaking and looting, smaller teams of four to five officers can be utilized as follow-up elements to insure minimization of any further damage outside of the initial generating area. Combined also with a de-emphasis on direct force, this type of fluid approach can be highly successful. For example:

Last week, during the riot in Spanish Harlem, the T.P.F. formed a 36-man line and, night sticks held low, advanced silently on scores of rioters gathered on Third Avenue. Without striking a blow, they broke through the mob's ranks and stopped it cold. Then the T.P.F. split into small teams, scattering the mob down side streets. Other T.P.F. men took the "high ground," the rooftops, in search of snipers. "When we have the rooftops and can see all windows on both sides of the street," said the Force's Commander, Deputy Chief Inspector Charles E. McCarthy, "then we can decide what we want to do next."

In three nights of rioting, New York's cops fired only 50 to 75 rounds, and in return had 150 to 200 directed at them. One reason for such economy is that Police Commissioner Howard Leary requires a report on every bullet used by one of his men.²⁷

²⁷Time, August 4, 1967, pp. 16-17.

Guidelines for Action

A realistic program which would in adequate fashion encompass the multitudinous facets of riot control should be at least the subject of a volume. This writer, realizing that this can not be accomplished in the short space of a partial chapter, has touched upon only the surface highlights of riot control. However, in closing, two further aspects should be treated. One is the need for municipal departments to coordinate their operations and to cooperate with federal and state agencies. The past two years have indicated this need for mutual support. The New York City Police Department is receptive in this direction.

The National Guard of the State of New York is organized, trained and equipped to assist civilian police agencies in suppression of civil disorders.

Within the 42nd Infantry Division which is generally orientated towards the metropolitan area, there are two task forces and a division base with the capability of fielding approximately 9,500 men for riot duty. In addition, with the resupply and self equipping capabilities, the National Guard can remain in the vicinity of a disorder on a continuing basis.²⁸

And finally, in summary, the following guidelines for action are offered:

²⁸ From material distributed by the New York City Police Academy's Advanced and Specialized Training Section, in-service training program on Civil Disorder Control, conducted from January 29 to March 14, 1968.

1. Recognize a dangerous situation immediately.
2. Communicate information promptly.
3. Mobilize speedily.
4. Secure adequate equipment.
5. Contain the incident.
6. Isolate the area.
7. Select a specific plan of action.
8. Execute the plan as rapidly as possible, but not before an adequate show of force has been assembled.
9. Announce the prevailing law and direct the crowd to disperse, setting an unequivocal time limit.
10. Execute the plan firmly and determinedly, but fairly and without unnecessary force.
11. Disperse the crowd---prevent reforming.
12. Cover rooftops.
13. Identify leaders and agitators and take into custody as soon as possible.
14. Secure critical premises and installations, e.g., liquor stores, armories, gun dealers, fire alarm boxes, etc.
15. Illuminate, if at night.
16. Reroute traffic.
17. Maintain a mobile reserve.
18. Seek assistance of community leaders to appeal to the crowd.
19. Allow avenues of escape.
20. Never bluff or threaten.
21. Coordinate activities of other agencies and departments.
22. Maintain adequate patrol in area after the incident and for as long as necessary.²⁹

Summary

An examination of the areas of civil disorders and riot control will render an analyst to conclude that the causes of these types of social upheavals run deep and reflect to a significant extent the ills of a defective social environment. Many entities come into play, among which must be included the attitudes of the community, unemployment, poor housing, a failure to keep pace with an

²⁹McManus, George P., op. cit.

increasingly higher standard of living, and limited technological and educational opportunities. The police, for the most part, attempt to perform their functions in an objective manner and deserve the support, cooperation, and understanding of the people they serve.

The responsibility of the Tactical Patrol Force in riot control is founded on an impartial and highly professional approach which is cognizant of underlying social currents and problems. The variety of methods utilized are geared in appropriate fashion to a positive and meaningful community commitment, while also accomplishing a vital objective: the protection of life and property and the preservation of the public peace.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since its establishment on December 2, 1959, the Tactical Patrol Force has been a specialized mobile reserve force of city-wide jurisdiction ready on short notice to provide additional patrol personnel and equipment wherever required. It has continued to remain a highly useful administrative tool in effecting immediate action whenever the Department is confronted with pressure to do something because of either a spiraling pattern of violent street crimes or because a neighborhood is experiencing problems of an unusual nature.

This study considered The Organizational Structure and Growth Pattern of the Tactical Patrol Force in Chapter II. The compactness and relatively simple structural framework of this unit upon first being formed was pointed out by means of an organization chart dated May 1, 1960. At that time its total personnel complement consisted of 144 men and its operations, at any one time, were confined to a maximum of three precincts located in the same Borough. The organizational chart dated October 1, 1967, reflected the manner in which this unit, during the intervening years, had to adapt to the following circumstances:

1. An annually increasing personnel complement.
2. Wider patrol coverage.
3. Enlarged responsibilities.

Its manpower complement had more than tripled and its daily operations covered three Boroughs (Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn), providing patrol coverage in as many as eleven precincts simultaneously.

The Force's establishment and its continued applications indicate a dynamic willingness on the part of the Department's hierarchy to creatively approach the difficult problems of uniformed patrol manpower distribution. Much of the credit for its acceptance must, of course, be credited to the working environment that has been shaped by the T.P.F.'s policies and procedures. The processes of quality selectivity, the emphasis on "esprit de corps" within a young and enthusiastic group, the establishment of performance standards and incentives, the opportunities for individual recognition, the variety of work tasks, the positive leadership characteristics of supervisory personnel, and the flexible control techniques utilized, can not be underestimated in evaluating the success of this unit. Also, its sense of innovation, and the existence of administrative background whereby novel ideas can be quickly appraised and implemented once decided upon, are important contributing attributes.

On January 11, 1962, code-signal "10-70" was established to effect the rapid mobilization and response by the

Tactical Patrol Force. In addition to providing reenforcement to line patrol strength, it now was given the responsibility of providing "instant manpower" at the scenes of emergencies. The fluid, mobile nature of its operations facilitated its adaption to this added role. In conjunction with code-signal "10-70" and as an alternate means of refining still further the Rapid Mobilization Plan, an Auto Response Force utilizing T.P.F. radio motor patrol cars was established on November 14, 1966.

The application of the Force's capabilities in the policing of special events marked a "growing trend against committing all available manpower to static locations, and indicated the advantage of deploying manpower fluidly." The "Mobile Reserve Force" concept maximized police line power.

The primary reason for the establishment of the T.P.F. as a permanent patrol operation in the New York City Police Department was its excellent record of enforcement activity. However, of added significance are the recent civil disturbances that have occurred throughout the country. They have placed a requirement upon law enforcement agencies to be ready for employment to quell such actions. Rapid, effective action by a well-trained, well-armed, and effectively led group of police, can stop a riot before it can develop into the stages of major destruction and havoc. Consequently, the riot control functions of the Force have taken on new dimensions. To date, this unit has proved itself invaluable

in the handling of civil disorder.

Based on extensive analyses of the growth pattern and organizational structure of the Force, its method of operation, and the procedures and philosophies that have become an inherent part of its existence, this writer has arrived at several recommendations. All of them are offered with the thought in mind of not only improving the role of the T.P.F. within the New York City Police Department but of offering to the citizens of this city the benefits of a higher quality police service. These recommendations pertain to personnel complement, additional training, more equipment, a continued emphasis on selective recruitment, office relocation, the use of special operational techniques, and finally, and probably most significantly, a policy decision concerning the extent of the Force's responsibilities. Realization is accorded to the knowledge that future implementation will depend on such factors as validity, the department-wide ranking of over-all recommendations on a priority basis, and financial budgeting.

Recommendations

1. Continue with the enactment of plans to increase the personnel complement of the Tactical Patrol Force to 1,100 men. This recommendation was also made in An Organizational Study of The Police Department, New York City, New York, submitted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., in July of 1967.

The Tactical Patrol Force operation has proven so successful that the department now plans to expand the unit to approximately 1,100 men. It is the intent of the department to increase the strength of the tactical force in order to handle, on a continuing basis, many of the special situations and events that require shifting and redeploying manpower from the patrol precincts. A major concern of patrol commanders is their inability to maintain adequate permanent patrol coverage of their areas because of this condition.

During the summer of 1966, the department concentrated on handling a multitude of actual and potential disorder-producing situations by maintaining a fluid and flexible deployment of resources. The establishment of priorities of this nature, of course, is a necessary and vital part of the administrative processes. The fact that there were no major disorders in New York during this period attests to the success of the program. The department can take real pride in this achievement and should be commended for effectively maintaining law and order under these trying conditions.¹

Already the Department is moving in this direction.

The following is a quote from the New York Times of January 28, 1968:

. . . the Mayor and Commissioner Leary said in a statement that they would undertake the following:

The transfer of 200 more patrolmen from regular duty to the Tactical Patrol Force, used for special drives in high-crime neighborhoods.²

2. The Tactical Patrol Force should receive additional and intensive riot control training on a continuing basis. This training must be applicable to all levels of personnel within the Force and be concentrated on such subjects

¹International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., An Organizational Study of The Police Department, New York City, New York. Washington, D.C.: The Association, July, 1967, p. 390.

²New York Times, January 28, 1968, pp. 1 and 61.

as tactics and procedures, special equipment and weapons.

It must be stressed also, as we have seen in Chapter VII, that recent national disorders have been characterized by roving bands of rioters engaged in window breaking, looting, and fire-bombing, over areas enveloping as much as six square miles. "Traditional riot control methods and squad tactics were wholly ineffective or only partially useful in the disorders." Consequently, it becomes apparent that though the orthodox squad formations will always retain a foundational basis in the area of riot control, a new emphasis must be directed toward the teaching of fluid techniques that will enable teams of officers (4 to 5 men) to operate flexibly and effectively within the riot zone.

3. The nature and importance of the Force's operations warrant an increase in both the number of walkie-talkies and station-wagon type vehicles assigned. These convenient portable radios have become an essential part of the T.P.F.'s patrol techniques, and in the areas of civil disorder and riot control they provide a communicational link necessary for the coordination of separated operations.

The station-wagon type vehicles are particularly suited to transporting teams of officers (1 supervisor and 3 patrolmen) as called for by the Auto Response plans of this unit and the Rapid Mobilization Plans of the Department. In a riot area they can quickly bring sufficient

teams of police to locations immediately requiring their presence.

4. Maintain an emphasis on selectivity in the recruitment processes of new members, and "esprit de corps" within the context of an elite unit. To some degree the maintenance of high entrance standards will pose an immediate problem because of the objective of a substantial increase in the personnel complement. However, quality should not be sacrificed for quantity.

It is also this writer's opinion that the Force should be developed to the point where its members, after having rendered above average performance for a period of from two to three years, would enjoy an advantageous position so far as receptivity to opportunities enabling them to be transferred to the detective division or other special departmental assignments. This would serve as a prominent incentive in tending to raise still higher the performance features of the Force on an over-all basis.

An additional minor suggestion offered here is that each T.P.F. man wear a patch with the words "TACTICAL PATROL FORCE" either on the left sleeve midway between the elbow and shoulder, or on the left arm just below the shoulder seam. Presently, there is no item of wearing apparel, with the small exception of "T.P.F." initials worn on the collar or lapel of the outermost garment, that distinguish the T.P.F. patrolmen from other officers. Members

of the Motorcycle Command have a readily identifiable uniform. So also the members of the Emergency Service and Mounted Divisions. It would seem that the Force itself would supplement whatever practical steps are available to add to the stature of a hard won image.

5. Relocate the offices of the Administrative Staff and the Statistical Analysis and Deployment Section. Since June of 1961, the Tactical Force has housed its operations above the 4th Precinct station house, on the 3rd floor of 16 Erricsson Place in Manhattan. Since that time the personnel complement of the Force has more than tripled and its territorial coverage has expanded from an average of three precincts daily to the present day operational set-up where the placement of squads in three Boroughs is regularly exercised, providing patrol coverage in as many as eleven precincts simultaneously. Also, as has been indicated in recommendation No.1, plans are underway for further increases in personnel complement. All of these factors have resulted in a substantially heavier administrative and clerical work-load. As of this writing, the offices of the Force are overcrowded and not suited to their objectives.

It is recommended that in order to improve the total efficiency of the Tactical Patrol Force, but specifically the Administrative Staff Office and the Statistical Analysis and Deployment Section, the headquarters of the

Force should be relocated. This new site should be central to its daily operations, its offices offering more working area, separate locker and storage facilities, better physical conditions, a continuity of work flow, and a degree of privacy appropriate to personal concentration and group conference.

6. Continue the innovation and utilization of special operational techniques in circumstances indicative of their effective applicability. For example, this would include the implementation of "Operation Decoy" in neighborhoods experiencing a high degree of assaults on women, or the use of officers in plainclothes where the temporary absence of uniformed patrolmen on a specific post would seemingly offer to a potential perpetrator the opportunity for illegal activity that will prompt him to action resulting in his apprehension and arrest.
7. In 1960 the primary functions of this unit involved patrolling high-hazard crime areas between the hours of 6 P.M. and 2 A.M., and serving as a striking reserve force in the event that any part of the line structure had been threatened. In 1962, the Force was assigned the responsibility of providing a rapid mobilization and response force to emergencies, disorders, or threatened violence between the hours of 6 P.M. and 2 A.M., under Standard Operating Procedure No. 3 of January 11, 1962. In recent years its riot control capabilities have assumed a

broader and more vital role within the Department. The Force's present duties encompass the policing of demonstrations, Presidential visits, and the furnishing of patrolmen for Film Detail duties.

Since its inception in 1959, the Force has been a highly successful administrative tool. Perhaps its very attainments serve as a motive in attempting to apply its efforts in a multiplicity of sometimes unrelated and diverse directions. This would obviously be self-defeating and result in an erosion of its characteristically specialized functions.

In view of the above, it is suggested here that a policy decision should be made to determine whether any new duties and responsibilities are to be assigned to this unit. It is the feeling of this writer that the adding of further functions to the jurisdiction of the Tactical Patrol Force, particularly if they do not correlate with the "mobile striking force" concept, will only detract from the objectives for which the Force was initially created and intended.

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